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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

THE
DISPLACEMENT
OF POPULATION
IN EUROPE

by

Eugene M. KULISCHER

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PREFATORY NOTE

The resettlement of populations scattered by war and by enemy occupation is one of the problems with which Europe will be most urgently faced when the occupied countries are set free. Since hostilities began, millions of people have left homes destroyed or threatened with destruction; millions more have been transplanted, deported, or expelled to make room for foreign newcomers who have taken over their property; millions of others again have been taken prisoner or individually recruited as workers and sent away from their countries to serve the occupying power.

The political, economic and social reconstruction of the liberated countries cannot be contemplated until some degree of order has been restored among this confusion of peoples. Political reconstruction requires that the nationals of each country shall be able to return within their own frontiers. Economic reconstruction depends not only on the re-equipment of industry and agriculture and on restocking with raw materials and seed, but also on the rebuilding of the labour force of each country. Lastly, social reconstruction is only possible if families are reunited and those who have been uprooted are resettled in their old homes or in new homes where, in the words of the resolution adopted by the Conference of the International Labour Organisation in New York in 1941, they can "work in freedom and security and hope".

It is obvious that the number and whereabouts of all those who will have to be redistributed and resettled cannot be determined until the war is over. For the time being every passing month merely complicates the problem still further. Workers are being snatched from their homes in thousands and tens of thousands; families are disintegrated; whole groups are separated from their national community and scattered or regrouped in distant places. But at a time when the war seems to be entering on a new phase, it may be useful to make a preliminary general survey of the position and a tentative estimate of the magnitude of the problems to be solved.

In building up a general picture of the movements of the peoples of Europe during the war the first step was to list as fully as possible all the available sources of information. The second was to sift the information collected, retaining only the most typical and reliable

items, and the third to arrange and present the data so as to bring out the leading trends and characteristics of the movements.

To carry out this work the Office was able to secure the services of Professor Eugene M. Kulischer, who has prepared the present study in consultation with Mr. Pierre Waelbroeck, Chief of the Labour Conditions, Employment and Migration Section of the International Labour Office. In spite of the plentiful material which it has been possible to assemble with the help of a number of institutions and individuals, public and private, who have kindly made their information available, it is clear that under present circumstances the results of a survey of this kind must necessarily be regarded in many ways as of a preliminary and provisional nature. Nevertheless, the object of the study will have been achieved if it helps to show the magnitude and nature of the problems with which the world will be confronted at the end of the war and to demonstrate that, as the writer emphasises in his conclusions, they cannot be satisfactorily solved otherwise than by close international collaboration.

The International Labour Office.

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INTRODUCTION

From time immemorial war has always caused widespread displacements of population. Driven abroad by the destruction of their homes, fleeing from the neighbourhood of the battlefields or from the threat of enemy occupation, floods of refugees have always taken to the roads in search of a haven which is never easy to find.

It is many centuries, however, since the world witnessed population movements comparable to those set in motion by the present war. The size of modern armies, the distances over which their campaigns are conducted, the widening of the danger zone as a result of the enormous range of aeroplanes, have multiplied the risks to which civilians are exposed. While the authorities have tried to check uncontrolled movements, they have themselves organised methodical evacuations on a huge scale. Whole towns and districts have been cleared of their inhabitants to give the fighting forces complete freedom of movement or to safeguard the civilian population against bombing. Government departments and essential undertakings, together with their equipment and staff, have been transferred from one part of the country to another, and even abroad. Unreliable sections of the population have been removed from strategic areas as a precaution against sabotage and espionage.

In Europe these movements directly due to the war have reached a special pitch of intensity at given times. Each of the German offensives drove before it a floodtide of refugees and evacuees. Relatively few of these people, however, crossed the borders of their own countries. In Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia and Greece most of them returned to their homes when the hostilities were over. In Russia, on the other hand, where the front has held, the unoccupied part of the country still harbours millions of refugees and evacuees from the regions under enemy occupation. Moreover, throughout Europe the systematic evacuation from the coastal areas is only the prelude to the fresh compulsory removals of population which will inevitably accompany the reopening of the military campaign on the continent.

Europe has not been the only scene of these mass displacements. In China the number of refugees who have left their homes as a result of Japanese aggression is reckoned at 30 to 60 million. The invasion of Malaya led to the evacuation of a large section of the white population. From Burma, Indians fled with Europeans before the advancing Japanese armies. In Abyssinia and North Africa too, military operations have caused population movements. Even in America, so far from the actual theatre of operations, the war has led to certain displacements; over 110,000 persons of Japanese race or enemy nationality have been removed from the Pacific zone of the United States and transferred inland.

But it is in Europe above all other continents that the transfers of population which have taken place since the beginning of the war present the most complicated pattern. War refugees and evacuees are only one factor in the problem. Within the territories occupied by the German armies, Germany has redistributed or dispersed the population and carried out mass removals of individuals or families, whether in furtherance of political designs or of demographic and ethnical policy, or to supply its manpower requirements. Unlike the exodus of war refugees and evacuees, these transfers are not the direct result of the hostilities. To some extent they had already begun before the war. From each of the territories which successively came under a totalitarian régime floods of refugees, fleeing from political and racial persecution, surged into the neighbouring countries. On the eve of the war Europe was divided into two zones, one dominated by the centrifugal forces of totalitarianism, while the other tried to arrest or control this forced immigration. Germany's conquest of the major part of Europe brought both zones under German control and gave its rulers a free hand to carry out the transfers they considered necessary to implement their policy. Within the vast expanses of territory controlled by the totalitarian Powers transfers of population assumed enormous dimensions. The mass displacements of non-German populations were matched by the transplantation of Germans or peoples of Germanic origin into the zones assigned to German settlement. Population exchanges were arranged between Germany and neighbouring or allied countries. The acknowledged aim of the German Government is to redistribute the population of Europe so as to establish German influence and leadership over the largest possible area.

To these displacements of population in fulfilment of a long-term policy has been added the transfer of millions of workers. The requirements of the rearmament programme led, in Germany especially, to an increase in internal migration movements, closely

connected with changes in economic structure; the transition from peacetime to wartime industry was accompanied by changes in the geographical distribution of labour, while the expansion of total industrial employment stimulated the rural exodus. Still more important was the influx of workers from other countries. Even before the outbreak of hostilities the growing needs of munitions industries had sucked up the labour reserves on the employment market of each of the territories which came under German domination. This process has been intensified during the war. In the camps of prisoners of war, in the occupied territories and in those of its new allies, Germany found enormous reserves of labour which were at once drawn upon to meet the needs of German agriculture and war industries. From east and west, north and south, a constant stream of workers has been directed towards the Reich. In the opposite direction, a growing army of officials, technicians, employees and key workers has crossed the frontiers to administer the occupied countries and exploit their economic resources. Lastly, with the expansion of the war economy in the occupied territories and the strengthening of military defence works on their borders, these currents of migration have multiplied and crossed each other in every direction. At the present time the total mobilisation of Europe's labour force is proceeding under unified direction at a quickened tempo. Throughout the area under German control those who are capable of work are being recruited, transferred, and redistributed according to the dictates of Germany's economic and military plans.

It is no easy task to reduce all these movements to an intelligible pattern and find a criterion for their classification. There is, in fact, no clear dividing line between war refugees and those officially evacuated; in many cases people who left their homes voluntarily would have been evacuated later had they waited for the official decision, and the situation of both groups is practically the same. In the same way it would be arbitrary to draw any distinction between a political refugee and a war refugee who did not return after his country had been defeated for fear of political or racial persecution. It is also difficult, if not often impossible, to distinguish between evacuation and deportation. The Alsatians evacuated at the beginning of the war who were not allowed to return after their homeland was annexed by Germany are no differently situated from those who were expelled from Alsace after the annexation. Even where it would be theoretically possible to sort out these various groups from one another, the information is often inadequate.

Three main categories may, however, be distinguished among the masses of people involved in these movements. The first con-

sists of Germans and persons of German origin who have been moved into occupied countries since the beginning of the war. The second comprises non-Germans who left their homes under the threat of invasion or who have been the victims of wholesale transfer, deportation or expulsion from the invaded territories. The third consists of prisoners of war and workers recruited individually in all the European countries under German occupation for work in Germany or in other occupied territories. Although it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between recruitment and deportation, there is at least one difference between labour recruitment and the deportations covered by the second group in that the former does not aim at changing the demographic map of Europe, but merely at temporarily transferring away from their country persons whom Germany wishes to use in the service of its war economy.

In order to assess the consequences of all these migrations, voluntary or compulsory, for the countries concerned and the problems they raise for the future, it would be important to know the age, sex and occupational distribution of the transferred persons and also their precise whereabouts. Unfortunately information on these points is scanty. Such particulars as are available have been included in this study, but as a rule it has been possible to give only the total figures.

Even so far as the total volume of the movements is concerned, the information available does not always give a clear picture of the situation, especially for the most recent period. In many cases statistical information from official or semi-official sources is obtainable, for instance in respect of the resettlement of German populations and the recruitment of workers in the countries under German control. In other cases, however, there are only estimates from indirect sources, and those which appear to be the most trustworthy have been selected from the data available. As it is clearly impossible at the present juncture to make a strict statistical study of the population movements concerned, all that has been attempted is a preliminary inventory of the available material.

In drawing up this inventory, the author was fortunate in being able to call on the assistance of a number of institutions and individuals who have helped him to carry out the necessary research and have placed their collections of material at his disposal. He is glad to acknowledge his debt of gratitude to the American Friends Service, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the American National Red Cross, Washington; the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, New York; the American Jewish Committee Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems, New York; the Belgian

Information Centre, New York; the Board of Economic Warfare, Washington; the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, New York; the Czechoslovak Information Service, New York; the United States Department of Commerce, Washington; the Finnish Legation, Washington; the French Information Centre, New York; The French National Committee, Delegation to the United States, New York; the Greek Office of Information, Washington; the Hias-Ica Emigration Association (Hicem), New York; the International Red Cross, Washington; the Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York; the Latvian Legation, Washington; the Lithuanian Consulate-General, New York; the Office of Population Research, Princeton, New York; the ORT Economic Research Committee, New York; the Polish Information Centre, New York; the Turkish Embassy, Washington; the Young Men's Christian Association, New York; and the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, New York. Thanks are also due to Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, military and naval correspondent of the *New York Times*; Mr. George Barrett, also of the *New York Times*; Dr. Brutsaert, Director of Medical Laboratories, Leopoldville, Belgian Congo; Dr. Myron K. Kantorowitz, Takoma Park, Maryland; Dr. Frank Lorimer, Washington; Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Ithaca, New York; Mrs. Irene B. Taeuber, Director, Census Library Project, Washington; and Mr. Sergius A. Vassiliev, Consulting Engineer, New York.

Thanks to the valuable assistance received from all these sources, it has been possible, where no official figures were available, to scrutinise the existing material, to compare divergent data and to attempt at least some estimates when there were gaps in the existing documentation. It is on the basis of all this varied information that a synoptic table and a general analysis of the movements studied have been attempted in the final chapter of the report.

CHAPTER I

MIGRATION MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

The political expansion and military conquests of Germany have been followed by mass migration movements of people of German stock from abroad (*Auslandsdeutsche*) to Greater Germany and of German nationals (*Reichsdeutsche*) to the occupied territories.

The first group of movements is not a purely wartime phenomenon; it has precedents in the recent history of Germany. After the war of 1914-1918 a very large number of people of German nationality or origin, who before the war had lived either in territory detached from the Reich under the Treaty of Versailles or elsewhere, flocked back to live within the new German frontiers.

The German Migration Office published the following estimates of the extent and net results of this immigration up to the end of 1920¹:

	No. of immigrants
From Alsace-Lorraine	120,000
From other territories detached from Germany	500,000
German nationals repatriated from other foreign countries (including 20,000 German colonials)	190,000-200,000
"Racial" Germans (100,000 immigrants, of whom 30,000 re-emigrated)	70,000
Baltic Germans (25,000 immigrants, of whom 5,000 re-emigrated)	20,000
Total	900,000-910,000

This estimate was substantially confirmed by the census of 1925.² According to the census figures, the population of the Reich at that time included 1,377,000 persons who before 1 August 1914 were living outside the German frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. Of this number, only 279,000 were foreigners. All the others were German nationals: 770,000 came from territories detached from the Reich; others were German citizens who had been living abroad before the war; others again were persons of

¹ *Reichstagsdrucksache*, 1920-22, No. 4084. The figures relate to immigration from the beginning of the war, but in fact by far the greater proportion took place after the war.

² *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Vol. 401, Part II, pp. 538-541.

German origin or German stock who had previously been nationals of foreign countries, the countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe among others, and had acquired German nationality after entering Germany.

The magnetic pull of Germany on Germans from abroad, after slackening for some years, revived in a still stronger form after the introduction of the National Socialist régime. The rapid development of economic activity due to the rearmament programme attracted over half a million immigrants to Germany between 1933 and 1939; during this period, in spite of the departure of some 400,000 refugees¹, Greater Germany (*i.e.* the old Reich, with the addition of Austria and the Sudetenland) showed a migratory gain of 93,000 persons. It is true that this consisted very largely of foreign workers recruited outside the frontiers of Germany to meet the labour requirements of the German war economy; but it also included a large proportion of Germans. Indeed, the German Statistical Office attributes the fact that Germany had a favourable balance of migration at that time mainly to this new wave of immigration or repatriation of persons of German race or nationality, explaining that "the re-immigration of racial Germans, previously unorganised, was carried out methodically and on a vast scale after the 1939 census in order to colonise the newly acquired German living space".²

Thus, the mass transfer of Germans from abroad carried out during the war must be regarded as a direct continuation of the spontaneous movement of German minorities abroad to the Reich, organised methodically and directed towards a new demographic and political goal.

The second movement, on the other hand—that of Reich Germans into other European countries—which has been in progress since 1939, is a direct result of German conquests and has nothing in common with peacetime movements. During the years immediately following the last war, German emigration was on a very reduced scale. The sudden wave of emigration which followed the collapse of the German currency was short-lived. In 1923, German overseas emigration rose to 115,000, a figure which had not been reached since 1893, but owing to the joint effect of the United States quota restrictions and of German economic reconstruction during the Locarno period it dwindled again to something like 60,000 a year between 1924 and 1928. The world depression practically put a stop to all migration, and when it was resumed after the establishment of the National Socialist régime it took

¹ Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 42.

² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, No. 20, Oct. 1940.

the form of enforced emigration. From 1933 to the outbreak of war practically the only emigrants from Germany were Jews and political refugees who were the victims of persecution or expulsion.

It was only in 1938, simultaneously with Germany's first conquests, that quite a different type of movement began, namely, the fanning out of Germans beyond the old German frontiers to the territories annexed, occupied or controlled by Germany. It is this movement, continually expanded by a variety of circumstances, which is described in the second section of this chapter.

TRANSFER AND RESETTLEMENT OF GERMANS FROM ABROAD

The victorious eastward march of the German armies in 1939 was followed by a mass transplantation of people of German origin living in other countries to the newly enlarged territories of Greater Germany. A series of agreements concluded by the German Government in 1939 and 1940 resulted in the transfer of about 600,000 Germans from eastern, south-eastern and southern Europe to Germany. This mass migration was described by German propaganda as a "return to the Fatherland", or "repatriation", terms which cannot, of course, be taken literally, since hardly any of the "repatriated" persons had any connection with the Reich. They were nationals of other countries, which they and their ancestors had inhabited for many centuries. Moreover, most of them were not actually transferred to Germany, but were settled on foreign territories under German control.

The ideological basis of this great, more or less forced, movement of migration was laid down by Chancellor Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag on 6 October 1939. He stated that the most important task of present day policy would be the establishment of a new order of ethnographic conditions—that is, a resettlement of nationalities which would ultimately result in the fixing of better dividing lines than in the past. Eastern and south-eastern Europe were largely populated by splinters of German stock, whose very existence gave rise to constant international disturbances. In this age of the principle of nationalities and of racial theories, it was Utopian to believe that members of a highly-developed nation could be assimilated without trouble, and a far-sighted policy for ordering the life of Europe therefore demanded that resettlement should be carried out, so as to remove at least one cause of European conflict.

In speculating as to the true reasons for Chancellor Hitler's repatriation policy three explanations are commonly advanced. These are that it was intended, first, to germanise Polish Pomerania, Poznan and other districts taken by conquest from Poland

and incorporated into the Reich, by settling repatriated Germans in place of the expelled Poles; secondly, to secure the needed manpower for the army and for German war industry; and thirdly, to create realisable assets abroad from the property of the repatriated persons.

With regard to the first point, Germany was, of course, very much interested in the rapid germanisation of the newly conquered territories. It was emphasised in leading German circles, however, that the colonisation of the eastern borderlands would not be effected by the settlement of foreign-born Germans, but mainly by the skill and labour of the peasants from the over-populated parts of southern and south-western Germany, and that this project had been postponed until the end of the war only so as to give settlement privileges to the returning soldiers.¹ On the other hand, it was pointed out that large numbers of Germans would be required to take over and administer the whole economic sector of the annexed territories; that the war and the gigantic problems it involved left no forces free to undertake this task, which would in fact be lightened precisely by the resettlement of Germans "which the Führer had ordered on a grand scale".²

The second point—the need of manpower—was probably not taken so seriously in 1939, when the world was still impressed by the constant German complaints of lack of "living space". But the crushing weight of this factor was clearly demonstrated by subsequent economic developments in Germany and by the Government's efforts to mobilise the whole German population—men, women, and even children—and to attract all available manpower from abroad.

As to the financial aspects of the transfer, they are dealt with in the repatriation treaties, which stipulated that the property of the repatriated persons was to be liquidated and transferred to Germany little by little. Thus, the German Government hoped to receive large sums in foreign exchange which could be used for the purpose of financing necessary imports.

All these factors may have been taken into consideration by the Government of the Reich. Nor should the part played by the fear of Communism in the decision of the *Auslandsdeutsche* to leave the land where they and their families had lived for centuries be underestimated; many non-Germans who joined in the exodus emphasise the importance of this motive.

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 Aug. 1940, No. 23, Part V, p. 397; *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, 31 Jan. 1941; *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 28, Oct. 1941: "Wirtschaftliche Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums".

² *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 28, Oct. 1941: "Wirtschaftsaufbau im Warthegau".

Nevertheless, the main reason for the "repatriation" of the German minorities was in all probability political. Chancellor Hitler gave it as being the "elimination of international disturbances". In fact, however, this policy was not a general gesture of peace, but was rather determined by a definite political situation. The Soviet Union had occupied Eastern Poland and was ready to extend its dominion over the Baltic States and the eastern part of Rumania. All these territories had large German minorities, and if they had been left under Soviet rule the Reich would have had either to tolerate the expropriation of their property or to defend them. To adopt the first solution was to abandon the pretence of protecting all Germans; the second meant interfering with the internal policy of the Soviet Union and risking a conflict at a moment when this was not considered to be opportune. The situation was similar in the case of the Tyrolese, whose presence on the Brenner frontier was apt to disturb the good relations between the German and Italian Governments. The repatriation of the German minorities from these countries, therefore, provided a solution avoiding a conflict with powers with which Germany needed, at least temporarily, to remain on good terms.

As will be seen below, the extent to which repatriation was actually carried out was mainly conditioned by these considerations of political expediency. Out of 600,000 repatriated Germans, about 400,000 came from the Russian and 100,000 from the Italian sphere of influence.¹

The Transfer of German Minorities

The Baltic States.

The Baltic Germans constituted the most ancient German colony in foreign lands. They were descendants of the Teutonic knights and Hanseatic merchants who conquered these countries seven centuries ago. But even before they lost their political and economic influence their demographic expansion had ceased. In Latvia, the number of Germans had shown a continual decline since 1881, a decline which became much steeper after the first world war. In 1918-1919, German volunteers under the leadership of General von der Goltz started a campaign to "liberate" the Baltic peoples from the Bolsheviks. This crusade, accompanied

¹ The remaining 100,000 may be accounted for by (a) migration from Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobruja, where, after the partition of the two Rumanian provinces, living conditions became more difficult; (b) transfers from the General Government, in order to create "ethnic" divisions in German-occupied Poland; and (c) migration from other countries with scattered German communities.

by colonisation projects, ended with the eviction of the Germans by the Latvians, with the assistance of the Allied Nations. With them went a good many of the Baltic Germans, some of them land-owners who had been affected by the agrarian reform. The remaining Germans in Latvia and Estonia were concentrated in the larger towns, and suffered the fate which usually befalls purely urban groups—stagnation and even decline by excess of deaths over births. In Latvia, in 1935, this excess had reached a rate of seven per thousand. Before 1914, the territory of the future Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania contained more than 250,000 Germans. When the exodus started, their numbers were estimated at between 110,000 and 130,000. Thus, the transfer only gave the final blow to the slowly dying German communities.

The legal basis of this transfer was provided by treaties concluded by Germany with the Governments of Estonia (15 October 1939)¹, and Latvia (30 October 1939).² The arrangements were already in full swing at these dates, however, and the transfer started immediately after the treaties were signed.

The treaties covered all the members of the German minority. Provision was made for defining persons belonging to this minority and for the ways and means by which German origin might be proved even by persons who were not formally members of the minority. Many non-Germans, however, native Estonians, Latvians and Russians, appear to have joined the departing Germans³, while others flocked into Sweden. These voluntary emigrants were members of wealthy families, business men, doctors, priests and others, who fled for fear of the economic and social consequences of a possible Russian occupation.

The treaties also made arrangements concerning the property of the repatriated persons. They were allowed to take their household goods, the tools of their trade (with some exceptions), a very limited amount of their jewelry, and a small sum in cash.⁴ All their other property had to be liquidated and transferred in the form of the mutual exchange of goods between Latvia and Estonia and the Reich.

¹ Cf. *Industrial and Labour Information*, Vol. LXXII, No. 8, 20 Nov. 1939, p. 227.

² *Idem*, No. 10, 4 Dec. 1939, p. 274.

³ This is emphatically stated by Dr. Joseph SCHRECHTMAN, whose work on the transfer of German populations, prepared for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, has been consulted in manuscript by courtesy of the author. The evidence he quotes in support of his statement consists of (a) letters from the evacuated Balts (*Baltenbriefe zur Rückkehr ins Reich*, Berlin-Leipzig, 1940), and (b) lists of persons who lost their Latvian citizenship through being evacuated to the Reich.

⁴ This was limited to 50 crowns (\$13.50) in Estonia and 50 lats (\$10.00) in Latvia.

The transfer of Germans from the Baltic countries was described by the treaties as strictly voluntary. Persons who wished to be transferred had to make application in a prescribed form and within a prescribed time, and only after this application had been accepted did the applicant lose his Estonian or Latvian citizenship, and was obliged to leave the country. In practice, the transfer was carried out under strong moral pressure exercised by the local National Socialist leaders and in a wild panic provoked by rumours that the "Reds" were at the door. After the first panic had subsided many Germans began to reconsider their decision, and those who had not committed themselves refused to leave the country where they were comfortably established for an uncertain future.

But the great majority, 63,832 in all¹, were swept away by the current. The main transfer was concluded in January 1940.

In July 1940 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet Union, and on 10 January 1941 a resettlement treaty was signed by Germany and the Soviet Union providing for the repatriation of all Germans from the above-named countries. Under this agreement, according to German sources, 16,244 Germans from Latvia and Estonia—all who still remained there—were repatriated. The number of persons transferred from Lithuania under it was 50,471.² According to an official Lithuanian source, the great majority were not Germans at all but Lithuanians fearful of Soviet rule, 35,000 of whom succeeded in obtaining the required certificate of German origin. Under the same agreement, 12,000 Lithuanians and 9,000 Russians were transferred to Soviet controlled territory from the Lithuanian districts of Memel and Suwalki, annexed by Germany. All these transfers had been completed by 25 March 1941.³

Soviet-occupied Western Ukraine and Western Bielorrussia (Provinces of Eastern Poland).

In his speech of 6 October to the Reichstag, Chancellor Hitler declared that the purpose of the resettlement scheme was to prevent international conflict, emphasising thereby that Germany

¹ This is the final corrected figure given by the *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gesellschaft* (D.U.T.), as quoted by the *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942. Earlier figures published in *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 1, showed approximately 12,900 persons transferred from Estonia and 49,600 from Latvia.

² *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, loc. cit. Official Lithuanian sources give this figure as 52,600. This corresponds to information published in the Moscow *Pravda* (26 Mar. 1941), giving the total number of Germans repatriated from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the basis of the treaties between Germany and the Soviet Union as 68,805.

³ *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1941, No. 1-2, p. 43.

and the Union of Soviet Republics had come to a mutual agreement on the matter. It was therefore naturally assumed that a wave of migration would also surge up among the hundreds of thousands of Germans living in Russia. But the facts did not measure up to these expectations, and during the period that followed there was no question of a transfer of people of German race from the numerous German colonies within the former frontiers of the Soviet Union.

After the collapse of Poland, Polish territory was divided into a German and a Soviet sphere of interest. Later, part of the Polish territory administered by the Germans was incorporated into the Reich¹, while the rest of German-occupied Poland became a special separate administrative region known as "The General Government for the Occupied Polish Territories".

Germany's policy was originally to endow these three parts of dismembered Poland with a specific ethnical character. The incorporated territories were to be wholly germanised. The General Government was set apart for Poles and Jews. The Russian-occupied provinces were to accommodate Russian, Ukrainian and Bielorussian emigrants from the German-occupied parts of Poland. This policy appears to have agreed with the intentions of the Soviet Government, which, while it had no interest in disturbing the economy of the Union by a sudden mass emigration from inner Russia, welcomed the possibility of strengthening the Bielorussian and Ukrainian elements in its newly acquired territory, while at the same time eliminating the German colonies in the neighbourhood of the new German frontier, where they would constitute a permanent political and military danger.

The agreement² concluded between the German and Soviet Governments on 3 November 1939 was in harmony with the aims of the contracting parties as described above. It dealt with the exchange of populations, and provided that all Germans residing in the Western Ukraine and Western Bielorussia (both formerly part of Poland) had the right to migrate to German-controlled territory, and all Ukrainians, Bielorussians, Russians and Ruthenians residing in the former Polish territories now within the German sphere of influence, to migrate to the territory controlled by the Soviet Union. A further agreement provided for the return to the territory of their permanent or legal residence of all persons who happened temporarily or accidentally to be in the other area.

¹ For details, see Chapter II, under Poland, pp. 50-51.

² Cf. *Industrial and Labour Information*, Vol. LXXII, No. 10, 4 Dec. 1939, p. 275.

There were in German-occupied territory many persons who had come from Eastern Poland for business, study or other reasons and were caught there by the war, but who were regular residents of the Soviet-occupied area. On the Russian-occupied side there were the great mass of refugees who had fled from the German invasion further and further to the east. Hundred of thousands of them crowded into the cities; the population of Lwow, for instance, was more than doubled. The Germans, however, only permitted the re-entry of a number of Polish and Ukrainian refugees who had their residence in German-controlled territory, but refused to allow any Jewish refugees to return.¹

The provision made for disposing of the property of the migrants was unusual; the migrants were to be allowed to take with them such of their property as was necessary for the continuation of their economic activity.

In accordance with the first agreement, German colonists began to leave their homes in Volhynia, Eastern Galicia and the Bialystok region in December 1939. From 18 December 1939 to 26 January 1940² a constant stream was crossing the Russo-German border in primitive horse-drawn wagons, piled high with all their goods, and in mile-long railway trains. This trek brought to German-held territory 134,267³ persons, most of them peasants who had abandoned settlements founded by their ancestors 150 years ago. In the opposite direction the number of Bielorrussians and Ukrainians who were to move to Russian-occupied territory was roughly estimated as between 30,000 and 40,000.

With regard to the persons who migrated under the additional agreement, no official estimate is available.⁴ Such an estimate would, in fact, be valuable only if it were possible to distinguish between those whose return to their homes was genuine and thus did not increase but reduced the transfer of population, and those who took advantage of the situation to escape German domination.

¹ Concerning these refugees, cf. Chapter II, Poland, p. 58.

² According to a statement by Werner LORENZ, Chief of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, who was in charge of this evacuation, quoted by Helmut SOMMER in *Hundert-fünf-und-dreissig Tausend Gewannen das Vaterland* (Berlin, 1940).

³ *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942. This source does not give the numbers who left from each region, but they cannot differ much from the figures published a year before in *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 1. The total number at that time was estimated at 128,100 and was made up of 64,600 settlers from Volhynia, 55,400 from Galicia and 8,100 from Bialystok.

⁴ The number of Poles who had to be returned to their previous homes in the territory under German control has been estimated at 14,000 (D.N.B. release, quoted by *New York Herald Tribune*, 20 Mar. 1940). A month earlier an Associated Press cable from Berlin referred to 60,000 Polish refugees who were to be moved from Soviet-occupied territory to the General Government (*New York Times*, 20 Feb. 1940). It was also reported that 80,000 Galician Jews were to be transferred to Russian-occupied territory (*New York Times*, 27 Dec. 1939).

Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

On 28 June 1940, Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. On 5 September 1940 an agreement was reached between Germany and the Soviet Union concerning the transfer of Germans living in these formerly Rumanian provinces. In general, this agreement reproduces the provisions of the treaty concerning the Russian-occupied eastern Polish provinces; it is, however, unilateral, no exchange of populations being provided for.

The evacuation began in the autumn of 1940. Many of the Bessarabian Germans travelled up the Danube in groups as far as Belgrade, whence they were transported further by railway. A large number of migrants spent the winter in camps in southern Austria.

The last Rumanian census, taken in 1930, showed that there were 80,000 Germans in Bessarabia. There are no corresponding figures for Northern Bukovina, the number of Germans in the whole province of Bukovina being 76,000. Under the Russo-German agreement 136,989 persons¹ left Russian-occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina for Greater Germany, including 12,500 from Cernauzi (Czernowitz), the capital of Bukovina.²

Dobruja and Southern Bukovina.

Already in November 1939 about 10,000 Germans from the Dobruja district had signified their intention of emigrating to Germany. They were farmers whose ancestors had settled in small Dobruja villages about 60 or 70 years ago, and who complained that they had no prospect of enlarging their holdings, since only Rumanians could then lawfully buy land in the Dobruja district.

It was not until the autumn of 1940, however, after the partition of the Dobruja, the southern part of which was ceded to Bulgaria, and of Bukovina, the northern part of which was occupied by the Russians, that the transfer of Germans from the Dobruja actually took place, together with those from Southern Bukovina. The transfer was regulated by a German-Rumanian Treaty of 22 October 1940. Rumania took over the land and some of the migrants' other property in payment for the products supplied to Germany. The transfer was carried out simultaneously with the evacuation of Germans from Northern Bukovina, described above.

The number of Germans transferred from Dobruja and Southern

¹ *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942.

² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 7. According to this source, 93,500 were transferred from Bessarabia and 42,400 from Northern Bukovina.

Bukovina was originally given as 66,400.¹ Many more moved later, however. The Bucharest agency of the *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gesellschaft* was engaged throughout 1941 in arranging for their transportation and admission to Germany and for the settlement of their property problems.² The total number rose to 76,765.³

South Tyrol.

The transfer of the Tyrolese originated under conditions somewhat different from those which produced the great German migration from the east and south-east. The initiative was taken not by the Germans, but by the Italians.

The South Tyrol, with a large German-speaking population, was annexed to Italy after the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. Measures were adopted by the Italian authorities to italianise the region. The only official language was Italian. Education was in Italian, place names were italianised. All officials were Italian, and Italian settlers were introduced. This policy was modified after the reconciliation between Germany and Italy in 1936, but the anti-Italian attitude of the Tyrolese Germans remained unchanged, and they openly expressed the hope that the Tyrol would soon return to Germany, especially after the annexation of Austria in March 1938.

Two months later, at the meeting between Chancellor Hitler and the Duce in Rome, the Führer agreed to the Duce's wish to have the frontier "purified". The division between the North and South Tyrol was to be racial as well as geographical. The Brenner was to become the ethnographical frontier.

The formal agreement which settled the fate of the German Tyrol was signed by the Italian and German Governments on 21 October 1939. This agreement made provision, first, for German nationals, and secondly, for Italian nationals of German origin. The former were unconditionally obliged to move from the Upper Adige region (the official Italian name for South Tyrol), while the latter had the choice either of remaining in Italy and becoming full-fledged Italians or of moving into Germany. It was understood at first that those who chose to remain Italian would have to migrate to some other part of Italy, away from the frontier. But ultimately this stipulation was relaxed, and the German Tyrolese who opted in

¹ *Ibid.*; 52,100 were given as transferred from southern Rumania and 14,000 from the Dobruja; 7,000 came from Old Rumania, having their legal domicile in the transfer area of Bessarabia and both parts of Bukovina,

² *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, 2 Apr. 1942.

³ *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942.

favour of Italian nationality were allowed to remain in the valleys where their ancestors had begun to settle as early as the thirteenth century.

In fulfilment of this agreement, 10,000 German nationals had to migrate to Germany. The German-speaking inhabitants of Italian nationality had to opt for German citizenship before the end of 1939. The votes were cast in the Italian province of Bolzano and in certain districts of the provinces of Udine, Trento and Belluno. Altogether, 266,985 persons were entitled to opt, of whom 185,085 chose to migrate to Germany.¹

Thus, a majority of the Germans from the Tyrol officially registered their final decision to abandon their Italian citizenship and to migrate to Germany. But the extent to which this decision was carried out only partly corresponded to the vote. The agreement itself granted a generous time limit, up to 31 December 1942, for the optants to leave Italy², and the Tyrolese Germans took full advantage of this opportunity of postponing their departure. During the whole of the year 1940, only 65,000 Tyrolese migrated to Germany³, and there was no considerable increase in this figure in the course of 1941. The total was only 72,000 up to the spring of 1942.⁴

Nor does the Italian Government appear to have pressed the optants to leave. Even the partial emigration of the Germans from the Tyrol was a severe blow to the local economy. The depopulation of mountain regions in general is a serious and much discussed problem in Italy⁵, which was artificially aggravated by the proposed "purification" of the frontier. It became more and more evident that the problem was not merely to remove the Germans from the Tyrolese valleys, but also to replace them by Italians, and there was a lack of suitable human material for resettlement. Lowlanders, and even settlers from the Appenines, are not suitable for agricultural work in the Tyrol, where conditions are very different, and the neighbouring valleys of Piedmont, which are more or less similar in character, have virtually no surplus population.

The report of the German Resettlement Trust for 1942, recently quoted by German newspapers⁶, admits that "the resettlement

¹ These figures are given by German sources. The Agafi News Agency published slightly different figures on 6 May 1942, stating that out of 317,947 Germans who had the right to opt, 180,000 voted for resettlement. The number of those who actually migrated was not given.

² According to the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 26 Aug. 1942, quoting the *Börsener Zeitung*, the time limit was later extended up to the end of 1943.

³ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 10, Apr. 1941.

⁴ *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942.

⁵ Cf. *Lo Spopolamento Montano in Italia* (Rome, 1932-1938, 8 vols.), edited by the Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria with the assistance of the Comitato per la Geografia and other agencies.

⁶ Cf. *Völkischer Beobachter* and *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 Apr. 1943.

of the South Tyrolese continued to be difficult and troublesome". It is claimed that much progress was made in 1942, but no figure is given for the number of Tyrolese who were moved during that period.

The General Government.

The transfer of Germans from this territory, which covers all the German-occupied part of Poland not incorporated into the Reich, was effected on a different legal basis. It was based not on an international treaty, but on an Order of the German Government having the same authority in the provinces incorporated into the Reich as in the General Government. This did not, however, affect the political, demographic and economic features of the operation, which even included a partial exchange of populations, some of the Polish peasants expelled from the Incorporated Provinces having been sent to replace the repatriated Germans. Not all the Germans in the General Government were repatriated¹, but only those from the areas to the east of the Vistula, from the district of Lublin. The number repatriated was 30,495.² The transfer took place in September and October 1940, after the close of the harvesting season.

Ljubljana (Italian-annexed Slovenia).

After Chancellor Hitler had announced, in his speech of 6 October 1939, his plan for the resettlement within the borders of Germany of all Germans living abroad, propaganda was also carried on among the German minorities in Yugoslavia, numbering some 500,000, with a view to persuading them to make the sacrifices entailed by accepting the Führer's invitation to "return home". But no practical steps were taken in this direction.

The scheme was taken up again after the conquest of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, but this time only in respect of a small section of the German minority. The transfer of the large German population of Yugoslavia was no longer considered desirable. In view of their strategic situation, these Germans were regarded as serving a more useful purpose where they were as an instrument of control, an advance post of German domination in the Balkans. But an

¹ After the transfer there were still 63,000 "ethnical Germans" (*Volksdeutsche*) in the General Government, and many more had applied for recognition as Germans, as being partly of German origin. Cf. *Archiv für Wanderingswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1941, No. 1-2, p. 41. In the summer of 1942, 75,000 persons were counted as *Volksdeutsche* (*Krakauer Zeitung*, 15 July 1942, quoting the *Europäische Revue*).

² *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942. The number reported in spring 1941 by *Wirtschaft und Statistik* (1941, No. 1) was 30,300.

exception was made for a group of Germans residing in the province of Ljubljana, the Italian-occupied part of Slovenia, who the German Government feared would lose their German character under Italian domination. This group, living in the district of Kocevije and numbering some 16,000¹, constituted a German island in the midst of a purely Slovenian population. In agreement with the Italian authorities, 13,500 of them² were transplanted from the land on which they had lived since the fourteenth century and moved to the Slovenian districts incorporated into the Reich. According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, the scheme was at first willingly accepted by the people concerned; later on, however, they regretted their decision and wished to remain where they were, but had no option but to fall in with the plans for transfer, which were then all ready. The transfer started in November 1941 and was completed in 1942.

Apart from the Germans of Ljubljana, about 1,000 more³ were transferred from other parts of Yugoslavia. On 6 October 1942 an agreement was made between Germany and Croatia for the repatriation of some 20,000 Germans from Bosnia and Herzegovina and some other parts of Croatia, mostly artisans, merchants and officials, but including also some peasants.⁴ The settlers were at first directed to a camp in Zhurz, near Lodz⁵, to be settled, since spring 1943, in the Lublin area of the General Government.⁶

Miscellaneous Groups.

Small groups of Germans have also been transferred from other countries.

From Bulgaria⁷ 423 Germans were repatriated in 1942. In spring 1943 another 800 were on the way to Germany.⁸

In France, exclusive of Alsace-Lorraine, 13,353 Germans have been "sifted" (*durchschleust*) and one-third of them were "called back" for resettlement. The transfer was substantially carried out during 1941 and 1942.⁹

¹ According to the 1931 statistics, there were at that time 25,100 Germans in Slovenia, 5,400 in the regions later occupied by Germany, and 19,700 in the regions later occupied by Italy.

² *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Apr. 1943.

³ The precise number was 993 (*Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942.)

⁴ *Relazioni Internazionali*, 31 Oct. 1942; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10 Oct. 1942 and 9 Feb. 1943.

⁵ *Marburger Zeitung*, 30 Dec. 1942.

⁶ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 Apr. 1943.

⁷ *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942.

⁸ Transocean broadcast, 13 Apr. 1943.

⁹ *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 67; *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1942, No. 11, p. 362; *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Apr. 1943.

The transfer of a group from the Leningrad district started in the spring of 1942. These Russians were described as German minorities, and were said to be descended from Germans who immigrated at the call of Catherine the Great to cultivate the areas around St. Petersburg.¹ Two thousand one hundred and four persons have been "recognised as resettlers".²

Finally small groups are being repatriated from Slovakia and Greece (Heraklion).³

Distribution and Areas of Resettlement

The resettlement of German immigrants of varied occupations and diverse geographical origin presented a difficult problem.

Occupationally, the overwhelming majority—over four-fifths—of Germans from Volhynia, the General Government, Bessarabia and the Dobruja were peasants. Among those from Galicia two-thirds were peasants and the rest townspeople engaged in handicrafts and trade. Among the migrants from Bukovina, the Narev region, and the Baltic countries, persons engaged in agriculture were in the minority, and the smallest rural group of all, numbering 2,090 persons, was among the Baltic Germans from Estonia and Latvia, the great majority of whom had been engaged in industry, commerce and the liberal professions.⁴ The percentage distribution by age and by occupation of the removed German minorities is given in the table on the next page.

As already mentioned, the "repatriated" Germans have not been settled within Germany's former frontiers. The great majority were established on territories newly conquered from Poland, France and Yugoslavia and incorporated into the Reich while some tens of thousands were settled in former Austria.⁵

The main settlement area was in the incorporated Polish provinces, namely the Warthegau, Danzig-West Prussia, and the Ciechanow district, now forming part of East Prussia, where the

¹ *New York Times*, 24 Apr. 1942 (despatch from Stockholm); *Ostland*, 26 Mar. 1942.

² *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Apr. 1943.

³ *Ibid.* The Greek Germans have been reported to be assembled in a camp, their property having been sold with advantage.

⁴ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7. It was emphasised that the efficiency of the industrial workers among the transferred groups who came from more backward areas than the Reich must be improved (*Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Feb. 1942, No. 4, Part V, p. 85).

⁵ The location of the branches of the *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gesellschaft*, which is entrusted with the work of resettlement, is instructive. The five branches are in Poznan, Danzig, Katowice (all three in Western Poland), Innsbruck (North Tyrol, Austria), and Marburg (Slovenia, German-annexed Yugoslav territory). Other subsidiary branches are at Lodz and Ciechanow (Western Poland), Klagenfurt (Carinthia, Austria), Veldes and Rann (Slovenia, German-annexed Yugoslav territory).

REMOVAL OF GERMAN MINORITIES

Distribution by age and occupation¹

Area of origin	Percentage by age			Percentage by occupation				
	Below 14	14-65	Over 65	Agriculture and forestry	Handicrafts and industry	Trade and communications	Liberal professions	Domestic service
Estonia	15.2	70.7	14.1	20.1	30.5	31.1	16.1	2.3
Latvia	18.4	71.3	10.3					
Volhynia	37.7	58.8	3.5	85.9	8.5	2.9	0.9	1.8
Galicja	28.9	67.3	3.8	65.6	19.9	10.2	4.1	0.2
Bialystok	25.9	68.2	5.9	25.8	39.8	20.2	9.5	4.7
General Government	38.3	57.4	4.3	83.1	8.8	4.1	2.4	1.6
North Bukovina	24.3	71.0	4.7	30.7	48.4	8.8	11.0	1.8
Bessarabia	31.7	64.7	3.6	81.7	12.9	2.2	1.8	1.3
South Bukovina	27.7	67.5	4.8	43.7	46.2	3.7	3.5	2.5
Dobruja	37.1	60.2	2.7	79.9	14.2	2.7	1.2	1.8

great majority of the Baltic Germans and of all the groups transferred from areas which were formerly part of Poland and Rumania were established. The number reported to have been brought into the area by the summer of 1942 was 497,000. Of these, 230,800 were settled in the Warthegau and 148,000 in Danzig-West Prussia. The remaining 120,000 odd had not yet been settled and were still living in camps.² The resettlement of Lithuanians was started in the Ciechanow district³, but this scheme was subsequently abandoned in favour of sending them back to Lithuania, as described below.

The Ljubljana Germans were transferred to the border region of Southern Styria—that is, to the part of Yugoslav territory inhabited by Slovenes incorporated into the Reich by the German Government.⁴

A very small minority of those transferred from Bessarabia, Southern Bukovina and Dobruja were established in Southern Styria, in Lorraine⁵, and in parts of Alsace where the Maginot Line formerly was.⁶

¹ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7. The percentages are calculated on the basis of figures for the spring of 1941.

² *Danziger Vorposten*, 2 July 1942. Similar figures are given in *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 77, in regard to settlement up to the end of 1941: Warthegau, 221,000; Danzig-West Prussia, 150,000. The settlement of 4,000 Germans in Upper Silesia was reported by the *Krakauer Zeitung*, 8 Sept. 1942. In 1942, another 3,700 families were settled in the Warthegau, Danzig-West Prussia, and Upper Silesia.

³ *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1941, No. 3, p. 109; *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1942, No. 11, p. 362.

⁴ *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 66; *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1942, No. 11, p. 362.

⁵ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 Apr. 1943.

⁶ Jacques LORRAINE: *La France Allemande* (1942), p. 205.

Those transferred from France were reported to have applied for settlement in Alsace-Lorraine.¹

The function assigned to the Germans transplanted into the newly incorporated territories was to germanise them by replacing the native populations who were being expelled. Thus, in the western Polish provinces, they took over the homes, jobs and businesses of one and a half million Poles and Jews who had been expelled into the General Government.²

The Tyrolese were the only group who as a whole were not settled in a conquered territory with a non-German population. Accustomed to their mountain villages, they could not be expected to settle in the different geographical and climatic conditions of the plains of Western Poland. The great majority of them were installed in the North Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, on the other side of the Alps, opposite their former homes, and others in Carinthia.³ To make room for them, 2,400 peasant families have been removed from Carinthia since March 1942.⁴ However, some Tyrolese Germans have been settled in Southern Styria (German-annexed Slovenia), and according to the latest report of the German Resettlement Trust they are also to be given preference for speedy settlement in Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the eastern part of the Sudetenland. This does not seem to be a large-scale settlement scheme, however. Thus, in Lorraine only about a thousand homes have been vacated for Germans transferred from the Tyrol as well as from Southern Bukovina.⁵

The change in German policy in 1942⁶ opened up the General Government as a new resettlement area. The district of Lublin, from which Germans had been removed in 1940, has since 1942 been allocated to the new groups of "repatriated" Germans from Bosnia and Croatia, the Leningrad district, Serbia and Bulgaria, as well as to the Baltic Germans and those transferred from Bessarabia, who had been taken to the Warthegau but could not be settled there.⁷

In spite of the care with which the settlement of the Baltic Germans was carried out, they do not appear to have acclimatised themselves very readily to their new surroundings. After the German conquest of the Baltic countries in 1941, the "repatriated" Baltic Germans asked to be allowed to return to their former homes.

¹ *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 67.

² Cf. Chapter II, below, pp. 53-54.

³ *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde*, loc. cit.

⁴ According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre.

⁵ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 Apr. 1943.

⁶ Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 52.

⁷ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 Apr. 1943. Industrial workers are reported to have been sent to the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

This request was met with a firm refusal and it was pointed out to them that they had a more important national duty to fulfil where they were.

Towards the summer of 1942 it was announced that the Germans from Lithuania would be transferred back to their former homes. To reassure the Lithuanians, a local German paper explained that the returning Germans would receive the property of Jews and other members of the non-Lithuanian population. This apparently includes the Poles, and the reported arrest of many wealthy Poles in the Wilno district may possibly denote that homes were being prepared for the returning Germans.¹ According to official Lithuanian sources, 11,000 of the genuine Germans transferred to the Reich received permission to return to Lithuania. On the other hand, all applications from Lithuanians who had posed as Germans in order to obtain permission to emigrate have been rejected.

Summary

According to the report of the German Resettlement Trust for 1941, the number of persons covered by the repatriation schemes was 751,400.² Of these, 600,000 had actually arrived in Greater Germany before the end of 1941 or early in 1942. The table opposite gives a general idea of the geographical origin of the "repatriated" Germans, and of the main regions where they have been resettled. It will be noted that the difference between the numbers covered by the schemes as planned and as executed is accounted for mainly by the South Tyrolese.

These figures, and especially the total of some 600,000 Germans from abroad transferred to the new German border provinces, are really impressive.³ Nevertheless, a closer examination shows that, in the first place, even the racial aims of the resettlement scheme were very incompletely attained. Many of those who were repatriated as being "ethnic Germans" (*Volksdeutsche*) were of non-German origin. As mentioned above, many Estonians, Latvians, and especially Lithuanians, were transferred with the

¹ *Kauner Zeitung*, quoted by *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New York), 5 Sept. 1942. This is confirmed by a Berlin dispatch to the *Stockholm Tidningen*, quoted in *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Feb. 1943.

² The report for 1942 mentions as a new task assigned to the German Resettlement Trust the establishment of re-emigrants from non-European countries.

³ The report of the German Resettlement Trust for 1942 shows a total of 806,000 persons covered by the repatriation scheme. The increase was due partly to an enlargement of former groups, partly to the inclusion of German minorities from new territories: 20,000 from Bosnia, a few thousand from the Leningrad district, and minor groups from Slovakia and Greece. Some of them were actually transferred during 1942 and the first months of 1943.

REMOVAL OF GERMAN MINORITIES FROM VARIOUS
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1939-1941

Area of origin	No covered by the transfer scheme	No transferred as reported in spring 1941 ¹	No transferred as reported in spring 1942 ²	Main area of resettlement
Estonia	80,000	{12,900 48,600}	{63,832 16,244	Incorporated Polish Provinces
Latvia				
Estonia and Latvia (late comers)				
Lithuania	50,000	{64,600 55,400 8,100	{50,471 134,267	
Volhynia				
Galicia	164,000	{30,300 42,400 93,500	{30,495 136,989	
Bialystok				
General Government				
Northern Bukovina	214,000	{52,100 14,000	{76,765	
Bessarabia				
Southern Bukovina				
Dobruja	220,000	{65,000	{72,000	
South Tyrol				
Ljubljana	16,000		13,500	North Tyrol (a few thousand to Carinthia and German-annexed Slovenia)
Serbia	1,000		993	German-annexed Slovenia
Bulgaria	400		423	
France	6,000		4,000	Alsace-Lorraine
	751,400	486,900	599,979	

¹ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, Nos 1 and 7.² *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942. All figures except those for the Tyrolese, the French and Ljubljana Germans are based on the report of the *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gesellschaft* (D.U.T.) for the year 1941. The figures for Ljubljana and France are taken from the *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Apr. 1943.

Baltic Germans, while the Germans themselves have admitted that the settlers who came to Germany from Soviet-occupied areas included a number of Ukrainians. The "Bughollander", too, who were transferred with the Volhynian Germans, were definitely stated to be "as regards the language, utterly degermanised".¹ Secondly, and even more important, the scheme has failed in its proclaimed object of obtaining better dividing lines between different nationalities. German minorities have been transferred from one non-German area only to be settled in another non-German area; other minority groups have not been transferred at all, while deportations and expulsions, as will be seen below, have led to an even greater mixture of races and peoples than before.

As to the material benefits derived from the newcomers, these fell far short of the estimates made by National Socialist writers when the transfer had just begun. It is estimated that by these

¹ *Südost Echo* (Vienna), 23 May 1941.

transfers Germany has gained approximately 275,000 employable persons. This is a very modest figure compared with the millions of foreign workers now employed in Germany; and the net gain, after deducting those who crossed into Soviet territory in accordance with the population exchange provisions of the treaties, must have been smaller still. In addition to this indirect contribution to the German war effort, however, the direct utilisation of the "repatriated" Germans for military service must also be taken into account. Having been granted German citizenship, they can be (and in fact have been) enlisted in the army.

There is little doubt that there was a wide discrepancy between the volume of repatriation which had been expected by many in Germany and that which actually took place.

Some German authors had interpreted Chancellor Hitler's speech of 6 October 1939, referred to at the beginning of the present chapter, as denoting a radical change in the Reich's policy with regard to German minorities. It was said that "previously, the basic principle had been to strengthen German minority groups and to prevent them from weakening. . . Now, however, whole ethnic groups will have to migrate."¹ For "German people must have an unbroken living space", and "common blood shall not be separated by arbitrary frontiers".²

It was generally assumed that Germany had decided to repatriate—besides the 130,000 Germans from the Baltic States, 135,000 from Russian-occupied Poland and 220,000 from the Tyrol—all the German minorities from Slovakia (128,000), Yugoslavia (then numbering some 500,000)³, Hungary (480,000)⁴ and Rumania (750,000).

There are, however, strong grounds for believing that even at the outset no break with the traditional German policy in regard to minorities was contemplated, that the repatriation was purposely restricted to the Italian and Soviet spheres of interest, and that German minorities living within the territories of less powerful states were intended to stay at their posts to serve as the bulwarks of German expansion.⁵

Whatever the reason, no serious attempt to transfer these other

¹ W. GRADMANN, in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, May 1941, p. 277.

² H. KRUG: *ibid.*, Jan.-Feb. 1940. The author claims to formulate in these words "the ideas repeatedly expressed by the Führer".

³ German sources even gave a figure of 700,000. Cf. *Grenzbote* (Bratislava), 19 Feb. 1943.

⁴ Four hundred and seventy-eight thousand, according to the Hungarian Statistical Year Book for 1933. German sources gave the figure as 648,500. Cf. *Nation und Staat*, Mar.-Apr. 1939, p. 481.

⁵ Joseph HANČ: *Tornado across Eastern Europe* (New York, 1942), p. 231. This is also the opinion which Dr. J. SCHRECHTMAN has formed after a thorough study of the problem. Cf. the manuscript quoted on p. 12 above.

minorities has in fact been made. On the contrary, the German Government has used its influence to strengthen the position of German minorities, and to confer on them the legal status of a privileged "state within the State".

But with Germany's territorial expansion there came a corresponding change in the whole approach to the problem of Germans outside the Reich and of Greater Germany. In November 1941 a German economic periodical stated that the Eastern Territories, from Königsberg through Warthegau and Upper Silesia to Austria, would form the future frontier of German settlement, adding, however, that even beyond this ethnical frontier there would be opportunities for Germans to "work and live in the Eastern Territories under German political and economic leadership".¹ And six months later a leading German newspaper put the position unambiguously as follows: "*The proportions between space and people have been reversed. The problem of how to feed a great people in a narrow space has changed into that of the best way of exploiting the conquered spaces with the limited number of people available.*"²

German migration towards the conquered territories was then already in full swing.

MOVEMENTS OF GERMANS FROM THE REICH

The main movement of Germans across the borders of the Reich has been that of the German armies. Germany is estimated to have mobilised between nine and ten million men, the great majority of whom are outside the Reich, principally on the Russian front since the invasion of the Soviet Union. This is, of course, not a migration movement in the proper sense. According to a slogan coined by Chancellor Hitler and frequently repeated by National Socialist leaders, "the conquests of the German sword must be consolidated by the plough". The German victories throughout Europe did not, however, lead to any appreciable volume of German settlement apart from the resettlement of Germans from abroad, nor was there any real migratory movement of a nature to enlarge the settlement area of the German people. There are, of course, millions of Germans from the Reich in the territories conquered, annexed or occupied by Germany, but the overwhelming majority of them are directly connected with the military operations. Another category consists of persons evacuated to the occupied territories to escape the air attacks of the United Nations; a great many of these evacuees, if not the majority, are women and children.

¹ *Die Wirtschaftskurve*, No. 4, Nov. 1941, p. 272.

² *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 July 1942.

The German Colonists

The extension of the area cultivated by the German people was one of the principal items in the National Socialist programme. Vigorous propaganda was carried out to further this aim, the fulfilment of which was to form the basis of the future German economy and to consolidate Germany's military conquests. Since 1940, National Socialist Party publications have persistently stressed that "the achievements of the sword can endure only if they are protected by a human rampart of German people, especially German peasants, above all in the East".¹ In the spring of 1942 Joseph Buerkel, Gauleiter of Lorraine, announced the same policy in regard to the West, stating that "only a solid ring of German settlers around the Reich can provide a durable national frontier".² And yet the number of German settlers in the conquered territories appears to be comparatively small.

The main reason for this clearly lies in the war itself. Mobilisation has diminished the number of hands available, while the need for workers in the German economy has increased. The agricultural population especially has been affected by mobilisation. In the Reich itself, farms are often managed by women with the help of prisoners of war or foreign workers. There are therefore no skilled German farmers to replace the local agriculturists, and the urgent need for continued agricultural production does not permit of the use of inexperienced hands.

It was stated in German circles that the programme of German settlement in the east was deliberately left in the background, in order that room might be kept for the returning soldiers at the end of the war; and that in the meantime colonisation could be carried out only by the repatriation of the Germans from abroad.³ In Alsace-Lorraine, too, the final settlement plans were said to be held over until after the war and the return of the soldiers.⁴ At the same time, German economists themselves acknowledged that "after a victorious war the rising generation will diminish in numbers for many years, and certainly until 1947".⁵

The basis of this declining supply of manpower is demographic; the natural loss of the productive population is not made good by a numerically inferior rising generation. The number of young

¹ "German Occupation of Poland", *Polish White Book*, pp. 184-185.

² Cf. article by J. BUEKEL, in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 24 Apr. 1942.

³ See above, p. 10.

⁴ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 12, Apr. 1941.

⁵ *Idem*, No. 1-2, Jan. 1941.

people entering the labour market yearly had fallen from over 1,300,000 in 1926 to less than 1,100,000 in 1938. German statisticians calculated that, even without the war, there would have been a further steady decline from 1940 to 1947, resulting in a reduction of another 20 per cent. to about 900,000. The vast overcrowding of the labour market in the twenties and early thirties was produced by a generation born before the war of 1914-1918. The generation born between 1899 and 1914 was more numerous than the preceding one, decimated by war, and than the subsequent ones, reduced by the declining birthrate. This was the generation, constituting an abnormally high proportion of the population, which gradually entered the labour market from 1918 to 1933, and the situation it created was aggravated by the advent of the great depression. But in the demographic evolution of Germany this was only a passing phenomenon. There was no rising generation in the following years to replace those eliminated by the war of 1914-1918. While the excess of births over deaths in such countries as Italy and Poland was at the rate of over 9 and 11 per thousand and that of Russia over 12, in Germany it was less than 7 even if calculated as an average for the years 1933-1939, when exceptional efforts were made to increase the birth rate. This means that even without the wastage of war the German population would have had no surplus for populating new settlement areas.

There is another obstacle to German colonisation projects in the incorporated territories of the east and west, the areas mainly affected—namely, the competition of German farmers living on the spot. From the very beginning, the German "land reform" measures had strengthened the indigenous German element in the incorporated territories. The local German minorities in the western Polish provinces as well as in Alsace-Lorraine were the first to profit by the German measures of expropriation. As will be seen below, about 1,200,000 Poles and 300,000 Jews were expelled from the incorporated Polish provinces in 1939-40.¹ Their undamaged property was given to the Germans in place of their own, which had been ruined by the war; small local German landowners and farmers' younger sons were transferred to more promising farms.² From Alsace-Lorraine about another 200,000 persons were expelled, of whom some 75 per cent. had been farmers, and their land was used in the first place to enlarge the holdings of the neighbouring German peasantry. In Lorraine, and even more so in the adjacent Saar Basin, the land had been parcelled out from generation to generation into ever smaller fields, and to remedy this situation

¹ Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 54.

² *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 28, Oct. 1941.

German peasants were transferred from overcrowded areas to the land confiscated from the farmers of Alsace-Lorraine.¹

As a result, the German settlement schemes did not fulfil the promises made for them. Among the Germans in the occupied territories, the colonists were not by any means the dominant group. The largest farming colony of German settlers from the Reich, that in Western Poland, numbers only a few tens of thousands.² The number of German peasants who settled in Bohemia-Moravia and Alsace-Lorraine is probably even lower.

After the invasion of the Soviet Union it was announced that the large stretches of eastern territory occupied would, thanks to German methods of cultivation and organisation, become the main granary of the Reich. So far, however, there have been no reports of any appreciable influx of German settlers. Even in the case of Lithuania, adjacent to East Prussia, reports of the expulsion of Lithuanian peasants from their land, which was handed over with all its equipment and livestock to German colonists³, refer only to the Memel region, a narrow belt of land on the German border incorporated into the Reich on 22 March 1939.⁴ A class of German agriculturists often mentioned as immigrating to Lithuania, as well as to Estonia and Latvia, are overseers, whose mission it is to improve the methods of farming and to make the local labourers work, but they are comparatively few in number.

The situation in Western Bielorrussia and the Western Ukraine (which from October 1939 until the German invasion were under Russian rule) and in the incorporated territories formerly belonging to the Soviet Union seems to be no different. Attempts to colonise these areas have been made by the German authorities, mainly, no doubt, in the Bialystok region, which was incorporated into the German province of East Prussia in June 1941 after the invasion of the Soviet Union, and had therefore, like all the incorporated territories, to be germanised. The German Ministry of Agriculture looked for settlers in Germany as well as in the Netherlands and

¹ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 12, Apr. 1941. The execution of this plan was reported to have originally affected 2,500 to 4,000 families.

² According to Polish sources. Some contribution appears to have been made by the Hitler Youth to the germanisation of the Warthegau. According to the *Ostdeutscher Beobachter* (25 Nov. 1942), during 1942 the number of youth camps in the Warthegau rose from 11 to 18 and the number of camps for young women from 14 to 22. Special efforts had also been made to attract suitable settlers, even among non-Germans, and the training camps had been opened to Norwegians, Flemings, Netherlands and Danes. Altogether 900 people were enrolled. Many of the non-Germans subsequently settled in the towns, but efforts were made to get the Germans settled on the land.

³ *Izvestia*, 11 Nov. 1942, quoting *Vilnaer Zeitung*.

⁴ Other reports of the evacuation of Lithuanian homesteads for the benefit of Germans concern the repatriated Germans who left Lithuania in 1940 and returned in 1942.

Denmark. "Those with proper qualifications were given from 20 to 40 hectares, in special cases even more, of agricultural land in the East."¹ Information is lacking as to how far the German plan to obtain settlers from the Reich was successful, the only frequent references, occurring in particular in the Russian press, being to agricultural overseers. These "agricultural experts", who have to act as chairmen of the farms and are responsible for keeping up the deliveries of produce, are said to number "many thousands".² Neither in character nor in number, however, can the entry of German agricultural immigrants into the Eastern Territories be characterised as a colonisation movement of the German nation towards the east.

Officials and Non-Agricultural Workers and Employees

This group of Reich Germans in the occupied territories consists mainly of civilian auxiliaries to the German army. The great majority are police and other Government officials, employees and workers on the militarised railways, and overseers, foremen and skilled workers engaged in building fortifications and armament factories. With few exceptions, they have been sent under orders and are performing work to which they have been assigned—work directly serving military needs or the needs of the German war economy.

The number of German officials in the occupied territories, who are often accompanied by their families, is very large. In the Warthegau alone they numbered 10,000 in 1941.³ A German economic journal, discussing the heavy drain on manpower due to the war, mentions at the same time, and as though giving equal weight to each, the demand for labour in the armament industries and for the administration of the occupied territories.⁴ Later, it was stated that the shortage of officials had been aggravated by the extension of the area to be administered.⁵ Huge numbers are employed in the ordinary police force and in the political police (Gestapo and S.S.), and many more in various administrative branches connected with the German war economy. Thus, for instance, the employment offices of the Eastern Territories alone (not including Western Poland and the General Government, enlarged by the addition of East Galicia) employed 1,700 Germans in the autumn of 1942.⁶

Among the workers and salaried employees, many are engaged

¹ *Central European Observer*, 27 Nov. 1942.

² According to the *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland*, 30 Aug. 1942, 7,000 young agricultural instructors were sent from Germany to the Ukraine.

³ *Deutsche Post aus dem Osten*, June 1942.

⁴ *Wirtschaftsdienst*, 1 May 1942.

⁵ *Völkischer Beobachter*, 19 Sept. 1942.

⁶ *Berliner Börsen Zeitung*, 11 Sept. 1942.

in running the more or less militarised railways. In the railway service of the General Government alone over 7,000 Germans from the Reich are employed.¹ There are also numbers of German foremen and other skilled factory workers. The General Controller of Labour, Dr Sauckel, has laid down that German employees and workers are bound to obey orders to go to work in the occupied territories.² The authorities concerned are advised to be sparing in their use of German skilled labour, directing it to the occupied territories mainly in accordance with military requirements.

The influx of Germans of these categories from the Reich was especially large in Bohemia-Moravia where, as will be seen below, many Czech officials, railway and tramway employees, and others, were replaced by incoming Germans.

Another area to which there was much German immigration was Alsace-Lorraine, whence hundreds of thousands of the local population had left or been expelled.³ In both these territories, however, the shortage of manpower has made it generally impossible to replace the industrial workers.

Many Germans from the Reich settled among the working population of the western Polish provinces, in addition to the Germans transferred from eastern and south-eastern Europe. As to the occupied Soviet territories, the problem there was different. All officials and vast numbers of skilled workers had been evacuated by the Russians, and the difficulty was to supply these immense territories with the labour necessary to organise the construction of fortifications and to restore some of the mines and factories to working order. Instructions were therefore given that German craftsmen from the Reich might be employed in the Ukraine, but only to a limited extent and in order to fulfil the tasks which were most urgent and important for the war effort.⁴

Finally, mention must be made of the Reich Germans engaged in trade and commerce in the occupied countries. A tremendous volume of business has to be handled by the German firms responsible for the wholesale trade in the occupied countries and in some of those allied to Germany. The function of the centralised German wholesale traders in the General Government, for instance, is on the one hand "to supply the rural population of the regions assigned to them with necessary goods, particularly with agricultural tools, fertilisers and important commodities; and on the other to obtain the agricultural products of these regions and deliver them to be used". This task has been entrusted in particular to firms from

¹ *Krauhauer Zeitung*, 4 Sept. 1942.

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Aug. 1942, No. 21, Part I, p. 850.

³ See Chapter II, pp. 70-75.

⁴ *D.N.B.*, 22 Nov. 1942.

Hamburg, Bremen and other Hanseatic cities which had lost their overseas trade because of the British blockade "South-eastern Europe is already covered with a network of German firms, especially those from Bremen and Hamburg, which have established branches in Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, and have organised a vast exchange of goods between these countries and Germany" The experience acquired here was later utilised in occupied Russia. Furthermore, Hanscatic shippers and forwarding agencies established branches in Riga and Reval (Tallinn), while other German firms were engaged in tobacco and cotton production and other businesses in the Balkans and the Ukraine.¹ Nevertheless, the number of Germans working abroad in commercial undertakings should not be overestimated, since it must be remembered that retail trade, which commonly absorbs the great majority of the people engaged in commerce, is left in the hands of local merchants.

Refugees and Evacuees

All the movements of Germans from the Reich described above are controlled by the German Government in accordance with the necessities of war. In 1942, however, a new turn in military events caused mass dislocation of a different kind among the German population. This was the evacuation resulting from the bombing of German cities. About the beginning of 1942 there were already reports of the removal of many factories from the Ruhr to Austria in order to escape British air raids.² Then came the heavy bombing of Cologne and other industrial centres in the Rhineland and the Ruhr, as well as on the sea coast, and the removal of factories and the evacuation and flight of the population began on a grand scale.

The first reports spoke of a general exodus from the cities of the Rhineland and other heavily bombed regions, reminiscent of scenes on the French roads two years earlier. In some cases it was an aimless wandering into the open country to escape the horrors of the raids, but many such refugees definitely left their homes. Later, this haphazard flight of people in fear was transformed into organised evacuation, and women and children were removed in an orderly manner to safer regions. At the same time the more difficult task was undertaken of transferring industrial workers together with the factories where they had been employed. The number of refu-

¹ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 20, July 1942. This same periodical had reported in Nov. 1941 that forty firms formerly engaged in overseas trade were operating in the General Government. *Wirtschaftsdienst*, No. 2, 9 Jan. 1942, reported that German overseas firms, especially Hanseatic houses, which had been operating in the General Government for two years, had been entrusted with the wholesale trade in Western Białoruś and the Western Ukraine.

² *New York Times*, 2 Jan. 1942.

gees from Cologne, the first heavily bombed city, was estimated at 140,000.¹ Large numbers are reported to have left Aachen, Düsseldorf and Mainz on the Rhine, the industrial cities of Wuppertal, Essen, Solingen and Dortmund in the Rhine-Ruhr region², Münster and Bielefeld in Northern Westphalia, Bremen, Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven³ on the North Sea, and the Baltic ports of Kiel, Lübeck and Rostock.

A rough estimate of the number of these evacuees can be made on the basis of a report of the German Extended Child Evacuation Scheme issued in October 1942. According to this report, no less than 1,700 special trains, besides other means of transportation, were used to remove women and children from the danger zones. German press reports gave the number of evacuated children alone as 1,300,000.⁴ This does not include those who travelled by road or took ordinary trains on their own initiative. Furthermore, many workers were removed with the factories where they had been employed. All these would add up to millions. An estimate of over two million for the end of 1942 might be considered conservative and must have been by far surpassed, after the heavy bombings of 1943.

The Child Evacuation Scheme selected reception areas in safe districts of the Reich, as well as in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Denmark, and the Protectorate. Reports about other refugees mention different regions where they took shelter. The hotels of Berlin were reported to be crowded with them.⁵ Many went to Bavaria and South Baden and other parts of the Reich more remote from the bombed areas, but great masses seem to have taken refuge in occupied or allied countries. Austria⁶, Bohemia-Moravia, and Alsace-Lorraine are often mentioned in this connection. During

¹ This was reported by the London correspondent of the *New York Times*, 23 July 1942, on the basis of a "reliable foreign source". The Moscow radio estimated the number of refugees at 200,000.

² According to recent reports from London and Berne, the evacuation of 3,000,000 persons not essential to the Ruhr's industries was ordered in June 1943, more than 1,000,000 having already moved (*New York Times*, 25, 26 and 27 June 1943). In Aug. 1943 hundreds of thousands more left Hamburg and Berlin.

³ According to a Swedish Press report, quoted by the *New York Times*, 3 Mar. 1943, all women and children were evacuated from Wilhelmshaven by special trains.

⁴ The normal period of evacuation was said to be 6 to 9 months. It was added, however, that the camps in which children over 10 years were housed (those under 10 years having been billeted with families) "were not necessarily temporary structures" (*Völkischer Beobachter*, 24 Sept. and 17 Oct. 1942). In any case, the limited period for which the children were housed does not mean that they were all sent home afterwards. This would rather have been an exception in cases where children were housed during repairs, the area itself not being considered as endangered. In the ordinary way, the children would have been housed until their parents had established themselves elsewhere.

⁵ *Izvestia*, 26 July 1942.

⁶ Thirteen thousand families in Vienna, according to an Overseas News Agency (O.N.A.) report from Berne, 9 June 1943; 7,000 children and mothers in Styria from Cologne alone, according to a German press report.

the summer and autumn of 1942, a large number sought refuge in Paris. The first wave, coming mainly from Cologne, was followed by 30,000 more from the Rhineland; they settled in the suburbs of Paris. Another 20,000 were established in Dijon and 10,000 more were expected in Châlon-sur-Marne.¹ Even the Netherlands² and Belgium³, so easily accessible to the raiders, were chosen for the evacuation of children and attracted goodly numbers of fleeing Germans. In Slovakia, the large increase in the German population is probably to be attributed to the influx of refugees. In regard to Poland, there is definite information concerning 50,000 German children sent to the General Government from the parts of the Reich most subject to Allied air raids.⁴ Furthermore, it is reported that in Warsaw many refugees from the Rhineland took over the dwellings of Poles who had been forcibly moved to the outskirts of the city.⁵ German refugees were to be found even as far afield as Kiev and Athens.

Factories from the bombed areas, together with their skilled workers, were reported to have been moved to southern Germany, the Protectorate and Poland, as well as to Norway (where, for instance, a section of the famous chemical works, *I. G. Farben*, was established) and to the occupied Soviet territories.

Summary

It is difficult to estimate the total number of Germans from the Reich in the territories occupied or controlled by Germany, but some of the information available may be quoted to give an idea of the volume of this immigration into certain countries.

The first big influx of Germans went to Bohemia-Moravia, mainly to Prague. The best modern apartment houses were cleared of their Czech tenants for German occupation; the best suburbs were transformed into German residential quarters. The total number of Germans in Prague was estimated in spring 1942 at 200,000. Pilsen and Brno also received numerous immigrants and even many smaller towns witnessed the rise of German colonies.⁶

¹ *Pour la Victoire* (New York), 17 Oct. 1942.

² *Netherlands News*, 11/25 Nov. 1942.

³ It was reported that evacuees from heavily bombed areas in western Germany had gone to live in Brussels, thus creating a housing shortage there (*News from Belgium*, 14 Nov. 1942). Furthermore, construction of barracks in the Belgio-German frontier area for evacuees from the Ruhr has been reported (*idem*, 3 Apr. 1943). In July 1943, 30,000 Ruhr workers were reported transferred to Luxemburg.

⁴ *Krakauer Zeitung*, 15 Oct. 1942. More groups of children were reported to have been sent at the beginning of 1943 to the Tatra Mountains on the Slovenian frontier (*idem*, 3 Mar. 1943).

⁵ *Nowy Swiat*, 22 Sept. 1942 (O.N.A. report from Zurich).

⁶ According to the Czechoslovak Information Service. Cf. also Eug. V. ERDELY: *Germany's First European Protectorate* (London, 1942), p. 244, and René KRAUS: *Europe in Revolt* (1942), pp. 244-245, where an influx of 250,000 Germans to Prague is mentioned.

Since then, the influx of refugees from bombed areas has considerably increased this total.

A hint of the extent of immigration into Slovakia may be gleaned from the increase in the German population there. Before the Germans occupied Bohemia-Moravia and obtained control of Slovakia, the German press usually referred to the Germans in Slovakia as numbering about 128,000.¹ In 1940, after the dismemberment of Slovakia, the figure of only 79,000² was given, whereas a figure of 160,000 has since been reported.³ If these figures are reliable, they would seem to indicate recent German immigration which may well consist of refugees from the bombed areas.

Another area into which there has been considerable German immigration is Alsace-Lorraine. In November 1940 German authorities declared that about 200,000 Germans were to move into Lorraine. No information is available as to the carrying out of this programme, but there can be little doubt that the figure announced was reached and, taking Alsace and Lorraine together, even exceeded, particularly when it is remembered that these provinces had lost something like 500,000 of their French-speaking population.⁴ Some idea of the number of Germans residing in other parts of France may be obtained from a report from Stockholm that 100,000 Germans in Paris were being trained on Sundays in street fighting and other forms of partisan warfare.⁵ This despatch refers to "German civilians holding positions in various Reich administrations in Paris". But even assuming that the figure quoted above includes all the male Germans in the Paris region not belonging to the army of occupation, the total of Germans, including women and children, in France (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) would be at least twice as large.

Numerous incidental reports also suggest an extensive German infiltration into the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway.⁶

Early in 1943 a German source⁷ announced that "more than 400,000 Germans from the old Reich were induced to settle down in Warthegau by the favourable opportunities offered to them

¹ *Der Deutsche im Ostland*, Jan. 1939: "Volksdeutscher Aufbau im Ostland".

² Franz RIBBT, *Das Deutschtum zwischen Pressburg und Barfeld*, 1940 (published by the *Deutsches Auslandsinstitut*). This figure is approved by *Archiv für Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde* (No. 1-2, 1941, p. 52) as "probably approximately correct".

³ *Berliner Illustrierte Nachrichten*, 8 Oct. 1942.

⁴ Cf. Chapter II, below, p. 75.

⁵ *New York Times*, 31 Aug. 1942.

⁶ According to a statement of the Norwegian labour leader, Martin Tranmæl, there are at present about 400,000 Germans, military and civilian, in Norway (*Swedish Press*, 14 Apr. 1943). Preparations for a German influx have been reported from Kristiansund (*Göteborgs-Posten*, 3 Apr. 1943).

⁷ Transocean broadcast, 31 Jan. 1943.

there". It seems probable, however, that this migration was due not only to the attraction of the inducements offered, but also to the expulsive force of the Anglo-American bombing.

The influx into Danzig-West Prussia and Silcsia was, of course, much smaller. Yet even assuming that it amounted only to a quarter of the immigrants into Warthegau, *i.e.* 100,000, the total of Reich Germans in the incorporated Polish provinces would amount to half a million.

As to the General Government, apart from the 50,000 evacuated children noted above, information is available for Cracow, where the German population increased from 500 in 1933 to 24,800 in August 1942.¹ Plans made by the Governor of Warsaw for the evacuation of 40,000 apartments in the Polish capital in order to make room for Germans have also been reported.² The completion of this scheme, which had already been begun, would mean an influx of about 200,000 Germans.

The total number of Germans from the Reich in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union is undoubtedly large. No credit can be attached, however, to a report that there are in Kiev about 300,000 Germans, including both foremen and skilled workers transferred there to operate factories and evacuees from bombed areas. This report is not confirmed by any other source, and it is implicitly contradicted by another report of about the same date from Kiev, which described living conditions in the city in detail without mentioning the presence of a number of German immigrants large enough to double its decimated population.³ If the figure of 300,000 has any basis at all, it can only apply to all Germans from the Reich in the whole of German-occupied territory east of the General Government.

The table following gives a tentative estimate of the number of Reich Germans in some occupied and allied territories into which they have probably immigrated in the largest numbers. The table is based on the figures quoted in the text, allowing for an estimated number of 1,000,000 German refugees abroad evacuated from the bombed areas to cover those who have not been included in any other group. The object of the table is only to give a rough idea of German civilian emigration and its distribution, and the estimates given are rather conservative than the reverse.

¹ According to the German-published Russian paper, *Novoye Slovo* (Berlin), quoted by *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New York), 24 Aug. 1942.

² *Nowy Swiat*, 22 Sept. 1942 (O.N.A. dispatch from Zurich).

³ *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, 30 Dec 1942. The report states that "only houses occupied by Germans are heated". The word 'only' would be strange if it covered the apartments of half the city's population, especially as mention is made of "hospitals overcrowded with wounded German soldiers".

Country or region	No. of German immigrants from the Reich
Alsace-Lorraine	300,000
Other parts of France	200,000
Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway	200,000
Bohemia-Moravia	400,000
Slovakia	80,000
Incorporated Polish Provinces	500,000
General Government	300,000
Other Germ in-occupied Eastern Territories	300,000
Total	<u>2,280,000</u>

The total number of German civilians from the Reich abroad, including south-eastern Europe and the neutral countries, must therefore be in the neighbourhood of 2,500,000.

CHAPTER II

MOVEMENTS OF NON-GERMAN POPULATIONS

PRE-WAR REFUGEE MOVEMENTS

The population movements described in the present chapter are largely the continuation and extension of the forced migrations characteristic of Europe during the pre-war years, when they arose successively in all the countries which came under a totalitarian régime.

When National Socialism came into power in Germany in 1933, Europe had barely finished disposing of the refugee problem bequeathed by the first world war. The problem of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor had been solved by a huge population transfer carried out under the Treaty of Lausanne of 30 January 1923. Three hundred and eighty-eight thousand Moslems were transferred from Greek territory to Turkey in exchange for 800,000 persons of Greek origin who had left Turkey at the time of the Smyrna defeat¹, and many others who migrated between 1922 and 1924 from Eastern Thrace, Anatolia and Istanbul. The total of Greek refugees, including some tens of thousands from Russia and Bulgaria, has been estimated at 1,300,000.²

The problem of Russian refugees had taken longer to solve. From 1918 to 1922 there had been a considerable stream of emigration from Russia; from Southern Russia, through Siberia, over the frontiers of the Baltic countries, of Rumania, and especially of Poland, the civil war and the revolution had caused the departure of a very large number of military personnel and civilians, variously estimated at anything between 900,000 and 2,900,000³, the most probable figure being 1,500,000. Most of these refugees, however, had

¹ Sir John Hope Simpson: *The Refugee Problem* (London, 1939), pp. 14 and 26.

² *Idem*, p. 17.

³ The first figure is given by Dr. Isjumov who made an enquiry for Sir John Hope Simpson (*op. cit.*, pp. 80, 82), the latter by H. von Rimscha, in *Der russische Bürgerkrieg und die russische Emigration* (Jena, 1924), pp. 50-51, on the basis of the figures for refugees assisted by the American Red Cross. Soviet authors estimated the total of refugees at 2,000,000. Cf. E. Z. Volkov: *Dinamika narodonaseleniya S.S.S.R. za vosemdesiat let* (1930), p. 185; N. P. Oganyovskiy: *Ocherki po ekonomicheskoi geographii S.S.S.R.* (2nd edition, 1924), p. 71; P. T. Jurid and N. A. Koval'evskiy: *Ekonomicheskaya geografiya S.S.S.R.*, Vol. 1, 1934, pp. 73 and 78. The same figure is given by Russian emigré authors; cf. B. Nikitin, in *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, 1922, II, p. 191; and V. K. Davatz and N. N. Lvov: *Russkaya armiya na chuzhbine*, 1923, p. 12.

ultimately managed to settle in the country of their choice in Europe or elsewhere, and the problem might have been regarded as solved had not the unemployment crisis and the restrictions placed on the employment of foreigners suddenly revived it.

From 1933 onwards the refugee problem assumed a different aspect. At that date there began a series of forced migrations, the prelude to the mass displacements of non-German peoples which Europe has witnessed since the beginning of the present war. The National Socialist revolution in Germany caused the flight of many Germans compromised by their previous political activities, while others left the country to escape from a régime founded on theories they could not accept. But the great majority of the refugees were Jews who were gradually forced to leave by persecution and by their exclusion from every form of economic activity.

The first panic flight of refugees followed immediately on the establishment of the National Socialist Government. The second came after the promulgation of the anti-Jewish Nürnberg laws of 15 September 1935, and the third after the annexation of Austria and the pogroms of November 1938. At first, France and other European countries opened their frontiers to the refugees and temporary facilities were given for emigration to Palestine. Later, however, European countries, still in the throes of the world depression, raised difficulties to their entry, while restrictions were also placed on admission to Palestine. Moreover, the process of leaving Germany was complicated by the Reich's financial policy towards emigrants, which in the years immediately preceding the war practically amounted to complete expropriation. While encouraging the departure of Jews, the German Government endeavoured at the same time to confiscate everything they possessed. The refugees were not allowed to take with them either money, jewelry, furs, furniture, or the tools of their trade. The normal difficulties involved in liquidating property in a hurry were increased by special regulations. The emigrant had to pay a "flight tax" of 25 per cent., and the remainder of his property was put in a blocked account which could be used only for payments in Germany. In order to transfer his blocked marks abroad, the refugee had to sell them to the Reich's *Golddiskontobank*, which in 1938 paid only 9 to 14 per cent. of their value, so that in the end he received only about 8 per cent. of the proceeds of the sale of his property.

In spite of all these obstacles, however, a great many persons, both Jews and others, were able to emigrate from Germany. According to the census of 1933, Germany then had a Jewish population of 499,700, to which must be added 3,100 Jews from the Saar (census of July 1933), giving a total of 503,000. Sir Herbert

Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, has estimated the entire number of Jews who left Germany between April 1933 and 1 July 1939 at 215,000¹. Adding emigration during the months of July and August, the total would be about 226,000.

On 12 March 1938 Austria was annexed by Germany, and the application of the anti-Jewish policy to the 180,000² Austrian Jews followed immediately. "The effect was more catastrophic than in Germany, because a process spread over five years in Germany was carried out in a few months in Austria. The whole programme, built up by a series of administrative and legal measures in Germany, was applied at one blow to Austria."³ The new wave of emigration was, however, restricted by "the impossibility for the refugee to take out even the minimum of resources to keep him going until he could find his feet, and because frontiers had been closed against immigration. The way out for many in Vienna was not emigration, but suicide."⁴ Nevertheless the Jewish exodus from Austria was even on a relatively larger scale than from Germany. Sir Herbert Emerson estimated the number of Jews who emigrated from Austria up to 1 July 1939 at 97,000, and up to the outbreak of war the total would probably be about 106,000.⁵

After the Munich agreement German rule was gradually extended over Czechoslovak territory. The annexation of the Sudetenland on 1 October 1938 provoked a mass flight from this territory to unoccupied Bohemia-Moravia. Among the refugees there were again a great number of Jews, estimated at a total of 17,000⁶, this constituting the great majority of the Jewish population of the Sudetenland which numbered 23,000. In the following March the mutilated remains of Bohemia-Moravia were also occupied. Even before the occupation, Jewish emigration started on a large scale. The number of settled Jews in unoccupied Bohemia-Moravia was about 90,000⁷, and to them must be added 17,000 refugees

¹ *International Assistance to Refugees: Supplementary Report Submitted to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees*, 20 Oct. 1939 (LEAGUE OF NATIONS, A. 18 (a), 1939, XII)

² *Report of the Jewish Community of Vienna on Emigration, Returning and Social Care*, 2 May 1938—31 July 1939.

³ Sir John Hope Simpson: *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 141.

⁵ *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, 7 Feb. 1941, gave the figure of 105,000 Jewish emigrants from Austria up to the census of May 1939. According to the report of the Jewish Community of Vienna, 104,000 Jews left Vienna (where almost all Austrian Jews were then concentrated) up to 31 July 1939, including 1,680 who went to Germany. The report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee states that up to the end of 1939 about 124,000 Jews had escaped from Austria.

⁶ According to the Institute of Jewish Affairs.

⁷ The Czechoslovak census of 1930 shows 117,600 Jews in Bohemia, Moravia and Czechoslovak Silesia. From this number must be deducted 23,000 in the Sudetenland and a few thousand in Silesia, occupied by Poland.

from the Sudetenland and some 15,000 from Germany and Austria.¹ The number of Jews who emigrated from Bohemia-Moravia up to 1 July 1939 is estimated by Sir Herbert Emerson at 17,000, consisting almost entirely of Jews who had fled at an earlier date from Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland. According to an estimate of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, legal and illegal emigration during the year 1 October 1938—1 October 1939 amounted to some 39,000.

The total Jewish emigration from Greater Germany between April 1933 and 1 July 1939 was estimated by Sir Herbert Emerson at 329,000. According to the figures given above, it must have amounted to between 360,000 and 370,000 up to the outbreak of war.

These figures refer only to confessional Jewish refugees. From the National Socialist standpoint the Jewish problem is a question of race and not of religion, and the anti-Jewish laws are applied also to other so-called "non-Aryans"—i.e., to Christians of Jewish or partly Jewish origin—so that German policy also provoked the emigration of "non-Aryan" Christians. Furthermore, many "Aryans" emigrated also for political reasons, especially immediately after Chancellor Hitler assumed power. The Gestapo evaluated their number in 1933-1934 at 20,000 (the number of Jewish emigrants being given as 90,000). Mr. James G. McDonald, High Commissioner of the League of Nations for German Refugees, estimated in his letter of resignation that the non-Jews, including political emigrants and non-Aryan Christians, constituted 15 to 20 per cent. of the total number of refugees in 1935. Taking into consideration the Christian refugees as well as the emigration since 1 July 1939, Sir Herbert Emerson estimated in his report of 20 October 1939 that a total of 400,000 refugees had left Greater Germany since 1933.²

By no means all the refugees who fled from Greater Germany escaped from persecution. Many of them went to countries which subsequently came under German domination during the war.³

¹ On 1 Aug. 1939 there were 14,800 Jewish refugees in the Protectorate (not including those from the Sudetenland), according to the official statistics reported by the Jewish Community of Prague.

² Apart from the Jewish refugees, the High Commissioner's supplementary report of 20 Oct. 1939 mentions about 20,000 Czechs and political refugees from the Sudetenland. The Reich Statistical Office gives the figure of 400,000 as a rough estimate of the number of refugees up to the census of May 1939 (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, Nos. 5-6 and 20, 1940).

³ The distribution of German refugees at certain dates up to the end of 1937 is shown by Sir John HOPP SMITHSON'S diagrams and tables. For the period after 1937 information is contained in the reports of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for the years 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941 and the first five months of 1942, the annual reports of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigration Aid Society

(Footnote continued on next page.)

Palestine was the only overseas country of importance for immigration purposes during the early years. Later, the refugee colonies in the countries of Western Europe were scattered all over the world, while a growing current of overseas emigration also went directly from Germany. In December 1937 about 60 per cent. of the total number of refugees, estimated at 154,000, were in overseas countries, the proportions being as follows: Palestine (27.2 per cent.), United States (17.1 per cent.), South America (13.4 per cent.), South Africa (3.1 per cent.).

The increased emigration to the United States and to Latin America could not, however, absorb the new wave of refugees which rose after the annexation of Austria and the pogroms of November 1938. Once again masses of Jews fled to France, Belgium, the Netherlands and other neighbouring countries. In December 1939 the percentage of German refugees in overseas countries was nearly the same as two years before (about 55 per cent.). But in view of the increased total of Jewish refugees from Greater Germany—over 360,000—this indicated that over 160,000 refugees still remained in Europe. Of this number, some 50,000 were in Great Britain, and, in countries which have remained neutral¹, the others—some 110,000—were in countries which came under German occupation or became Germany's allies in the course of the war.² Only a few thousands of the German refugees in these countries succeeded in emigrating from Europe before the German offensive

(*Hias*) and Hias-Ica Emigration Association (*Hicem*), the reports of the Jewish Communities and Committees presented to the Joint-Hicem conference held in Paris on 24 Aug. 1939 (these reports, which give the numbers of Jewish refugees in some European countries on 1 Aug. 1939, have been consulted by courtesy of I. Dijour, Executive Secretary of the Hias-Ica Emigration Association), the report of the Vienna Jewish Community (with a map illustrating the dispersal of the Vienna Jews over the world), the German statistics of overseas emigration in 1935-1939 (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 18), and the statistics of immigration into the United States and Palestine. Cf. also I. DIJOUR: "Jewish Emigration from Europe in the Present War", in *Jivo Bleter* (Journal of the Yiddish Scientific Institute), Vol. XIX, No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1942, pp. 145-156; ARIEH TARTAKOWER: "The Jewish Refugees", in *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1942, pp. 311-348; *American Jewish Year Book*, Vols. 43 and 44 (New York, 1941-1942); and MARC WISNITZKY: "Migration of Jews", in *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. VII. It should be borne in mind that many German Jews arrived in the United States not directly from Germany, but via other European countries, while others entered not as immigrants but as visitors.

¹ On 1 Aug. 1939 there were 42,600 refugees in Great Britain and 2,500 assisted refugees in Switzerland, according to the reports of the Jewish Communities and Committees.

² On 1 Aug. 1939 there were 71,000 refugees in France, 14,000 assisted refugees in Belgium and 300 refugees in Luxemburg, according to the same source. The figure of 71,000 seems to include also Russian Jewish refugees who had entered France long before the war. The report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 1939 gives the number of refugees from Greater Germany in Dec. 1939 as 38,000. The total of refugees in Belgium was 25,000 and in the Netherlands 23,000, according to MAX GOTTSCHALK, President of the Hias-Ica Emigration Association (*Hicem*), in *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 43, p. 324.

of May 1940 and later (up to November 1942), mainly from the unoccupied part of France; others escaped to England. The rest were submerged in the mass of the Jewish population of Nazi-dominated Europe and shared their fate.

Another mass movement of refugees in the pre-war period came from Spain. The Civil War at first gave rise to a tremendous internal movement of population fleeing before General Franco's advance; in August 1938 the Catalonian Government stated that there were 2,000,000 refugees on Republican territory.¹ The subsequent conquest of Catalonia by General Franco led to a mass movement across the frontier. The Republican army retreated into French territory together with a crowd of civilian refugees; a report presented to a committee of the French Parliament stated that there were a total of 450,000 Spanish refugees in France, including 220,000 belonging to the Republican army. A return movement to Spain started in September 1939. Other refugees, in particular Basques, emigrated to Latin America; still others were able to find employment in France, especially in agriculture and in the metal-working industries. At the end of 1939 the French Government was supporting 51,400 Spanish civilians and 71,300 militiamen.² In February 1940 the French Minister of the Interior, Albert Sarraut, stated that there remained in France 140,000 Spanish refugees. About 300,000 had left France, between 20,000 and 25,000 having gone to Latin America while the rest had returned to Spain.

Thus the events which took place from 1933 to 1939 left the countries of Europe at the outbreak of the war with a heritage of some 300,000 political, religious and racial refugees—160,000 from Greater Germany and 140,000 from Spain—to whom must be added the Czechs and Slovaks expelled from their homes as a consequence of the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak Republic.³

With the outbreak of war a new period of population displacement began. The hostilities did not at first completely put an end to overseas emigration from Germany and Nazi-dominated countries, which continued, though on a very restricted scale, even after the United States had entered the war. The total number of Jews who emigrated from Europe during the war may be estimated at about 135,000, of whom some 65,000 went to the United States, about 30,000 to Latin America, 35,000 to Palestine and 5,000 to other overseas countries. A further 15 or 20 thousand went to the

¹ Sir John Hope Simpson: *op. cit.*, p. 164.

² *The I.L.O. Year-Book*, 1939-40, pp. 227-228.

³ Cf. below, pp. 46-48.

neutral countries, Sweden, Spain and Switzerland.¹ Finally, between 10,000 and 12,000 were reported to be in North Africa; since the arrival of the British-American army, these are now being released from the camps in which they had been interned.² To all these must be added the non-confessional Jews and the "Aryan" refugees. Assuming that they constituted 20 per cent. of the whole number of refugees³, the total would be about 200,000.

After the Franco-German armistice an attempt was also made to evacuate Spanish refugees overseas. Negotiations between France and Mexico led to an agreement for the transfer of a large number of them, but for various reasons this agreement could not be carried out. In the summer of 1941 it was reported that the Vichy Government had sent Spanish internees to French North African possessions for employment on the Trans-Saharan Railway and other construction work.⁴ The number remaining at the time of the occupation of North Africa by the British-American forces was slightly over 3,000.⁵

But while, as more and more countries have become involved in the war, overseas emigration has gradually dwindled to what is now virtually a standstill, mass displacements of population within the European continent have been taking place among the peoples of the countries invaded by Germany. The war itself, invasion, bombing, have led to the flight or evacuation of millions. As a corollary to the transfers of German populations described in the

¹ According to recent information there are about 11,000 foreign refugees in Switzerland. Estimates as to the number of refugees in Spain vary from between seven and eight thousand—the estimate of the U.S. Department of State—and 18,000—the estimate of the Spanish Government (COMMON COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN UNITY: *Interpreter Releases*, Vol. XX, No. 9, Series A, Immigration, No. 3, 19 Mar. 1943). According to the latest figures issued by the Social Board, there are in Sweden, apart from slightly over 9,000 Norwegians, 2,400 refugees from Germany and 1,300 others (Swedish Press, 5 Mar. 1943). All these figures which indicate the current position naturally include pre-war refugees as well.

² *J.D.C. Digest*, Feb. 1943.

³ Some figures may be quoted to substantiate this estimate. In 1939-1940, 1,640 non-Jews arrived from Germany in the U.S., representing 7.5 per cent. of the total of immigrants coming directly from Germany. In 1939-1940 and 1940-1941, among the immigrants into the U.S. from France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg, there were 3,200, or 24 per cent., non-Jews. The proportion in the emigration to the Congo, Curaçao, etc., may have been even higher (I. DRYOUR: *loc. cit.*, pp. 147-148). On the other hand, not all non-Jewish emigrants were political or racial refugees. The percentage of non-Jews among the Polish war refugees in transoceanic countries varies from 10 per cent. (Shanghai) to 40 per cent. (Brazil), according to Polish sources. It has also to be remembered that the important emigration to Palestine was purely Jewish.

⁴ *New York Times*, 15 June and 6 July 1941.

⁵ According to an announcement of the Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees in French North and West Africa (*New York Times*, 6 Apr. 1943). Other estimates are substantially higher. Cf. *Aufbau* (New York), 22 Jan. 1943, and *New York Post*, 6 Apr. 1943. It has been reported that the Mexican Government will admit the Spanish refugees and that approximately 1,500 of them wish to emigrate.

preceding chapter, local populations have been deported to make room for the newcomers. More mass expulsions have been carried out by Germany's allies in the territories of the defeated countries they have annexed. Population transfers and population exchanges have been organised by treaty or imposed following frontier changes.

All these movements, which are often interdependent and difficult to disentangle from one another, are described together in the first part of this chapter for each of the countries affected. There is one class of deportations, however, which for the sake of clearness has been dealt with separately because it reveals a definite design pursued by Germany or under German influence throughout Axis-occupied and Axis-controlled Europe; this is the deportation of Jews, which is described in the second part of the chapter.

MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLES OTHER THAN JEWS

Czechoslovakia

The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

The proclamation made by the Führer on 16 March 1939, just after the occupation of Prague, began with the words: "Bohemia and Moravia have for a thousand years belonged to the living space of the German people". This claim was given political reality by Chancellor Hitler's Decree of 16 March, the first article of which laid down that Bohemia and Moravia "belong henceforth to the territory of the Greater German Reich". Since then the Germans have been persistently trying to establish themselves in the country of the Czechs, not only politically and economically but also demographically.

Within the framework of a general scheme for the removal of the Czech population and resettlement of the area by Germans, the region of Moravska-Ostrava was to serve as a bridgehead for German ethnical penetration. German language corridors were to be cut across Bohemia and Moravia to isolate the Czechs from the Slovaks and to separate Bohemia from Moravia. The formation of a ring of German settlements round Prague was to complete this programme for the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak nation and people. In fulfilment of the scheme, more than 10,000 workers from the Czech mines and smelting works of Moravska-Ostrava were sent to Germany. In addition, 6,000 Jews from the same region were deported to Poland.¹

About a hundred Czech villages were evacuated, some of them just after the outbreak of the war and others in 1940: forty-two in

¹ Cf. below, p. 98, note 2.

north-eastern Moravia (Vyskov district), the others in the Elbe Valley (Melnik district), near Pilsen (Chrastava district) and in the neighbourhood of Prague, in order to surround the capital with a "Germanic Iron Circle".¹ The expelled Czech peasants (estimated at 70,000) were replaced by German settlers.² There is some doubt as to how many German settlers have been moved in, since the settlement scheme met with various difficulties. For one thing, it threatened the labour supply of the Czech munition industries, and for another, German agriculturists refused to transfer in sufficient numbers to replace the highly efficient Czech farmers. As a result, the settlement scheme was abandoned for the time being.

German immigration on a grand scale came later and was of quite a different social composition, being mainly urban in character. The advance guard consisted of German Gestapo, SS men, and other officials, but as the programme of germanisation proceeded the influx grew steadily greater. New German officials were constantly being appointed and naturally brought their families with them; this process of substituting German for local officials was promoted by a Decree of July 1939 requiring that negotiations between Czech authorities and the "Protectorate Department" must be conducted in German exclusively. Many of the Czech railwaymen were replaced by Germans. In Prague and Brno, the majority of Czech tramway conductors were dismissed and their places taken by Germans, on the pretext that the Czechs could not properly pronounce the new German names of the streets. Even students from all parts of the Reich were sent to the reopened German University of Prague.³ But German immigration was mainly swelled from 1941 onwards as a result of the bombing of German cities; factories, workers, women and children were evacuated to the Protectorate.

The overwhelming majority of German immigrants came from the old Reich, especially from Prussia, and not from Austria. On the other hand, the majority of emigrating Czech workers went to Austria, the largest colony being in Linz.⁴ There has been there-

¹ Eug. V. ERDELY: *op. cit.*, pp. 239-244; René KRAUS: *op. cit.*, pp. 344-345; *New York Herald Tribune*, 20 Feb. 1940. No information is available as to the present whereabouts of these expelled Czech peasants.

² The rumour that some of these settlers came not from the Reich but from Bessarabia is not confirmed by the German reports concerning the resettlement of the "repatriated" Germans. For the first time the D.U.T. report for 1942 mentioned that the industrial workers among repatriated groups are resettled in the Protectorate.

³ Cf. Eug. V. ERDELY: *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 193, and 244-245.

⁴ According to the Czechoslovak Information Service. Cf. also Eug. V. ERDELY: *op. cit.*, pp. 191 and 193.

fore a straight flow of migration crossing Bohemia-Moravia from north to south, the Germans entering Bohemia from the north and the Czechs emigrating to the south.

Slovakia.

Following the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, the Vienna Conference of 3 November 1938 awarded the southern part of Slovakia to Hungary. In this region there were numerous Slovak settlers, who as a result of the agrarian reform in Czechoslovakia had been granted holdings of land some of which had formerly belonged to the big Magyar landowners. This land reform was declared void in the territory incorporated into Hungary, and within a few weeks the settlers were expropriated and expelled.¹ They were joined by officials and employees of public offices and public utilities, and in some districts also by small business men and tradesmen. According to the Czechoslovak Information Service, the total number of Slovaks expelled was between 60,000 and 80,000.

On 14 March 1939, the day before the German occupation of Bohemia, Slovakia declared itself independent. There followed a Hungarian occupation of certain other districts of Slovakia and of the whole of Subcarpathia, resulting, according to the Czechoslovak Information Service, in another migration of 20,000 to 30,000 people who were expelled and sent to Slovakia or to Bohemia-Moravia.²

On the other hand, numerous groups also had to leave Slovakia. According to the Czechoslovak Information Service, about 130,000 Czechs in Slovakia, many of them officials and teachers, were dismissed from their posts and forced to go to Bohemia-Moravia.³

Poland

Mass movements of Poles during the war have taken three forms: first, the flight of the Polish population before the German invasion in September 1939; secondly, the expulsion of Poles from the western Polish provinces incorporated into the Reich, which took place mainly in 1939-1940; and thirdly, the transfer of the population of the eastern Polish provinces (Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine) to the eastern areas of the Soviet Union, organised by the Soviet Government partly in 1939-1940 after

¹ *Südost Echo*, 23 May 1941.

² R. NOWAK, in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, Vol. XVI, 1939, p. 19, affirms that 60 per cent. of this number were Czechs.

³ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 2, states that many nationals of the Protectorate emigrated from Bratislava.

occupying these territories, but mainly in the summer of 1941 on the eve of the German invasion. Two further movements of the Polish population are dealt with in other parts of this study, namely the recruitment of Polish workers for Germany and German-occupied territories, and the deportation of Polish Jews.¹

Refugees after the German Invasion.

In September 1939 there was a mass flight of the Polish population before the rapid advance of the German army. The majority of these refugees remained in the territory occupied by Germany as a result of the Polish campaign. The influx to the capital, which kept up its resistance longer than the rest of the country, was especially large. The day after the German invasion began, the Associated Press reported that refugees from Western Poland and the Polish Corridor were crowding into Warsaw, and this movement continued throughout the German advance. The increase in the population of Warsaw, estimated a few months later at about 300,000, was attributed mainly to the influx of these refugees driven from their homes by war.²

Other refugees succeeded in escaping to Eastern Poland (*i.e.* to Western Bielorrussia and the Western Ukraine) before or after it was occupied by the Soviet Union, or in crossing the Polish frontiers. The first of these groups will be dealt with below in connection with the population transfers from Western Bielorrussia and the Western Ukraine to the east, but some figures are given here concerning those who went from German-occupied Polish territory directly to other countries.

Such part of the Polish army as left Polish territory retreated mainly to Rumania and Hungary, where it was interned. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of Polish soldiers, after overcoming all kinds of difficulties, found their way to France.³ A number of civilians also went to Rumania and Hungary, mostly politicians, officials and Jews. At the end of 1939 the number of Polish civilian refugees in Rumania was about 17,000, many having already managed to leave the country, and in Hungary 15,000.⁴ In 1940-1941 the departures continued, while other Polish refugees were removed from Rumania to Poland after Rumania had joined the Axis. At the end of 1942 the number of Polish refugees remaining was 9,000 in Hungary and 4,000 in Rumania. Three thousand of those who had left Rumania and Hungary found themselves in

¹ Cf. Chapter III, pp. 136-139, and Chapter II, pp. 98-100.

² *New York Times*, 3 Sept. 1939, 24 Feb. and 28 July 1940.

³ *The Black Book of Poland* (New York, 1942), p. 590.

⁴ *The I.L.O. Year Book*, 1939-1940, pp. 220-221.

Italy and others in the Balkan States. However, the great majority reached France (in May 1940 there were 25,000, some of whom escaped to England and America; on 1 November 1942 in the then unoccupied zone there were 11,000, 800 others being in Algeria), England where there were 5,000 civilians at the end of 1942, Switzerland (2,000), and Palestine (over 5,000).¹

Many of the refugees from Poland sought refuge in Lithuania, including the Wilno region, which had been part of Poland but which the Soviet Union had since occupied and handed over to Lithuania. According to official Lithuanian sources, the influx from Poland consisted of about 14,000 members of the Polish army who were interned by the Lithuanian authorities, and 75,000 to 80,000 civilian refugees, of whom all but 10,000 were Jews. Another reliable source gives the figure for civilian refugees as only 30,000, which seems consistent with the figure of 15,000 Jewish refugees given by the *American Jewish Year Book*. There were also 2,000 Polish refugees in Latvia.² Of all the Polish refugees in the Baltic countries, some 2,000 succeeded in crossing Siberia and going to America³, while nearly the same number landed in Japan and Shanghai (which had 950 Polish refugees when it was occupied by the Japanese). Many others were among those who were transferred from the Baltic States to the eastern part of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

Incorporated Western Polish Provinces.

After the collapse of Poland and the partition of Polish territory into a German and a Soviet sphere of interest, some of the Polish territories administered by the Germans were incorporated into the Reich. These were the so-called "reconquered provinces", that is, the German-Polish provinces which Germany had lost after the war of 1914-1918, with the addition of considerable areas of the part of Poland which was under Russian rule before 1914. Two new German provinces were made out of the annexed territory, along with the Free City of Danzig: Warthegau, covering most

¹ All these figures are derived from Polish sources. The total of Polish-Jewish war refugees in Palestine, including those who arrived after 1942 through Iran (cf. below, p. 59), has been estimated at 6,800.

² Another group which might also be considered as refugees are the 17,000 Polish agricultural labourers, out of the 25,000 who used to migrate annually to Latvia for the harvesting season, who were stranded in Latvia when war broke out.

³ The total of Polish refugees, i.e. those who came from west and east, was at the end of 1942, according to Polish sources: 1,800 in Brazil, 1,500 in other South American countries, 1,500 in the United States, 1,000 in Canada. Apart from them, many persons of Polish origin returned from Poland to the United States as American citizens.

of the Polish province of Poznan and part of the Polish province of Lodz, and Danzig-West Prussia, comprising the Free City of Danzig, Polish Pomerania and the rest of Poznan, while a third province, Upper Silesia, consists partly of German and partly of former Polish territories. The Ciechanow (Zischenau) district was merged into the province of East Prussia. The rest of German-occupied Poland became a separate administrative territory under the name of the "General Government for the Occupied Polish Territory", later simply the "General Government".¹

It was intended that the Incorporated Polish Provinces should become completely German, both racially and culturally. This policy was in harmony with the administrative tradition of Prussian rule over Polish territory, which had been a policy of germanisation for over a hundred years, culminating in the so-called "Hakatist Movement" of the last years of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.² But the National Socialist policy of germanisation was essentially different from its predecessors. Former Prussian rulers had tried to germanise the annexed Polish provinces by assimilating the Poles, planting German settlers among them to assist and expedite the process. In the new German policy, however, settlement was the main theme, and germanisation was only a means of expanding the German "living space". Chancellor Hitler in *Mein Kampf* had originated the slogan that the German living space lies to the east. But in Poland the Germans found a land more thickly populated than the adjacent parts of Germany itself, and a large-scale German settlement scheme could be carried out there only after first ridding the country of its own dense population. Accordingly, Germany's policy was not to germanise the Poles, but to expel them and settle Germans in their place. At the same time the political, economic and cultural life of the area had to be germanised to prepare it for German settlement.

Some time was required for the stabilisation of this German policy. At first, isolated attempts to increase the German element in the territory suggested that the policy of germanisation was to be extended even to the General Government. However, this trend was soon reversed, and some of the old-established German colonists were "repatriated" from the General Government, which was destined to become the settlement area for the Poles from the Incorporated Provinces and also for the Jews from all parts

¹ After the invasion of the U.S.S.R., Eastern Galicia, formerly in the Russian sphere of influence, was included in the General Government, while the Bialystok region became part of the province of East Prussia.

² Cf. Richard W. Toms: *Germanising Russian Poland. The H.K.T. Society and the Struggle for the Eastern Marches in the German Empire, 1894—1919* (New York, 1941).

of German-controlled Europe.¹ The Incorporated Provinces—Warthegau and Danzig-West Prussia—were, on the other hand, to become wholly German. This, of course, was merely the dominant principle of racial segregation in the east. Its application was substantially modified by practical considerations, especially those connected with the prosecution of the war.

The germanisation of the Incorporated Provinces was both rapid and thorough.² The Polish population, which formed 87 per cent. of the total population, and even now, after mass expulsion, still constitutes about three-fourths of the whole, is ignored by the German administration. The Poles have been completely excluded from local government; thus, for instance, in Lodz, which still has a large Polish majority, the city council is composed of 14 former Polish nationals of German origin and 24 Germans from the Reich. The names of cities have been germanised; for instance, Lodz has become Litzmannstadt. The streets have been given new German names, often in honour of National Socialist leaders. The use of the Polish language is banned in public life. Polish newspapers have been suspended, and the publication of books in Polish is prohibited. There are no Polish schools whatsoever. But the most radical method of all adopted to destroy the Polish character of the Incorporated Provinces was the actual eviction of the Polish population.

¹ With Germany's further expansion there seems to have been another reversal of the German view of the function to be performed by the General Government. In the summer of 1942, news reached the Polish Government in London that the population of whole villages in the districts of Lublin, Zamocz, Sieradz, Lask and Olkusz (all located in the General Government) had been evicted from their homes and the land occupied by German colonists imported from Volhynia and Rumania.

It seems that these cases mark a change in German colonisation policy. An article by Dr. Adolph DRESLER (*Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, 4 Oct. 1942) points out that the "racial Germans" in the General Government have become a weighty factor in the establishment of German leadership in the east. Organised in "the German fellowship", they form solid islands in an area inhabited by aliens, islands which are to serve as starting-points for further German expansion and at the same time as a link with the more remote occupied areas further east. Another article by Commissioner GŁOBOŹNIK, published in the *Krakauer Zeitung*, 3 Jan. 1943 (quoted in *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Feb. 1943), deals with the colonisation of the Zamocz area, where "there are numerous *Volksdeutsche* and people of German origin. Because the soil is very fertile it has been decided that, after the area has been cleared, many racial Germans who have been evacuated from other territories and German ex-servicemen will be settled there." As has already been seen, the General Government became, in fact, in the course of the year 1942, a new area for the resettlement of repatriated Germans (cf. above, Chapter I, p. 23).

According to the Polish Information Office, the removal of the Polish population from the General Government was connected with the construction of a line of fortifications running from the River Bug through the province of Lublin to Northern Galicia. In Aug. 1942, and again in Dec. 1942 and Jan. 1943, tens of thousands of Poles were removed from this area. Some of their land was taken over by transferred "racial Germans", and the rest remained unoccupied.

² A vivid picture of the process of germanisation is given by S. SEGAL: *The New Order in Poland* (1942).

This compulsory mass transfer was carried out according to a preconceived plan which prescribed the very harshness of the methods used. In a speech made at Bromberg on 26 November 1939, Gauleiter Forster declared:

The German cause has been entrusted to our keeping by the Führer, with the definite mission of re-germanising this country. It will be our highest and most honourable task to do everything in our power to ensure that in a few years everything in any way reminiscent of Poland shall have disappeared. This applies particularly to the racial purging of the country. Whosoever belongs to the Polish people must leave this land. We hope that in this struggle for the triumph of our German cause we shall never become merciful, that we shall always show the necessary harshness.¹

Similar declarations were made by other prominent National Socialists. Thus, Dr. Frank in a speech delivered at the end of 1939 in Kalisz (since incorporated into Germany) on the occasion of his appointment as General Governor, spoke as follows:

After the victory of our armies, the German colonists entered the struggle. Ten years from now, not a plot and not a farm will remain that is not German. Our colonists are coming to fight without mercy the Polish peasant. If God exists, he has chosen Adolf Hitler to chase this rabble out of here.²

The expulsion and deportation of Poles from the Incorporated Provinces to the General Government started in October 1939 at Gdynia, whence the majority of the Polish population was removed. In spite of the many foreign Germans and newcomers from Danzig settled in Gdynia, the number of its inhabitants declined sharply. The importance of this city, which under German rule had been a primitive fishing village and had been built up by the Poles into one of the most important ports on the Baltic, has almost completely disappeared. It has been renamed Gotenhaven, but people call it "Totenhaven". In November and December 1939 there were large-scale expulsions from the city of Poznan. Later the process was extended to other towns, and then even to the country districts.³

The purging of the Incorporated Provinces of their non-German inhabitants was indeed carried out "without mercy" and with great harshness. The *Polish White Book* gives the following account of this evacuation, based on original German orders and the accounts of many eye-witnesses:

¹ "German Occupation of Poland", *Polish White Book*, 1941, p. 181.

² *New York Herald Tribune*, 5 Oct. 1941.

³ Statistics of the actual removal of population from these cities are scarce. According to the official German statistics, on 1 Jan. 1942 only 40 per cent. of the population of Gdynia was still Polish, compared with 98 per cent. in 1936, when the total population was 83,400; while of the 314,000 inhabitants of Poznan over 190,000 were Poles, as compared with 238,000 in 1931. Cf. *Poland Fights*, 5 Dec. 1942.

The deportations of the Polish inhabitants are of a coercive character, and, as a rule, are ordered suddenly without any previous warning to those concerned. Deportations are often effected during the night. The inhabitants must leave their homes on extremely short notice; they are given from twenty minutes to two hours at the utmost to start on their journey. In these conditions, especially in the early months, when people were not yet accustomed to German administrative methods, the deportees, when hardly awake, were obliged to leave their homes not only without baggage of any description but sometimes only half clad.

In many cases the measures also served the secondary purpose of providing workers for Germany; thus, able-bodied men and women were sent to the Reich and the others to the General Government. The German authorities limited their own responsibility to the bare transportation of the expelled Poles to the General Government; no provision was made for them on the way, and after their arrival they were entirely abandoned. The Polish Ministry of Labour stated in a communiqué of April 1942:

They have met a very hard fate and their life is steadily becoming still harder. In the beginning, the population of the General Government helped as much as possible, but as the war continues, everybody is becoming too poor to help others. Only 10 per cent. of the population which had been deported from the annexed territory has found employment in trade, industry, etc.; the rest, which means 1,000,000, have to be kept by charitable institutions or by private persons who still have enough to share it. There are fewer of those who can afford that every day.

Later, the evicted Poles were used for compulsory labour.

It is generally estimated that during the first two years of German domination about 1,500,000 persons were deported from the Incorporated Provinces to the General Government, 1,200,000 of them being Poles and 300,000 Jews.¹ The figure has not risen substantially during recent months, and is now estimated at 1,600,000, making with 60,000 Jews who fled from Western to Central Poland² during the hostilities a total of 1,660,000. As will be seen, there were no further mass expulsions from the Incorporated Provinces after the early part of 1942, except in the case of Jews.

Poles and Jews were expelled from the Incorporated Provinces to make room for German immigrants, and had to give up their homes, all their personal belongings, their place in economic life, and their farms or businesses to the newcomers. Accordingly, eviction and deportation went hand in hand with total confiscation. The order of eviction and deportation allowed the deportees to

¹ *German Occupation of Poland*, p. 22. Cf. communiqué of the Polish Ministry of Labour, Apr. 1942; also S. SEGAL: *op. cit.*, pp. 45 and 56, and *Jews in Nazi Europe, Feb. 1933 to Nov. 1941*, Poland, p. 3. The only estimate differing from this is given by Hedwig WACHENHEIM, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1942, who calculates the number of Poles (exclusive of Jews) evicted to the General Government at between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000.

² Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 99.

take with them only one suitcase, weighing from 40 to 100 lbs. and containing personal effects only. All valuable objects, such as jewelry, gold and silver, stocks and bonds, and money in excess of a very small sum varying from 20 to 200 zloty, had to be left behind.¹ Real estate and businesses were taken over by German trustees, to be used, like the household furnishings of the deportees, mainly for the establishment of "their German heirs".

Legal justification for the confiscation was not provided until afterwards, in the form of a Decree issued by Field-Marshal Göring on 17 September 1940. Under this Decree, the properties of Polish citizens were to be confiscated:

- (1) If the owners were Jews;
- (2) If the owners had fled;
- (3) If the owners had acquired the property after 1 September 1939;
- (4) If the owners had settled after 1 October 1918 on territory which belonged to the Reich before 1914;
- (5) If the property were required in the public interest and, in particular, for the defence of the Reich or to strengthen the German element in the country.

The last clause was especially intended to cover the expropriation of the expelled and deported Poles.

A German report published in October 1941 gives details of the Polish and Jewish property confiscated by the German authorities and handed over to an official trustee.² This comprised, in Poznan, 17,300 handicraft workshops, 17,200 commercial undertakings, and 3,500 industrial undertakings; and in Lodz, 7,500 commercial undertakings, 6,400 handicraft workshops, and 2,400 textile undertakings. Moreover, the trustee took over 73,000 Polish and Jewish real estate properties in Poznaniania.

The large estates and undertakings became German State property or were turned over to big concerns organised by the National Socialist Party. But the bulk of the land which had belonged to Poles was used to settle about 500,000 incoming Germans, nearly all from foreign countries. Thus, roughly speaking, the property of one and a half million evicted Poles and Jews and the basis of their economic activity were used to start half a million Germans on a new life.

Germanisation by expulsion and settlement began immediately after the German conquest, and during the first months hundreds of thousands of people were deported. The bulk of the deportations took place in the first year of German domination; in the second

¹ *German Occupation of Poland*, p. 23.

² *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, Oct. 1941, No. 28.

year the process slowed down, and later there were only isolated cases. The expulsion of Polish peasants was the first to be stopped. Generally speaking, no Polish workers were deported to the General Government; those who were not transferred to the Reich or to other German-occupied territories were left at home to continue their usual occupations.

It would be tempting to explain the decline of eviction and deportation by the crude material fact that once the better-off Poles and Jews had been expelled and their property seized there was little to be taken from those who remained. Nevertheless, this would be an over-simplified explanation of the change in German Policy.

There were in the Incorporated Provinces of Western Poland nearly 400,000 farm holdings, many of them very small, and almost all in Polish hands. The original German plan was to expropriate and evict all these Polish farmers, to eliminate all "dwarf farms", and to create medium-sized farms throughout the annexed area. It was planned at first to settle the "repatriated" Germans, and then to bring in peasants from south-eastern Germany, from Baden and Württemberg, where the constant division of holdings had resulted in too dense a peasant population on exceedingly small holdings. The official review of the National Socialist Party wrote in January 1941:

The East calls all those who have shown their readiness, and amongst whom so many are now wearing field uniform. After the war they will all be able to utilise their knowledge and experience. Not under the hot sun of Africa, but here in the East the land is ready for starting on one's own soil from the beginning. A beautiful new country is waiting here; it has a German face, and many have shed their blood for it. The German East will be colonised by German people; it is going to be a rich country of peasants and children, a granary of the Reich and of the nation's blood. Thus, the German living space is secured for all time. And the war which must now be carried on has found its most beautiful fulfilment.¹

Another article in the same number of this review contains some information on the adjustment of the "repatriated" Germans, and paints the position in very different colours.

Artisans of all kinds, engineers, doctors and teachers are welcome collaborators who can exercise their old professions from the day of their arrival in the new provinces of the Reich. It was more difficult to accommodate farmers, because it was essential that a convenient farm should first be vacated for them.

Later, it became clear that the Polish farms were too small; that "agriculture in the east could not get along without the help of Polish hands, at least during the early years", and that "colonists

¹ *National-Sozialistische Monatshefte*, Jan. 1941, p. 19.

who took over the holdings left by Poles would for a long time be dependent on the help of the community".¹

Polish peasants could be deprived of their land, and those who were not expelled to the General Government could be forced to emigrate to eastern Germany and work there on the big estates. But the Germans could not replace them. The German economy needed the most abundant harvest possible from the land and the newcomers were unfamiliar with local methods of cultivation. German industry, absorbed in war production, could not deliver the implements for the newly enlarged farms. And, most important of all, there were no labourers except the Poles, either for agriculture or for any other work. The decisive factor was that the economy of the country needed hands which the German people did not offer, and could not produce.

Thus the expulsion of Poles from the Incorporated Provinces was halted², and for good reasons. Nevertheless, plans of eviction and colonisation have revived since the summer of 1942, this time in connection with the problem of the "half-way stratum", i.e. those people whose language was Polish but who had German blood in their veins, of whom the Germans have discovered close on a million in the province of Danzig-West Prussia.³ These people were to be put on the list of German people (*Volksliste*) as probationers; thereafter, those who proved acceptable would be subject to military service (this probably being the real reason for the scheme), while those who did not prove acceptable would be deported.

Having no Germans to replace them, the German Government searched for settlers of other nationalities accepted as being of German blood, and evolved the scheme of colonisation by settlers from the Netherlands. Attempts to establish settlements of Netherlands in the Western Provinces were first made in the fall of 1941, and resumed in the summer of 1942. It may be that further efforts in this direction will now be made, but the main scheme for the removal of millions of Netherlands to the east is designed to colonise the German-occupied territories of the Soviet Union and will be described later.⁴

Eastern Polish Provinces (Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine).

According to official Soviet sources, during its march into Poland the Russian Army captured 181,000 Polish prisoners. A

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 29 and 31.

² *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, 22 Sept. 1942.

³ According to the report of the *Reichsgesellschaft für Landwirtschaft* "for the most part the Poles were left in their farms although their property was confiscated" (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 15 May 1943).

⁴ Cf. below, pp. 65-67.

Moscow broadcast reported that most of these prisoners were freed, but that liberation did not extend to "noblemen and officers". Consequently, when the reorganisation of the Polish army was undertaken in the fall of 1941 numbers of Poles were still interned in prison camps.

Other Polish citizens voluntarily entered the Russian-occupied territories in their flight from the Germans. The majority were Jews, but there were also many non-Jewish refugees among them, especially members of the intelligentsia. Many more entered the Russian-occupied area as a result of the German-Soviet Treaty of 3 November 1939. It was estimated that the Treaty involved the transfer of 30,000 to 40,000 White Russians and Ukrainians to the Russian-occupied area in exchange for over 130,000 Germans who went to the Reich and a number of Polish refugees (14,000 or even more) who chose to return to German-occupied Poland. The total of Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland was estimated by the Institute of Jewish Affairs at 200,000. The number of non-Jewish refugees seems to have been lower.

In the winter of 1939-40, and again in June 1940, a number of refugees were deported by the Soviet authorities to the eastern part of the Soviet Union. This measure is said to have been applied to those refugees who neither returned to their homes nor accepted Soviet citizenship¹, but other categories also seem to have been involved in the transfer. The first batch of exiles were reported to have been members of the Polish intelligentsia, State and local government officials, teachers, judges, lawyers and the professional classes generally, together with a number of Jews and Ukrainians of the same classes and other middle-class people. Later, the same measure is said to have been applied on an even larger scale to Polish and even Ukrainian farmers; and deportation was not limited to the refugees from German-occupied Poland but was extended to residents of the Eastern Provinces. A White Paper presented to the United States Department of State by the Polish Embassy asserted that the total number of persons deported reached 400,000. Another source gives the number as 300,000.

The main movement from Soviet-occupied Poland to the east began in June 1941, immediately before the German invasion, and increased in volume after the invasion had begun. Hundreds of thousands of people were either forcibly removed or evacuated to inner and Asiatic Russia. Others fled as best they could from the invading German army. According to a statement issued by the Polish Foreign Minister on 7 May 1942, one and a half million

¹ *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 43 (1941), p. 291.

persons were transferred. The Joint Distribution Committee estimates the total number of evacuees from Soviet-occupied Polish territory at two million, of whom 600,000 were Jews¹, these figures including those who were transferred in 1939-1940. On the basis of information collected locally, an estimate from a reliable source gives the total of refugees as 1,200,000, the detailed figures being as follows:

Transferred to:	No. of persons
Archangelsk, Vologda, Kotlas	150,000
Molotovsk	50,000
Saratov, Buzuluk, Tchkalovsk.	100,000
Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk	50,000
Kazakhstan (Semipalatinsk)	350,000
Omsk, Tomsk, Barnaul	100,000
Krasnoyarsk, Kainsk	50,000
Yakutsk, Aldana	30,000
Uzbekistan (Tashkent)	250,000
Southern regions	50,000
Extreme north	20,000

In the fall of 1941, following an agreement between the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in exile, 348,000 Poles who were in internment camps were released² and allowed to join the newly formed Polish army. In 1942, 75,500 Poles crossed from Russia into Iran³, where the Polish army numbered 100,000 at the beginning of 1943.⁴ According to information furnished through the American Red Cross, 37,750 civilians also found their way along the shores of the Caspian into Iran. On 30 December 1942, notes were exchanged between the Prime Minister of Poland and the Foreign Secretary of Mexico concerning the transfer from Iran to Mexico of a number of Polish refugees provided that the Polish authorities assumed responsibility for their maintenance during the war and their repatriation after the war. One thousand five hundred Jews were evacuated to Palestine up to the end of 1942. Other Polish refugees went through Iran to India. There are 3,000 adults and some children in Karachi (Province of Sind), and 800 children have been received by the Maharanee of Nawangar.⁵ Others went to Africa. At the end of 1942 there were 7,000 Poles

¹ The figure of 600,000 is also accepted by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, whereas S. SERGAL (*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 44, p. 239) assumes it to have been 500,000. On 5 Jan. 1943 the number was estimated at 350,000 by S. WOLKOWICZ, Jewish Telegraphic Agency correspondent in Russia; cf. *Contemporary Jewish Record*, Apr. 1943, p. 185.

² The number of Poles who remained in the internment camps was 45,000.

³ Statement made on 7 May 1943 by the Foreign Vice-Commissioner of the U.S.S.R.

⁴ According to a statement by the British India Office, published in the *New York Times*, 25 Jan. 1943. This number includes between 25,000 and 30,000 of the Polish corps which had been formed in North Africa and then removed to Iran.

⁵ *Polish Review*, 25 Jan. 1943, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 15.

in Uganda and Tanganyika and 420 in Rhodesia.¹ Up to March 1943, the total number evacuated to the British East African colonies had reached 12,000. The number of Polish refugees in Iran did not diminish by evacuation alone. Many of them joined the Polish Army and the Women's Auxiliary Corps (2,500 up to the end of 1942); many others perished (1,200 up to the end of 1942). A report of 5 March 1943 showed 12,000 Polish refugees still remaining in Iran.²

Finland

The war between Finland and Russia started on 30 November 1939. Military action led to the evacuation or flight of hundreds of thousands of persons from the war-stricken areas. A few were evacuated to foreign countries; from 5,000 to 6,000 women and children were reported to have gone to Sweden, and a few hundred to Norway. There is no information about their return. Only some of those who had been evacuated to the interior of Finland came back when the hostilities had ceased.

Under the treaty of 12 March 1940, Finland ceded to the U.S.S.R. (a) the Karelian Isthmus, including the Eastern Islands in the Gulf of Finland, the city of Viborg (Viipuri) and the region around Lake Ladoga; (b) part of the communes of Kunsamo and Salla in the middle of the eastern frontier; and (c) the western part of the Rybachi peninsula on the Arctic. Furthermore, the fortress and peninsula of Hangö, between the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, were leased to the U.S.S.R. for 30 years along with the surrounding islands.

The inhabitants of the territory ceded to the Soviet Union were free to continue to live there or to migrate to other parts of Finland, but only one per cent. of the population remained. The Karelian Isthmus (including Viborg, the second largest city in Finland, and the region around Lake Ladoga) was among Finland's most thickly populated areas. The majority of its population, which before the war numbered some 420,000 persons³, were transferred to the interior with whatever movable property they could arrange to take away in the few days allowed them by the treaty. "They had very little opportunity to take any kind of property with them. Their cattle had already been evacuated; but apart from that, all that could be saved was perhaps their money,

¹ Quoted from a memorandum presented on 20 Jan. 1943 by the British Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State, in *Interpreter Releases*, Vol. XX, No. 9, Series A: Immigration, No. 3.

² According to information furnished through the American Red Cross.

³ *Social Tidskrift*, Helsinki, Nos. 9-10, 1942.

but very little else."¹ The refugees from the other areas ceded to Russia, which were sparsely populated, numbered only a few thousands. The total number of those who left the ceded areas during the war and after the conclusion of peace was some 450,000, or about one-eighth of the total population of Finland.

In a country of meagre natural resources, the resettlement of these people was a difficult task. About 180,000 of them were estimated to belong to the farming population, and an attempt was therefore made to settle them on the land so that they could continue their former occupation. With this end in view, the previous land settlement legislation was amended by an Act promulgated on 28 June 1940, giving priority in the allotment of land to Finnish farmers and fishermen who had moved out of the territory bordering on the new national frontier. The land to be provided in each locality for this purpose was primarily State-owned. Where other land could not be obtained by voluntary transfer, the property of churches, communes, companies, and persons deriving their main income from non-agricultural occupations, as well as neglected holdings and any other suitable land, could be expropriated and employed for the purpose of resettlement. The scheme provided for the creation of about 39,000 new holdings. By the end of 1940, after four months of the operation of the plan, some 7,000 had actually been created.²

The number of evacuees who had previously earned a living in industry, handicrafts, commerce, the liberal professions, construction or other works was about 270,000. They were mainly put to work on various kinds of reconstruction work, especially on State schemes.³

As to the geographical distribution of the resettled evacuees, press reports show that those from Viborg (Viipuri) and the Karelian Isthmus were settled in central Finland and along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, and those from the Ladoga area were moved towards Vasa and Abo on the Gulf of Bothnia. The small group of people from Hangö was distributed near by in the province of Nyland.

Resettlement proceeded slowly but steadily, until the whole scheme was reversed by the march of events. In June 1941 the war between Finland and the Soviet Union broke out again. Viborg and the Karelian Isthmus were recaptured, and in December Hangö too was abandoned by the Russians. A return movement of the evacuated Karelians began in the autumn of 1941. The number

¹ Eljas KAHRA: "Reconstruction in Finland", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 5, May 1941, p. 503.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 507-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 510-12.

of those repatriated up to the end of September 1942 was officially given as 220,000.¹ This figure does not seem to have risen much since that date; it was reported to have reached 237,500 in February 1943.² The number of evacuated Karelians who had not been repatriated was about 180,000.

Finally, it should be noted that during the present war the serious food shortage has led once again to the evacuation of children from Finland. Several thousands were reported to have been sent to Sweden and Denmark for the duration.³ In Sweden alone, the number of Finnish "foster-children" was estimated at some 20,000 in January 1943.⁴

The Baltic Countries

Mention has already been made of the transfer of 63,800 Baltic Germans to the Reich under treaties concluded by Germany with Estonia and Latvia in October 1939. In the same month Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed treaties granting certain air and naval bases to the Soviet Union. Reports from Estonia stated that the quartering of Russian troops there had led to the removal of a number of Estonians, the local population having had to evacuate the district assigned to the Russian troops. The evacuated Estonians were granted the land and homes of the repatriated Germans for settlement.⁵

In July 1940 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet Union, and under an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union a further 66,700 Baltic Germans were then transferred to Greater Germany from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, of whom about 35,000 were not really Germans but Lithuanians. On the other hand, 21,000 Lithuanians and Russians were transferred to Lithuania from districts annexed by Germany.⁶

The Soviet occupation of the Baltic States was followed by three further movements across the border. In the early days of the Soviet occupation some Lithuanians crossed the German frontier for fear of "Sovietisation". They were estimated to number about 2,000 persons, 1,300 having been registered in Berlin alone,⁷ and after the occupation of Lithuania by the Germans in June

¹ *Social Tidskrift*, loc. cit.

² Radio Lahti and other Finnish sources.

³ *New York Times*, 31 Jan. and 1 and 2 Feb. 1942 (based on German broadcasts and Swiss press reports).

⁴ Communication to the I.L.O. In the last few months the Finnish Government has, in agreement with the German authorities, transferred to Finland some 10,000 Ingermanlanders of Finnish origin from the neighbourhood of Leningrad (*Dagens Nyheter*, 26 June 1943).

⁵ *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 1939.

⁶ Cf. Chapter I, p. 13.

⁷ Information received from the Lithuanian Consulate General in New York.

1941 they were not allowed to return to their country.¹ Secondly, there was a movement into the Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, both of Russians and of former Baltic communists who had spent most of their lives in the Soviet Union and were now returning to their native land. These newcomers were employed in Government departments and in the various newly established State enterprises. Thirdly, there was some forced transfer of population from the Baltic States, the Soviet authorities having deported to inner Russia those who had formerly played a prominent part in politics. It is estimated that during the period concerned a thousand persons were deported from Lithuania.

Mass migration, both compulsory and voluntary, from the Baltic States to the interior of the Soviet Union took place in June 1941, just before the German invasion of Russia and immediately afterwards. The German army crossed the Soviet frontier on 22 June 1941. Before this move, the Soviet authorities arrested and removed from the Baltic States a large number of former officers and Government employees, intellectuals and business men and farmers, some of them with their families. Many others were evacuated or fled when the invasion was imminent.

In Lithuania, according to official data, this migration numbered about 65,000 persons. Some 35,000 persons were deported two weeks before the outbreak of the war, and another 30,000 left Lithuania, for the most part voluntarily, immediately after the aggression. Among them were about 10,000 Jews.

In Latvia, 14,700 persons were exiled on 13 and 14 June 1941. Six thousand were arrested and exiled after 14 June 1941, and another 12,200 were reported as missing. The list of trains in which the arrested persons were deported shows that nearly two-thirds of the coaches were sent to Asiatic Russia.² In addition, many Latvians fled before the invading armies and were glad to be evacuated. These included not only Soviet Russian employees who had entered the country since 1940, but also many permanent residents of Latvia. Their presence in Russia is attested by a report that in November 1941 tens of thousands of Latvians evacuated to Russia were in military training camps east of the Volga preparing to join the new Soviet armies.³ According to the Institute of Jewish Affairs,

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, 30 Nov. 1941.

² The Latvian Legation in Washington has furnished a list of deported Latvian citizens compiled by the Latvian Red Cross. This gives detailed statistics of those exiled on 13 and 14 June 1941, arrested and exiled after 14 June, and missing and killed, with particulars of their occupation. Another detailed list gives the number of trains in which Latvian citizens were deported to Soviet Russia, comprising 824 coaches, a figure which supports the total of 32,000 exiled and missing given by the Latvian Red Cross.

³ United Press despatch of 7 Nov. 1941, based on an Exchange Telegraph report.

the number of Jewish refugees alone from Latvia was 15,000. The total of those who left Latvia is estimated at nearly 60,000.¹

In Estonia, according to the estimates of local authorities, 61,000 persons, including almost all of the 5,000 Estonian Jews, were transferred to Soviet Russia.²

Denmark and Norway

The German occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 resulted not only in the recruitment of workers for Germany and German-controlled countries, but also in the migration of Danish and Norwegian agriculturists to the German-occupied Eastern Territories. Danish farm managers are reported to be going there³, and Norwegian and Danish youths are volunteering as settlers. The whole movement seems, however, to be on a very small scale. Thus in July 1942 the Danish Nazi press complained that while over 200 young Norwegians had passed through Copenhagen recently on their way to the east, the numbers of Danes were "considerably smaller".⁴ Another report refers to some hundreds of Norwegian "Quisling" youths undergoing training in the province of Poznan in preparation for settlement in the occupied Eastern Territories.⁵

Political persecution provoked a flight from Norway across the Swedish frontier. According to the latest figures issued by the

¹ Cf. K. R. PUSTA: *The Soviet Union and the Baltic States* (Washington, D.C., May 1940), p. 51. The German source gives even higher, and apparently exaggerated, figures. Thus *Novoye Slovo*, the Russian paper published in Berlin, writes that 200,000 persons were evacuated from Latvia (quoted by *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, 6 Mar. 1942).

² K. R. PUSTA: *op. cit.* The author gives these figures as though referring to deportations only. It is a fact that 7,000 persons had been imprisoned prior to their evacuation, but there can be no doubt that many Estonians also left the country voluntarily in order to escape the advancing Germans. German sources exaggerate the number of persons evacuated to Russia. *Novoye Slovo* (Berlin), for instance, reported that 150,000 persons were evacuated from Estonia. This is clearly an exaggeration. The Estonian population was estimated at 1,122,000 in Dec. 1939 and at 1,010,000 on 1 Dec. 1941. Assuming that the excess of births over deaths in 1940 and 1941 was more or less the same as in 1939, the natural population increase would be some 2,500. On the other hand, it may be assumed that the exceptional circumstances led to many deaths through violence. Taking all these factors into account, the migratory loss during the period concerned would amount at the most to 110,000. According to Pusta, 32,000 of the Estonian population were mobilised by the Soviet Government, so that, after deducting this figure, there remains a migratory loss of less than 80,000 (including some thousand additional Germans repatriated early in 1941). The Russians and Estonians who came to Estonia under Soviet rule were only temporary residents. The number of German immigrants in Sept.-Nov. 1941 was negligible.

³ Cf. I. JANUSEKIS, in *Socialisticheskoy Vestnik*, 3 Oct. 1942, p. 225, quoting *Deutsche Zeitung im Osten*. The Danish Minister Gunnar Larsen, during his journey to the east in the summer of 1942, "signed some contracts" providing for the sending of Danish colonists and managers to farms in the *Ostland*.

⁴ *Fædrelandet*, 10 July 1942.

⁵ *Svenska Dagbladet*, quoted in *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Feb. 1943. Cf. also above, Chapter I, p. 30, and below, pp. 65-66.

Swedish Social Board, the number of Norwegian refugees in Sweden was a little over 9,000.¹

Netherlands

The great exodus from the Netherlands was caused by the German invasion on 10 May 1940. Two thousand four hundred civilians from the Netherlands escaped to England.² Others, estimated at some 50,000, fled into France; most of these were repatriated after the armistice, and the number of Netherlands who still remained in France in the summer of 1941 was given by a well-informed source as only 5,000.

Later, a new movement, this time towards the Reich, started in the Netherlands in the form of the recruitment of workers for employment in Germany.³ In addition, many others have been removed from their homes, while it is proposed to send still more as settlers to the east.

According to National Socialist theory, the "germanisation" of the Eastern Territories can be achieved only by colonisation. This was emphasised again in the summer of 1942 by the Chief of the Gestapo, Himmler, who is also the German Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germanism. "Our task", he said, "is not to germanise the east in the former sense, in other words to teach the people living there our German speech and German law, but to bring about a position in which only people of German blood live there." As no true Germans were available for this purpose, recourse was had to the Netherlands as "people of German blood".

Attempts to settle Netherlands in the western Polish provinces incorporated into the Reich were made in the fall of 1941. The German press reported that 10,000 farmers and labourers were being transferred from the Netherlands to the Warthegau.⁴ No information is available as to the fulfilment of these intentions. In the summer of 1942, the German press again reported a scheme for the transfer of Netherlands to Western Poland. Young men from Flanders and the Netherlands, as well as from Denmark and Norway, arrived in the provinces of Danzig-West Prussia, Warthegau and Upper Silesia⁵ to begin agricultural work, and a settlement for Netherlands artisans was created in Poznan.⁶

But the great German scheme for the removal of millions of

¹ Swedish Press, 5 Mar. 1943.

² Report submitted by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Jan. 1941.

³ Cf. Chapter III, pp. 141-142.

⁴ *Kölnische Zeitung*, 10 Nov. 1941.

⁵ *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, 11 July 1942. Cf. above, Chapter I, p. 30.

⁶ *Idem*, 2 Aug. 1942.

people from the Netherlands to the east was planned as a solution of German settlement difficulties not in Poland, but in German-occupied Soviet territory. In the winter of 1941-1942, Netherlands—together with Belgian and Danish farmers—were reported to have been sent to occupied Russia as managers of former Soviet collective farms. Although they were described as "pioneers" and "colonisers", in reality their job was merely that of salaried overseers of Russian agricultural workers, and they numbered only a few hundreds.¹ Not until the summer of 1942 did the German plan to transfer Netherlands farmers to the east become a vast scheme for the mass migration of some 3,000,000 Netherlands to colonise the German-occupied Soviet territories, and especially to build a better community of German blood on the Baltic coast.

A great deal of propaganda has been spent on promoting this scheme. The Germans stressed that, next to Belgium, the Netherlands was the most densely populated area in Western Europe; that the country urgently needed a wider basis for its food supply; and that the waste regions of the east would "compensate the Dutch for the colonies they have lost forever".² Not merely the settlement of farmers is contemplated; undertakings are urged to transfer entire industrial plants with their machinery and staff from the Netherlands to Russia.³ To organise settlement in the east, the Netherlands East Company was created, directed by Netherlands Nazis and "collaborationist" business men. The financial basis of this concern is significant; the Netherlands Bank is entitled to draw on the clearing account for Germany's debt to the Netherlands, on which payment was stopped in 1941 and which now exceeds one billion guilders, to finance the company. Another source of capital is constituted by the assets of dissolved companies which formerly traded with the Netherlands Indies.

It is, however, easier to provide a paper money basis for a scheme of colonisation than to furnish the settlement area with the two main factors necessary for its execution—capital, in the form of the means of production, agricultural and other machinery, cattle, seed and so forth, and labour to cultivate the new land. The German war economy has no surplus production on the scale required for the establishment of millions of settlers. There is no means, under existing circumstances, of moving vast numbers of colonists across the European continent with the huge amount of livestock and other equipment necessary, even if their requirements

¹ *Netherlands News*, 26 Nov.-10 Dec. 1941, 26 Jan.-10 Feb. 1942.

² *Essener National Zeitung*, quoted in an Associated Press despatch from London of 11 June 1942. Cf. also the London correspondence of 24 Aug. 1942 in *New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1942.

³ *Ibid.*

were reduced to a minimum. Above all, there is no willingness on the part of the Netherlands to trek east under German leadership.

Since the summer of 1942, the German and German-controlled Netherlands press have constantly harped on plans for mass migration for agricultural as well as for industrial settlement.¹ But execution lags far behind planning. Groups of Netherlands peasants and artisans were sent to Bielorussia and the Kharkov region, their numbers being unspecified.² For the Baltic regions, only 300 had actually left up to August, mostly engineers, technicians and architects. Commissioner-General Schmidt is reported to have announced that "at the most 30,000 agricultural pioneers might be expected to settle in the east with a view to augmenting Poland's food supply".³ Roskam, the local Nazi leader of the Netherlands peasantry, admitted after having visited the Ukraine that the work of colonisation in the occupied Russian territories was at the preliminary stage; the German and Netherlands farmers who were already there still merely managed and directed the work of the local population.⁴ Immigrants were arriving in groups of several dozens of persons.⁵ In view of all these facts, no credit can be attached to rumours of tens or even hundreds of thousands of Netherlands colonists in German-occupied Soviet territory. The plans for establishing "a second Brabant, a second Gelderland or Limburg" in the east are for the time being suspended.

Finally, mention must be made of a population shift within the country, produced by evacuation from the coastal areas. In several places (*i.e.* the Province of Zeeland, part of Southern Holland and the greater part of Northern Holland) all the inhabitants are reported to have been sent to Groningen and Friesland, in the

¹ The Kuban territory in particular, since retaken by the Red Army, was recommended as ideal territory for Dutch farmers. Cf. *De Storm* (a Dutch Nazi publication), 18 Dec. 1942, quoted by *Netherlands News*, 11-25 Jan. 1943.

² *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 20, July 1942. *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, 23 June 1942, reported that a group of 85 engineers and artisans had been sent to Kharkov, 30 per cent. of them being Netherlands, and a "technical command" of Netherlands to Kiev.

³ *New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1942.

⁴ *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, 16 and 18 Sept. 1942. It has even been asserted that this should be the permanent role of the Netherlands agriculturists as well as of the Germans in the Eastern Territories. The Netherlands Nazi Agricultural Front official De Waard, when asked whether agricultural labourers would be sent to the Ukraine from the Netherlands, replied: "No, we'll start work with local labour. The Germanic peoples must feel far above the Slavic peoples. It would be wrong if we worked there because it would be detrimental to German prestige. We must employ Ukrainian workers, who are plentiful, women and children included." (*Netherlands News*, 11 and 25 Jan. 1943.)

⁵ A Hilversum broadcast reported in Aug. 1942 that the Netherlands East Company had taken over certain estates in the Wilno region as its first agricultural settlement and that peasants from the Netherlands would soon leave for the east. It was recently announced (*Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, 30 Apr. 1943) that the Netherlands East Company was planning to send a first experimental group of fishermen to Lake Peipus on the Russian-Estonian frontier.

eastern Netherlands.¹ In March 1943 it was estimated that at the Hague alone 280,000 persons had been ordered to move to the eastern Netherlands, as an anti-invasion precaution.²

Luxemburg

Large-scale emigration from Luxemburg began even before the German offensive. The closing of many metal works situated near the frontier caused an exodus of workers and their families to France to seek factory work there. Many wealthy people were also reported to be moving to France. In March 1940 as many as 15,000 visas were granted by the French Legation in Luxemburg.

During the campaign of May 1940 (Luxemburg having been invaded on 10 May 1940) some 70,000³ Luxemburgers were said to have fled to France. These refugees were speedily repatriated by the Germans.

Under German rule a new and far-reaching shift of population seems to be taking place in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg which, according to the census of 1935, has only 297,000 inhabitants. In the first year of German domination deportations from Luxemburg appear to have been of a purely political character, mainly affecting the intellectuals. A change of tactics on the part of the German authorities appeared in the winter of 1941-42, when in order to germanise the country a large-scale exchange of population was decided upon. The first step in this scheme affected several hundred more or less influential families, who were transplanted into various remote parts of Germany, and also workers, who were sent into the neighbouring districts of Trier and Coblenz. Luxemburg having been incorporated into the Reich, these workers are not listed in the statistics of foreign labour in Germany, but according to Luxemburg sources their number already exceeded 3,500 in January 1942⁴, and has since been constantly increasing.⁵ On the other hand, great numbers of German public and party officials were sent to Luxemburg with their families as "pioneers" in the colonisation of the country.

In September 1942 these measures seem to have been extended on a massive scale. The increased deportations were supposed to herald still more drastic action, and a Nazi newspaper published in Luxemburg stated that those residents of Luxemburg "who are reverting to anti-German agitation and are still unwilling to become conscious members of the National Socialist Reich. . . will be

¹ *Netherlands News*, 1 Nov. 1942; *Vrij Nederland*, 28 Nov. 1942.

² *Netherlands News*, 11-25 Mar. 1943.

³ Cf. below, p. 75, under France.

⁴ *Inter-Allied Review*, 15 Jan. 1942.

⁵ At the end of 1942 it was estimated at 10,000.

resettled within the German *Lebensraum*". The Germans were quoted as saying that they were prepared to deport the entire population if necessary and bring German workers in to keep the iron mines running.¹

The Commissioner for Information of the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg estimated the total of people removed to Germany (deported to concentration camps, recruited workers, and boys and girls in Hitler Youth camps) at 10 per cent. of the entire population, *i.e.* 30,000.²

Belgium

After the German invasion on 10 May 1940 the population of whole villages and towns fled before the invader, remembering the fate that had befallen them twenty-six years before. Many of these refugees were trapped by the German break-through to the sea, and after the surrender of the Belgian army in June 1940 they returned to their homes. Nevertheless, 15,000 Belgian civilians escaped to England.³ The main flood of Belgian refugees, estimated at 1,000,000, overflowed into north-eastern France, mingling with the fleeing French population. After the armistice the Belgian refugees were soon re-evacuated, partly with German help, and virtually all of them seem to have been sent home, except the few who succeeded in leaving for America or tried to reach a Spanish or Portuguese port. Some 1,500 persons reached the Belgian Congo.

Under the German occupation the main displacement of population was that of workers recruited for the Reich. Attempts were also made to interest the Belgians in the scheme for the colonisation of the German-occupied Soviet territories with the help of settlers from the Netherlands, as described above. At the end of 1942, it was reported that a European Union for Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Expansion in the East had just been formed in Belgium, corresponding to the Netherlands East Company.⁴ But apart from a few Belgians appointed as managers of former Soviet collective farms⁵, rumours of the sending of Belgian colonists to the east have not been confirmed. On the contrary, according to information received in March 1943, it was announced in Brussels that the scheme to establish an agricultural colony of Belgian families in the Ukraine has been "temporarily abandoned".⁶

¹ *New York Times*, 16 and 17 Sept. 1942, quoting the Luxemburg Nazi newspaper *Nationalblatt*.

² *The United Nations Review*, 15 Apr. 1943.

³ Report submitted by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Jan. 1941.

⁴ *Message* (London), Dec. 1942, p. 22.

⁵ Cf. above, p. 66, Netherlands.

⁶ *News from Belgium*, 27 Mar. 1943.

It may be noted that in Belgium, as in the Netherlands, an internal migration movement was produced by evacuation from the coast.¹

France

Alsace-Lorraine.

The first migration from Alsace and Lorraine took place at the beginning of the war. Both for the protection of the population itself, and in order to facilitate military operations, the French authorities ordered the evacuation of the regions adjacent to the Maginot Line which were within range of the enemy's guns. Strasbourg was especially affected by this measure, the entire population, numbering some 200,000 persons, having been evacuated. The towns and villages in Alsace-Lorraine between the frontier and the Maginot Line, and immediately behind it, were similarly affected. The total number of people evacuated in September 1939 is estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000.² Some of the evacuees were received in neighbouring districts, and later sent gradually further afield to various parts of central, southern and western France; others went directly to the south-west of France. A great many were sent to Perigueux and the surrounding district.

The German offensive in May 1940 was marked by another exodus from Alsace-Lorraine, but not on so large a scale as the first, and this time from the districts in the more remote rear.

In summer 1940, when the movement had reached its height, a generally well-informed source estimated the number of persons from Alsace-Lorraine who had been evacuated or had fled from their homes since September 1939 at 400,000. An official German source gives the number of evacuated "Alsations" as 370,000.³ A return movement took place after the armistice, when the German occupation authorities tried to induce the Alsations and Lorrainers to return home. The majority did so, to the number of 300,000 (out of 370,000), according to the German official figures, and 250,000 (out of a total of 400,000) according to the other source just quoted.⁴ But at the same time a new movement was set in motion by the expulsion orders of the German authorities.

It was not the first time that there had been a forced mass migration from this unhappy land, which more than once has

¹ In a single case reported by *La Belgique Indépendante* (London), 14 Jan. 1943, 10,000 persons were evacuated.

² *Pour la Victoire*, 9 Jan. 1943; *New York Times*, 6 Apr. 1941.

³ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 20 Dec. 1940, No. 35, Part V, p. 615.

⁴ The Vichy correspondent of the *New York Times* (29 Apr. 1941) reported the number of inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine who ultimately remained in the unoccupied zone as 130,000. For comparison, it may be mentioned that eight months earlier *Paris Soir* (11 Aug. 1940) gave the number as 200,000.

had to undergo a change of sovereignty. Goethe depicts a similar exodus of Alsatians in his *Hermann und Dorothea*; and again in 1871, when Alsace-Lorraine was annexed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian war, nearly half a million, or one-third of its inhabitants, who opted for France had to leave Alsace-Lorraine and were gradually replaced by 400,000 Germans.¹ After 1918, when a new page of history was again turned, 130,000 of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, many of them German officials, emigrated to the Reich² and were replaced by French newcomers.

Yet these previous emigration movements, even though more or less compulsory, were not to be compared with the removal of the population of Alsace-Lorraine after the German occupation in 1940. Expulsion was not only carried out on a massive scale, but in a spirit very different from that of the German Government in 1871 or of the French Government in 1918. The people concerned were given no choice between expatriation and recognising the "New Order". Their only choice lay between unoccupied France and Poland, and no one chose Poland. Of course, even in 1918 some categories of newcomers from the Reich had been forced to leave Alsace-Lorraine, but ample time was given them to collect their belongings and make financial arrangements with their banks. This time they received only a few days', and in some cases only a few hours' notice before leaving. They were permitted to take only a few personal effects, limited in weight to 50 kilograms (about 110 lbs.) for each adult and to 30 kilograms (about 65 lbs.) for each child, and 1,000 francs (equivalent to about \$23) in cash.

Immediately after the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine the German authorities began to prepare the ground for the building up of a "natural wall" to make the German frontier secure. The expulsion started with Alsatian Jews in July 1940. According to information given by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the Jews in Alsace-Lorraine numbered approximately 35,000 and lived, in contrast with both the German and the French Jews, mostly on the land and in small towns. Some 15,000 were evacuated from the frontier zone at the beginning of the war, including some 11,000 Jewish inhabitants of Strasburg and Mulhouse. Many others fled at the time of the German offensive in May 1940 and were subsequently forbidden to return.³ The rest of the better-off farmers were the first victims of expulsion. The Jews from Lorraine were expelled some time later along with other groups. In a speech made in Strasburg on 19 March 1941, Gauleiter Wagner announced that 22,000 Jews

¹ A. and E. KULISCHER: *Kriegs- und Wandersüge: Weltgeschichte als Völkerbewegung* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 158 and 210.

² *Reichstagsdrucksache*, 1920-22, No. 4084.

³ These Jewish evacuees and refugees are included in the total of Alsace-Lorrainers who remained in unoccupied France after the armistice.

had been expelled from Alsace-Lorraine. The combined result of flight and expulsion was the almost complete elimination of the Jewish residents of Alsace-Lorraine.

Some weeks later, beginning on 11 August 1940 in Alsace and five days later in Lorraine, expulsion was extended to the non-Jewish population. The process of expelling French-speaking people continued over a considerable period of time, from summer 1940 until spring 1941 and even later. In Alsace it progressed more slowly and gradually, and the percentage of expulsions was lower than in Lorraine. This difference is attributable to the fact that the majority of Alsatians speak a German dialect, so that most of the Alsatians expelled, apart from the Jews, were French immigrants who had entered the province after its restoration to France in 1918. In Lorraine expulsion was more radical and at times violent, especially just before the announcement on 30 November 1940 that Lorraine was to be annexed to Germany and to form, together with the Saar, the new German province of the Westmark. This mass expulsion started on 11 November 1940, and on 30 November Marshal Pétain announced that 70,000 Lorrainers had "come to seek refuge with their brothers of France". For some time thereafter the expulsions slackened, but they increased again in the spring of 1941, when a kind of enquiry was arranged among the population of Lorraine, the French Department of the Moselle, to establish which of them were willing to become genuine Germans. The rest were to be expelled as had been those before them.

The total number of persons expelled from Alsace-Lorraine can be estimated with some precision on the basis of official statements. The German Commissioner for Strasburg, Dr. Ernst, declared in August 1941 that more than 100,000 French people and Jews had been expelled from Alsace since the armistice. It is estimated that a similar number were exiled from Lorraine in the same period: 70,000 up to the end of November 1940, according to the abovementioned official statement, and 30,000 more since then. The total for Alsace-Lorraine would thus be 200,000¹, or over one-tenth of the pre-war population of 1,900,000, 8 per cent. in Alsace and 14 per cent. in Lorraine.

The criterion on which the expulsions were based is obscure. It was mainly the French who had settled in Alsace-Lorraine after 1918 who were expelled, but not only they. On the other hand,

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, 1 Sept. 1941. Another source already quoted estimates the number expelled at 250,000. The figure of 200,000 is accepted by René KRAUS (*op. cit.*, p. 73). Maurice P. ZWAGER in "The Nazis in Alsace and Lorraine" (*Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1942, p. 170) refers to at least 70,000 Lorrainers and more than 100,000 Alsatians, not including "the great number of those who fled without waiting to be expelled".

not all French-speaking people were expelled; in some districts they remained entirely unmolested, while in others almost every French-speaking resident was ordered to leave. The feelings and sympathies of the persons concerned seem to have had an important bearing on the selection.¹

Seventy-five per cent. of the expelled persons were farmers. Their property was used by the German authorities to enlarge the holdings of the local and neighbouring German peasantry.² In addition, Germans from the Rhineland and the Palatinate came to replace the Alsace-Lorrainers who had been driven from their homes, businesses, work benches and lands.³ Since spring 1941 Germans transferred from abroad have also been settled on the vacant lands.⁴ This particular transfer of property did not always go off smoothly; many of the farmers ordered to leave their homes set fire to their houses and barns, preferring to destroy them rather than let them fall into German hands.

In November 1940, when the expulsions from Lorraine had reached their height, it was announced in Berlin that about 120,000 Germans would move in to replace the expelled population. There is no information as to the execution of this plan. Joseph Buerkel, Gauleiter of Lorraine, describing German achievements in the farming districts in spring 1942, said that French-speaking zones had been "cleared", large estates divided into farms for as many German peasant families as possible, and small undertakings established in villages to give employment to Germans. With regard to the industrial areas in the north of Lorraine, his words indicated promise rather than performance. "Many foreign workers", he said, "live there. They must be replaced by German workers."⁵ And he added that "for purely economic reasons this situation cannot be changed immediately". But there is no doubt that there was an influx of German officials into Alsace-Lorraine to replace not only French officials but also many Alsace-Lorraine officials of German "race".

The mass expulsions from Alsace-Lorraine increased the burden of refugees to be maintained by the unoccupied zone of France. It seemed probable that their establishment would be largely facilitated by the fact that the great majority were farmers. There

¹ *New York Times*, 15 Nov. 1940 and 30 Mar. 1941; *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 Feb. 1942. It was noticed that among those expelled were some persons who had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and had returned home after the armistice. Cf. *New York Times*, 6 Apr. 1941.

² Cf. Chapter I, pp. 29-30.

³ *New York Times Magazine*, 8 June 1941; *New York Herald Tribune*, 15 Nov. 1940.

⁴ Cf. Chapter I, pp. 22-23.

⁵ J. Buerkel, article in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 24 Apr. 1942, reprinted in *Les Documents* (ed. Comités de la France Libre).

was in south-western France much land lying abandoned and uncultivated as the result of a rural exodus which took on great dimensions long before the war of 1914-1918. A number of immigrants from Northern Italy had begun to settle there in the twenties, but this movement, helpful to both countries, ceased with the anti-emigration policy¹ adopted by the Fascist régime. Mobilisation for the army had contributed further to the shortage of farm hands and to the abandonment of land. The expelled residents of Alsace-Lorraine were therefore sent to the departments of Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, Gers and Tarn-et-Garonne, in south-western France; and some even farther afield into the Pyrenees. Some were granted holdings of abandoned land or uncultivated tracts with a view to permanent settlement; others obtained jobs as farm hands; while still others undertook the cultivation of plots of land placed at their disposal by the municipalities. But owing to the difficulty of obtaining fertilisers and seed, and other difficulties of transport and supply, many of these former farmers remained unemployed and had to be maintained by the Government. Among the industrial workers only a few found employment as factory workers or in building. A few emigrated to North Africa or French West Africa, and there was even talk of settling them in Guadeloupe in the West Indies.²

In the summer of 1941 there was a new wave of deportation, this time directed eastward. On 8 May 1941, compulsory labour was introduced in Alsace-Lorraine for young people of both sexes between the ages of 17 and 25. Not all of those who registered under this measure were employed in Alsace-Lorraine itself. Many of them were sent to the adjacent regions of southern Germany, to central Germany and to the Sudetenland. But many thousands of youths failed to register and fled to France and Switzerland. By order of Gauleiter Buerkel their parents were arrested and deported into the interior.³ This was only a beginning; deportation for this and other reasons to the Reich, as well as to the Eastern Territories, took on mass dimensions in the course of 1942.⁴ The number of persons affected was estimated in the summer of 1942 at over 200,000.⁵ This was perhaps an exaggeration but since then the number has been constantly growing.⁶

¹ Cf. S. WLOCEWSKI: *L'installation des Italiens en France* (Paris, 1934), pp. 63-74.

² *New York Times*, 15 and 17 Nov. 1940, 22 Jan., 30 Mar., 6 and 20 Apr. and 1 May 1941. Cf. also the 1942 *Bulletins* of the American Friends (Quakers) Service Committee, who helped to restore abandoned villages for the resettlement of Lorrainers.

³ Cf. J. LORRAINE: *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁴ *New York Times*, 6 and 21 Aug. and 6 Sept. 1942.

⁵ Philippe BARRES, in *Pour la Victoire*, 11 July 1942.

⁶ *Pour la Victoire*, 30 Jan. 1943, gives a total of 500,000, this figure including also workers sent to the Reich and young men mobilised for service in the army.

The different groups of people who have left Alsace-Lorraine—those evacuated in 1939, refugees in the summer of 1940, those expelled to unoccupied France in 1940-41, those deported into the Reich, and those who clandestinely crossed the frontier—together total many hundreds of thousands, approaching half a million. This estimate does not include the numerous workers recruited for employment in the Reich, nor the Alsatians mobilised for German military service.

Other Parts of France.

In the days just before the outbreak of the war the French Government urged the civilian population of Paris to leave the capital, in the expectation that the war would start with bombing which would be especially dangerous in the densely populated Paris area. The evacuation was voluntary, although all who were not needed in Paris were asked to take refuge in regions less exposed to air raids. The evacuation of school children was organised through official agencies. In all, 500,000 people are estimated to have left Paris, but as the anticipated air raids did not occur a return movement began as early as September and by the winter the great majority of Parisians were at home again.

The great exodus from France, as from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, was provoked by the German invasion in May 1940.

According to the French News Service, on 31 May 1940 the estimated numbers of refugees in France were as follows: 2,500,000 French refugees from the north; 1,000,000 Belgian refugees; 70,000 from Luxemburg; and 50,000 from the Netherlands. The whole of this flood of humanity swept past Paris to the departments of inner France which were regarded as comparatively safe.

Next came the great movement from the Paris area. This was partly an organised evacuation of Government offices and factories, partly an orderly departure of youths of military age, and partly an entirely spontaneous exodus. Two-thirds of the population of Paris and its suburbs were estimated to have left their homes. All these millions of people fled before the advancing German armies into central and south-western France. Only a fraction of them were able to cross the Spanish border and reach, through Lisbon, Great Britain or America.

The number of refugees has been variously estimated. In his broadcast of 25 June 1940 Marshal Pétain stated that 1,000,000 of the French population and 500,000 Belgians had left towns and cities for the country. The American Red Cross is reported to have

aided 2,750,000 (though many of these were probably counted twice), while other estimates vary from ten to twelve and even twenty millions. A well-informed source gave the following figures: 4,000,000 French refugees, 30,000 Poles (partly war refugees, partly miners who had lived in France for many years but were not granted French citizenship), 1,000,000 Belgians, 50,000 Netherlands, 70,000 Luxemburgers, and 50,000 Germans and Austrians (mostly Jews), who had found a temporary haven in France.

After the armistice, repatriation began in respect of the refugees within the occupied zone as well as of those from the unoccupied to the occupied part of France. The first to be re-evacuated, partly with German help, were the Belgian refugees. As regards the French, it became clear that some of them, those from the Channel zone, were not to be allowed to return home. The return movement lasted for many months. On 9 October 1941, the following official figures of French refugees were given: 328,000 in the occupied zone, who were not permitted to return home, and 543,000 in the unoccupied zone, the latter number including about 100,000 persons from Alsace-Lorraine, or the remainder of those evacuated in 1939 at the outbreak of war, and probably not including about 200,000 expelled from Alsace-Lorraine in 1940-41. It was observed¹ that these figures did not include many thousands of refugees who, having means of their own, established themselves independently. Some of the Jewish refugees were able to secure visas for the United States or other American countries. Some of those who remained in unoccupied France were handed over to the Germans by the Vichy Government and sent to the ghettos and labour camps in eastern Europe, or fell into German hands after the occupation of the whole of French territory.²

In summer 1942 the German authorities started a new evacuation movement on a large scale in connection with their preparations for defence against an Allied invasion. Mass removal of the coastal population took place, in particular, to a depth of 18 miles from the coast from Boulogne to Dieppe. The number affected was stated to be "more than a million".³ It has been suggested that the evacuation was also a means of applying pressure on French workers to migrate to Germany for employment in the armament

¹ *New York Times*, 29 Apr. 1941 (Vichy despatch of 28 Apr.).

² Cf. below, p. 103.

³ *New York Times*, 27 June 1942, Associated Press despatch from London, quoting a "well-informed foreign source". Other reports refer to the evacuation of millions of French civilians, but even the figure of one million seems rather high, unless it includes all those who fled from the Channel zone in May and June 1940 and were not allowed to return later, as well as Belgians and Netherlands removed from the coast and those evacuated since autumn 1942. In the latter case it would, on the contrary, be on the conservative side.

factories.¹ The evacuees were transferred to the regions of Rheims, the Loire and the Sarthe.² This evacuation was resumed in autumn 1942³ and took on even greater dimensions in 1943 with the growing fear of an Allied invasion. All "unnecessary" civilians were ordered to evacuate seaside towns along the coast, in particular Le Havre, Cherbourg and Saint-Malo.⁴ There were also mass removals of population from the Atlantic coast.⁵

In the most recent months more evacuations have also been reported from various parts of the Mediterranean coast of France, particularly from Marseilles⁶ and Toulon.

South-Eastern Europe

Germany's expansion towards the south-east and the Axis conquest of the Balkans caused a series of mass displacements of population. Some of these migrations were set in motion by the victorious Powers, Germany and Italy, in their own interests, and Germany also arranged for an exchange of population between various Balkan States. Apart from this, however, a forced transfer was carried out by nations friendly to the Axis, namely Bulgaria and Hungary, which availed themselves of the opportunity to improve their own economic and demographic situation at the expense of the defeated countries.

Indeed the whole of south-eastern Europe, with its predominantly agricultural structure, suffered from over-population. It was stated that on the eve of the war 43 persons were living on every 100 hectares of arable land in Germany, and even fewer—37 persons per 100 hectares—in France, whereas for the Balkan States the figures were: in Hungary 72 persons, in Rumania 97 persons, in Yugoslavia 114 persons, and in Bulgaria 116 persons per 100 hectares. Since 1925, moreover, the countries of south-eastern Europe,

¹ *New York Times*, 28 June 1942, reporting a speech by B. S. TOWNROD, Secretary of the United Associations of Great Britain and France.

² *Pour la Victoire*, 11 July 1942.

³ United Press despatch from Vichy, 2 Oct. 1942 (*New York Times*, 3 Oct. 1942).

⁴ *New York Times*, 17 Apr. 1943; *Pariser Zeitung*, 24 Apr. 1943. A total of 20,000 women and children had been removed from the Channel ports of Havre and Dieppe and the surrounding area, according to a Berlin broadcast recorded by the Associated Press (*New York Times*, 26 Apr. 1943).

⁵ Twenty thousand refugees from the coast of Brittany have arrived in the department of Loiret, according to Radio Vichy, 23 Apr. 1943. The civilian population has been evacuated from the naval base of Lorient (*Pariser Zeitung*, 26 Mar. 1943) and from the coastal zone between Bayonne and the Spanish frontier (*Dépêche de Toulouse*, 5 May 1943).

⁶ A census taken lately showed that the population had decreased from about 1,000,000 before the war to less than 700,000 (Transocean broadcast, 19 Mar. 1943). This decrease is the result of evacuation as well as of a migration to rural districts, owing to the food situation. According to the Swedish paper *Arbetaren* (8 Apr. 1943), 40,000 persons have been expelled from their homes in Marseilles.

like Poland, have lost the United States outlet for their surplus agrarian population, which played an important role in their economy before the war of 1914-1918. The Nazi press pointed out that the support of the Axis now gave the countries co-operating with it an opportunity to relieve their population pressure at the expense of their neighbours, while all suitable workers could be recruited for employment in Germany.¹

*Yugoslavia.*²

After the invasion of Yugoslavia the country was carved up into seven parts; one part each was taken by Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary, while the remaining three parts formed the vassal states of Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro.

Traffic between these different parts of Yugoslavia is forbidden to the local population, and even travelling within the territories of the separate areas is not allowed without a special permit. Free migration being practically impossible, the movement of peoples takes the form of forced transfer, more or less forced departure for employment in Germany, and clandestine flight. Certain features of population movements are common to all sections of Yugoslavia. Apart from the removal of workers from all parts of Yugoslavia, and of Serbian war prisoners to Germany, dealt with in another context³, the movements can be classified as follows:

(1) *Waves of terror, provoking the flight of the population.* The number of Yugoslav refugees abroad is small and limited to groups of politicians and intellectuals, but there was a great movement of refugees in the interior of Yugoslavia itself.⁴

During the "purge" of the part of Slovenia annexed by Germany, many Slovenes escaped to the section annexed by Italy (Province of Ljubljana). According to a reliable source, at the turn of the year 1941-42, there were more than 10,000 refugees registered with the Red Cross in Ljubljana.⁵

From Croatia, about 250,000 Serbs and non-separatist Croats are said to have fled to Serbia and Italy to escape the *Ustachi* terror.

¹ These arguments are given in respect of Rumania by *Wirtschaftsdienst*, 1942, No. 1, and for Croatia by *Südost Echo*, 23 May 1941.

² The facts cited in this section are based on information supplied by the Royal Yugoslav Information Centre, unless otherwise stated.

³ Cf. Chapter III, pp. 151-153.

⁴ The extent of these movements has recently been shown by a census of refugees registered in Serbia. There were 72,524 families residing in the country amounting to 10 per cent. of the population.

⁵ This is corroborated by the following statement in the *Südost Economist*, 20 June 1941 (published in Budapest): "The immigration to Ljubljana of numbers of people from the former Drava Banat annexed by the Reich was the cause of a jump of about 3,000 in the unemployment figure in that city".

In the early days of the Hungarian occupation of north-eastern Yugoslavia, several thousands of Serbs fled to Old Serbia.

All the above migration movements concern persons fleeing from one part of Yugoslavia to another under a different military occupation and administrative régime. There was, however, also a similar movement within the limits of these same territories, particularly in what remained of Serbia and in Croatia. Thousands were forced to leave the smaller towns and villages, where life was insecure because of the irresponsible acts of the occupying forces and their supporters and of general conditions, and moved into larger cities such as Belgrade, Zagreb¹ and Nish.

There was also a continual stream of refugees from all parts of Yugoslavia to the mountains to join the guerrilla forces.

(2) *Efforts of the occupation authorities to purge the country of elements which they regarded as dangerous.* The Germans deported 30,000 persons, mostly belonging to the intelligentsia, to Croatia, and 26,000 to Old Serbia, from the part of Slovenia incorporated in the Reich, most of them during the early part of the occupation.

The Italians also deported to southern Italy 35,000 Slovenes² and another 57,000 people from Dalmatia and from the Croatian coast. The Italians seem to be following the policy of thoroughly clearing the Dalmatian coast and of settling Italians there.

(3) *Changes in land ownership.* The Yugoslav land reform laws were abolished in Croatia, in Bulgarian-held southern Serbia, in the north-eastern part of Yugoslavia annexed by Hungary, and in part of Old Serbia. In all these territories settlers who since 1918 had occupied the land of large and foreign landowners were dispossessed and removed from their farms. This led to various transfers of population described below.

In Slovenia, the repatriation of some 13,500 Germans from Kocevije, which was in effect a transfer from Italian-annexed Ljubljana to the German-annexed part of Slovenia, has already been described.³ In order to make the necessary room for them, still more Slovenes had to leave their homes. There are detailed reports of the forced emigration of 45,000 Slovenes from the districts of Brezice and Krsko (17,000) and of Litija (28,000). This took place from 24 October to 16 December 1941. The persons concerned were sent to different parts of Germany, information being available on the destination of the following groups: 5,000 to Lower Silesia, 16,000 to south-western Germany, and 12,000 to

¹ The population of Zagreb increased from 230,000 before the invasion of Yugoslavia to 350,000 in the autumn of 1942 (*Novo Hrvatska*, 15 Oct. 1942).

² This figure is confirmed by the *St. Gallen Tageblatt*, which reported that 35,000 Slovenes were in Italian concentration camps. According to *Aufbau* (Zurich), 3 Oct. 1942, 60,000 Slovenes had been deported to Italy.

³ Cf. Chapter I, pp. 19-20.

northern and central Germany. The Slovenes were quartered in concentration camps, and employment office officials gradually selected groups of labourers from among them; many of the men were employed on agricultural work and the women on housework.

In regard to southern Serbia (Northern Macedonia), occupied by Bulgaria, a pro-Axis paper stated that "only those Serbs who have immigrated since 1913 should be removed from here; their number is not large".¹ According to Yugoslav sources, about 120,000 were transferred to what remained of Serbia under a Bulgarian Decree laying down that all citizens who settled after 1 December 1918 must return to the place they came from. In southern Serbia about 100,000 hectares of land left by Serbs who had either been killed or deported to Serbia were divided among the Bulgarian peasants by the Bulgarian Government.

In north-eastern Yugoslavia, annexed by Hungary (Banat, Backa, and Baranja), the Hungarian Government issued a law after the occupation providing that the property of all citizens of Yugoslav nationality who had settled in this area after 1 December 1918 should be confiscated without any compensation for the capital and work they had invested in it over the past 20 years. In order to create a "pure Hungarian province", the Hungarian Government repealed the agrarian reform Act and reinstated the old landowners and their supporters, mainly the Hungarian aristocracy, in their property rights, while land was also granted to other Magyars for merit in the war. Information about the demographic effects of this measure is contradictory. According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, the Yugoslav peasants were expelled, and the new owners settled Hungarian farmers on their properties. Information from another source, however, indicates that only the ownership of the land changed hands and that the Yugoslav peasants remained as tenants and labourers. The reports of the expulsion of peasants were said to be unreliable, as Germany, which according to an agreement with Hungary was to share the whole of the crop with Italy, would not have allowed the expulsion of the local peasants. Those who fled during the early part of the Hungarian occupation belonged to the Serbian intelligentsia. Information published by the Central and Eastern European Planning Board on the basis of a report from a Swiss paper suggests, however, that large-scale settlement of repatriated Hungarians has taken place in the newly acquired districts, whether or not the land allotted to the new settlers had been obtained by expelling its previous owners.²

¹ *Südost-Economist* (Budapest), 6 June 1941.

² See below, Hungary, p. 86.

(4) *Repatriation of population.* Apart from the repatriation of the Kocevije and Bosnian Germans and of the Hungarians, already mentioned, a large-scale repatriation of Croats has been carried out by the Croatian Government. In 1941 about 70,000 Croats were transferred to Croatia from Serbia and Macedonia¹, and negotiations concerning the repatriation of Croats from Bulgaria have also been reported.²

Greece and Bulgaria.

After the second Balkan War of 1912-13 and the world war of 1914-18, part of Macedonia and Western Thrace was ceded to Greece by Bulgaria. A number of Bulgarians had already migrated from the Greek provinces of Macedonia and Thrace into Bulgaria before the treaty, and a further migration of Bulgarians resulted from the Treaty of Neuilly (27 November 1919) which provided for a voluntary exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria. According to Bulgarian sources the migrants totalled 300,000.³ German sources claim that as many as 500,000 Bulgarians migrated "as a result of Greek terrorism".⁴ These figures are highly exaggerated. According to an investigation made by the International Labour Office at the request of the Bulgarian Government in 1926, and based on reports of Bulgarian authorities, the total of refugees entering the country between 1913 and 1925 was 221,000.⁵ A final estimate 10 years later, including immigration since 1926, gave a total of 251,000 Bulgarian refugees, of whom 122,000 came from Greece (that is, from Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace) and the rest from Yugoslavia (31,000), from Turkey (70,000), and from Rumania (28,000).⁶

Greeks from Asia Minor were settled in Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace with the help of a commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations and the Greek Government. Much of this settlement was in formerly swampy, malaria-ridden districts, which were drained and improved by the work of the commission and with the help of a loan issued for the purpose. At the request of the Bulgarian Government, the League of Nations also helped to settle 32,000 Bulgarian refugee families, particularly in eastern Bulgaria. Loans of £2,400,000 and \$4,500,000 made to the Bulgarian Government helped in the execution of the scheme.

After the German-Italian conquest of Greece in 1941, Western

¹ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 23 July and 3 Nov. 1941.

² *Der Angriff* (Berlin), 28 Apr. 1942; *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, 29 Apr. 1942.

³ *Südost Economist*, 6 June 1941.

⁴ *Wirtschaftsdienst*, 22 May 1942.

⁵ INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: *Refugees and Labour Conditions in Bulgaria*, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 15 (Geneva, 1926), pp. 6-7.

⁶ Cf. Sir John Hope SMITHSON: *The Refugee Problem* (London, 1939), p. 25.

Thrace was annexed and Eastern (Greek) Macedonia occupied by Bulgaria. The policy of "bulgarisation", carried out most thoroughly in Western Thrace, is represented by the Axis press as intended to secure the repatriation of the Bulgarians who left the territory 20 to 25 years ago. However, it is acknowledged that a further aim of this scheme is the resettlement of a number of Bulgarians from the mountains and from other unfertile regions of old Bulgaria.¹

In the spring of 1942, the German press announced a great Bulgarian colonisation project, 100,000 peasants from Old Bulgaria having already applied for resettlement.² Later it was reported that according to a declaration by the Bulgarian Commissioner for Resettlement 50,000 Bulgarians were to be transferred from the "Old Kingdom" to the Aegean provinces.³ It may be added that, according to some reports, 50,000 Bulgarians from the Zaporozhe district in the Ukraine are also to be repatriated.⁴

According to the Greek Office of Information, based on reports relating to autumn 1942, at least 80,000 Greeks fled from the territory annexed and occupied by Bulgaria to that which remained Greek. In addition, 25,000 Greeks were deported to the interior of Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Bulgarian Government has sent about 80,000 Bulgarians to live in Western Thrace. Their occupational classification is unspecified, but according to another source, most of them are new Bulgarian officials with their families. The occupied territories afforded a means of alleviating the situation of the Bulgarian officials, who were underpaid and very numerous (130,000, or with their families, 650,000); as the Government could not afford to raise their salaries, it decided to send some of the officials from Old Bulgaria to the annexed territory and to give all officials a compensation of about 10 per cent. for the resultant increase in their work.⁵

Mention must further be made of the emigration from Greece. Apart from workers recruited for employment in Germany, there are also Greek refugees abroad. Many civilians emigrated with the retreating Greek army, and later many fled to Egypt and the Near East. Of the 4,830 refugees admitted to Cyprus nearly all were from Greece. One thousand Greeks were evacuated to Mau-

¹ *Südost Economist*, 6 June and 21 Nov. 1941. *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*, 24 Dec. 1942.

² *Wirtschaftsdienst*, 1 May 1942.

³ *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Jan. 1942, quoting the *Donau Zeitung*.

⁴ *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, 27 May 1942, printed a report of the Swedish Svenska Telegrambyrån that representatives of Bulgarians living in the Ukraine had arrived in Sofia to negotiate this repatriation scheme.

⁵ *Südost Economist*, 18 July 1941 and 31 July 1942.

ritius¹, several hundreds to Kenya², and 2,000 Greek refugees have already reached the Belgian Congo while another 3,000 are expected there.

Rumania.

After the war of 1914-1918 Rumania acquired vast territories with a large non-Rumanian population: Transylvania and the Banat from Hungary, Bukovina from Austria, and Bessarabia from Russia. In addition, not long before the war of 1914-1918, Dobruja had been acquired from Bulgaria. It was estimated that of the 18,000,000 people in the new Greater Rumania, 5,000,000 were not ethnically Rumanian.³ In some of the newly acquired territories, these non-Rumanians constituted the majority of the population.

In the summer of 1940, Rumania lost the major part of these territories. In June 1940 the Soviet Union regained the former Russian province of Bessarabia and annexed Northern Bukovina, which had been under Austrian rule before 1919 and had an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population. On 30 August 1940, Rumania lost Northern Transylvania to Hungary, and on 7 September 1940, by the Treaty of Craiowa, Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria.

By these cessions, Rumania lost a large part of its territory and population. According to the census of 29 December 1930, Greater Rumania had a population of 18,057,000, and of this total 6,161,000 then lived in the territories which are now no longer under Rumanian rule. All of these territories had large Rumanian minorities, great numbers of whom migrated into what remained of Rumania. The Rumanian census of 6 April 1941 indicated the total number of refugees from the ceded territories as 251,000.⁴

(1) *Hungaro-Rumanian population exchange.* After the world war of 1914-1918 Rumania annexed from Hungary the whole of Transylvania with its mixed population of Rumanians and Hungarians. The Vienna Award of August 1940 partitioned Transylvania into two parts, divided between Rumania and Hungary, with an approximately equal population. In connection with this transfer of sovereignty, a voluntary population exchange was also provided for. In Northern Transylvania, ceded to Hungary, Rumanians were allowed to opt within six months for either Rumanian or Hungarian citizenship. Those choosing Rumanian citizenship were to

¹ According to a British statement issued in Washington on 4 Mar. 1943.

² *News from Greece* (ed. by the National Committee for the Restoration of Greece, New York), 17 Aug. 1942.

³ Cf. Sir John ELOF SIMPSON: *op. cit.*, p. 411.

⁴ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 20.

migrate to Rumania within the next year, and the same applied to those choosing Hungarian citizenship in Southern Transylvania, which remained under Rumanian sovereignty. The migrants were allowed to take with them their movable property and to liquidate that which could not be moved.

The number of Rumanians who moved from Transylvania was estimated in 1941 at 100,000. Two years later it was reported that the census showed 202,233 refugees from northern Transylvania in Rumania.¹

(2) *Bulgaro-Rumanian population exchange.* In 1914 Bulgaria lost Southern Dobruja to Rumania. The whole territory of the Dobruja, situated between the lower Danube and the Black Sea, had a mixed population of Rumanians and Bulgarians, the northern part being mostly Rumanian and the southern part mostly Bulgarian. The latter remained ethnically Bulgarian, in spite of the large number of Bulgarians who emigrated after 1913 to escape Rumanian rule. Under the Treaty of Craiova of 7 September 1940, Rumania returned Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Arrangements were made for an exchange of population between the Bulgarians of Northern Dobruja and the Rumanians of Southern Dobruja, to secure ethnical uniformity in each of the two parts of the region. The migrants were allowed to take with them all their movable property, including in particular livestock, but landed property was seized by the State without any indemnity, the migrant being entitled to compensation from the country to which he was making his way.

The Bulgarian census taken in Southern Dobruja on 31 January 1941 showed a population of 319,600, including 62,000 Bulgarian migrants from Northern Dobruja. Nevertheless, the total population of this region showed a substantial loss in consequence of the emigration from Southern Dobruja of the Rumanians, who were more numerous than the Bulgarian immigrants.² The number of Rumanians who left Southern Dobruja was estimated at 110,000.

On 1 April 1943 an agreement was signed between Rumania and Bulgaria arranging a new repatriation scheme wider than that stipulated in the Treaty of Craiova and providing for a voluntary resettlement of all Bulgarians living in any part of Rumania and all Rumanians living in any part of Bulgaria.³ In May, however, the Mixed Bulgarian-Rumanian Commission for the Exchange of Nationals announced that the Governments of the two countries

¹ *Bukarester Tageblatt*, 30 Apr. 1943. These refugees included 116,948 men, mostly aged between 21 and 40. Peasants formed the largest category.

² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 8.

³ Transocean broadcast, 29 Apr. 1943.

had abandoned the idea of resettlement¹, the explanation given being that "neighbourly relations between Rumania and Bulgaria have become very cordial during the past few months".²

(3) *Migration from and to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.* In June 1940 the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union led to the flight of some of the Rumanian population. It should be noted that those who left were not the original Rumanian inhabitants of Bessarabia or the Moldavian peasants, who constituted about half of the population of the province, nor the peasants of Northern Bukovina.³ The refugees, estimated at between 35,000 and 40,000 persons⁴, consisted entirely of Rumanians who had come into Bessarabia and Bukovina after 1919, and were for the most part officials or persons engaged in the liberal professions. Most of the refugees from Bukovina went to Transylvania and those from Bessarabia to the neighbouring province of Moldavia.⁵

In June 1941, when Rumania joined Germany in invading the Soviet Union, there was a mass flight of Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina to the interior of the U.S.S.R., their number being estimated at between 100,000 and 130,000.⁶ Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were retaken by the Rumanians, and the neighbouring part of the Ukraine, including the city of Odessa, came under Rumanian domination and was renamed Transnistria. These events led to the return to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina of the Rumanians who in the summer of 1940 had fled to escape the Soviet occupation. Furthermore, a proposal was made a few months after the occupation of Bessarabia for the resettlement in Bessarabia of 100,000 Transylvanian Rumanians.⁷ There was also a Rumanian influx into Transnistria⁸, which appears to have consisted in large measure of Rumanian police and other officials; thus, according to Tass, the number of special requisition officers was 4,600.⁹

¹ D.N.B., 23 May 1943, despatch from Bucarest.

² Transocean broadcast, 25 May 1943.

³ The *New York Times* (14 Dec. 1940) published a United Press report from Bucarest six months later that Rumanian peasants from two villages in Northern Bukovina had left for Rumania, being dissatisfied with life under Soviet rule.

⁴ *New York Times*, 1 July 1940.

⁵ The measures taken by the Rumanian authorities to deal with the refugees consisted mainly in preventing them from reaching Bucarest. After the riots in Sept. 1940, the new pro-Axis Rumanian Government took care of the refugees in a manner consistent with its general policy. All the rural land and dwellings to which Jews held title were confiscated and turned over to Rumanian refugees from Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Southern Dobruja. It was also hoped that places would be found for numerous refugees by ousting Jews from the liberal professions.

⁶ Cf. below, p. 106.

⁷ *New York Times*, 20 Aug. 1941.

⁸ For the deportation of Rumanian Jews to this territory, see below, p. 106.

⁹ *Investita*, 14 Oct. 1942.

In the autumn of 1942, the Rumanian Government appointed a committee for the repatriation of Rumanians living to the east of the River Bug, in the Ukraine on the Dnieper, in the Crimea, and in the Caucasus. The exact number of persons involved is unknown, estimates varying between 30,000 and 200,000. The repatriated Rumanians are to be settled in Transnistria, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. Some of them will be granted farms which belonged to the Germans repatriated in 1940 to Greater Germany.

Hungary.

Through the frontier changes described above, Hungary recovered nearly all the territories inhabited by Magyar populations. With regard to the small scattered minorities which still remained outside the new frontiers, the Government proposed to repatriate them gradually and appointed a special Commissioner for the purpose. The last annual report of this Commissioner shows that 4,294 families comprising 17,614 persons were repatriated from May 1941 to the end of 1942, of whom 3,806 families comprising 15,593 persons were transferred in 1941 and 488 families comprising 2,021 persons in 1942. These persons were established in the southern part of the country in 32 adjacent settlements on land evacuated by Rumanians. Most of them came from Bukovina; others from Bosnia and Moldavia. At the end of 1942 the Commissioner still had enough land available to settle from 1,300 to 1,400 more families.¹

U.S.S.R.

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 caused the displacement of many millions of the population, who fled before the invader. The Russian retreat was accompanied by the evacuation of the population and the removal of factories. The first purpose of this policy was to prevent men and vital materials from falling into German hands; hence the so-called "scorched earth" policy meant not only the removal of goods, but also their destruction if immediate removal was not possible. Secondly, the evacuated men

¹ Communication to the I.L.O. According to information published by the Central and Eastern European Planning Board on the basis of a report from a Swiss paper, the occupied Yugoslav province of Backa has been the main place of settlement for these repatriated Hungarians. Fifty-three thousand acres are said to have been allotted in this province to 3,806 Hungarian families, numbering 15,600 persons, repatriated from Bukovina, while those repatriated from Bosnia were given an additional 2,900 acres. Four hundred and eight families numbering 1,600 members came from Moldavia and were also settled on Yugoslav territory. In addition, 600 persons received land for services rendered during the recapture of the province of Backa (*Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Apr. 1943, p. 3).

and materials were to be used in safer places eastward of European Russia and behind the Urals.

The trek to the east had long been a fundamental feature of Russian expansion and development. In old Russia it took the form of the colonisation of that part of Asiatic Russia which is suitable for agriculture, namely the belt between the Taiga, the virgin forests of the north, and the parched land. In the new Russia, it was connected with the process of industrialisation which commenced with the five-year plans. The industrial development of Soviet Russia, which was resumed after 1928, was not only designed to restore and enlarge the old industrial centres which had collapsed during the revolution and the civil war, but had the further objective of industrialising new areas in the more remote parts of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government's policy in regard to the geographical distribution of industry was guided by two considerations—first, that of the economic expediency of establishing factories near the sources of raw materials and power, and secondly, the strategic consideration of placing war industries in a position which would be as invulnerable as possible in the event of an invasion and creating a new self-sufficient industrial centre far behind the anticipated fighting lines.¹ Both considerations contributed towards the same result—a trend towards industrial development in and behind the Urals.

This orientation of Russian industry was intensified as a result of the war. Before the outbreak of war, the new industries in the east were created merely to supplement and not to supplant the old industrial areas; only in exceptional cases were existing factories removed from the western part of the Union to the Urals and Siberia. Since the German invasion, however, the industries in the east have had to make good the losses suffered in the course of the war, and this has been done largely by speeding up industrial development in the Urals and in Soviet Asia and by removing factories which might have fallen into enemy hands. Some evacuated plants were moved into ready-made buildings, available because of the fact that when the war began entirely new plants were in process of construction, some of them being merely empty buildings awaiting the installation of machinery. This accounts in part for the speed with which the plants were put into operation in the new

¹ The opinion that industry was intentionally removed from the danger zone is commonly accepted. Cf. A. YUGOW: *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace* (New York, 1942), pp. 150-151; JOHN SCOTT: *Behind the Urals* (New York, 1942), p. 262; *Report on the Development of Soviet Asia*, presented by Andrew J. STEIGER to the Conference of the Russian Economic Institute, New York, Oct. 1942 (*U.S.S.R. Economy and the War*, New York, 1943, pp. 82-83); and ROBERT J. KERNER: *The Present World Position of the U.S.S.R.*, in *California Monthly*, Nov. 1942. A contrary view is expressed in *Socialistichesky Vestnykh* (New York), 31 July 1942.

locations. In many other cases new buildings were erected with astonishing speed.¹

Long before the war, the industrialisation of the immense eastern territories of the Soviet Union gave rise to a great migratory movement towards the east. In the period between the two censuses of 1926 and 1939, over three million persons migrated into the Urals, Siberia and the eastern areas of the Union, while 1,700,000 went to Russian Central Asia, making a total of nearly five million immigrants to the Urals and the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union from European Russia.

In the years immediately before the war, there was some divergence between the trend of industrial development and that of population movement. The migration of workers to the east did not keep pace with the rapidly growing needs of expanding industry. The result was a growing shortage of workers, particularly of skilled workers and technicians, who with their improved standard of living had no inducement to move into the new industrial areas. To ensure an adequate supply of workers for the Siberian and Far Eastern factories, a Decree was issued on 19 October 1940² providing for compulsory transfer of construction engineers, master mechanics, draughtsmen, bookkeepers, economists, planning experts and skilled workmen from one undertaking or office to another, "irrespective of the geographical location of such undertaking or office".

Wartime conditions brought with them a simultaneous growth of the labour force and industrial capacity of the east. Two of the overwhelming problems produced by the emergencies of war actually balanced each other—the evacuation of large-scale undertakings and the eastward migration of millions of refugees. The transplantation of industry facilitated the resettlement of the refugees, who, for their part, supplied the labour to re-install, and later to operate, both evacuated factories and new plants.³

While there was no longer any need of coercive measures to stimulate the immigration of people who were only too glad to have the opportunity of escaping the advancing enemy, the Soviet Government took steps to make this temporary immigration permanent. In February 1942 the Council of the People's Commissars issued an Order requiring local authorities in the eastern regions to make arrangements for the permanent absorption of workers and employees transferred to those areas with their factories and undertakings. Provision was made regarding the homes and personal property of the evacuees. Further, the local authorities were

¹ Cf. Andrew J. STEIGER: *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

² Cf. *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, Feb. 1941, p. 207.

³ Cf. *Christian Science Monitor*, letter from John EVANS from Kuibyshev, 6 July 1942.

ordered to supply them with land and building materials so that they could build homes for themselves.

Opinions differ as to the precise extent of this evacuation, but it is generally agreed that it was on a large scale. There is no doubt that in the cities and other industrial areas the Soviet authorities carried out a far-reaching removal of factories and stocks of materials and products, destroying all that could not be removed.¹ Factories were removed together with their workers. Of course, not all the workers were evacuated, but at least all skilled workers. A large factory transferred from the zone of hostilities to Petropavlovsk in Kazakhstan, from which "40 per cent. of the plant's workers were evacuated with its equipment", is quoted by an official Soviet publication as a typical example.²

Industry was not alone affected by evacuation. German sources admit that agricultural machines and tools were for the most part removed or destroyed by the Russians and that cattle stocks were reduced.³ A shortage of agricultural workers was also reported⁴, although, according to German sources, the gathering of the harvest in 1941 "showed that the problem of shortage of workers arose in a few regions only. Thus, remedial action was required in Latvia and the prairie regions of southern Ukraine, while elsewhere only precautionary measures were taken by approaching prisoners of war camps and labour recruiting offices for labour, the need for which never actually arose."⁵ Meanwhile it was reported that wide tracts of land lay forsaken.⁶ A high German official stated in March 1942 that "the front had shifted considerably into a region whence labour had been systematically removed by the Bolsheviks".⁷

Indeed, with the progress of the campaign into inner Russia, the transfer was being conducted on a larger scale.⁸ A general displacement of population, however, was not possible under the circumstances, nor would it have fitted in with the plans of the Soviet Government; first, because it would have obstructed the highways, and secondly, because it would have resulted in a mass

¹ This is admitted by the German authorities; cf. below, Chapter III, p. 155.

² EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., Washington: *Information Bulletin*, 14 May 1942.

³ *Wirtschaftsdienst*, No. 5, 30 Jan. 1942; *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 17, June 1942.

⁴ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 18, June 1942. The shortage of agricultural workers, however, might not necessarily be due to evacuation, since the removal or destruction of machinery inevitably increased the number of workers needed on the farms.

⁵ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Mar. 1942, No. 7, Part V, p. 130, article by Dr. RACHNER, Chief of the War Economy Department of the German Economic Staff Administration of the East.

⁶ *Wirtschaftsdienst*, No. 5, Jan. 1942.

⁷ Dr. RACHNER, in *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, loc. cit.

⁸ Cf. the account of the evacuation of the Kuban Cossacks quoted from *Krasnaya Zvezda*, in *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, 11 and 24 Aug. 1942.

influx of people into an area which was not able to feed or house them.

The data available concerning the number of evacuees are fragmentary. The following is a list of the population losses of several cities and towns in German-occupied Russia, as reported by various newspapers:

Town	Pre-war population	Population after evacuation	Source of information
Kiev	850,000	330,000	<i>Izvestia</i> , 14 Oct. 1942
Odessa	604,000	300,000	<i>Novoye Slovo</i> (Berlin), 22 July 1942
Dnepropetrovsk	501,000	152,000	<i>Idem</i> , 7 Jan. 1942
Mariupol	270,000	178,000 ¹	<i>Ibid</i>
Smolensk	156,000	20,000	<i>Soviet War News</i> , 7 Sept. 1942
Nikolaev	167,000	100,000	<i>New York Herald Tribune</i> , 26 Oct. 1941
Mozhaïsk	18,000	5,000	<i>New York Times</i> , 27 Jan. 1942

¹ The sex and age distribution is significant. The population comprised 76,730 males and 101,628 females, 57,963 persons being under 16 years of age.

The people who were evacuated or fled from cities and towns were principally officials, employees, workers, and Jews.

The figures quoted above show a decrease of over 50 per cent. in the urban population. The whole of this loss cannot, however, be attributed to evacuation and flight from the occupied areas. There was also a migration to the countryside from the urban centres which had been destroyed or offered no further possibility of employment. With regard to the figures given above, only in the case of Mozhaïsk is it explicitly stated that 13,000 persons had been evacuated. As to Kiev, another source shows that part of the loss occurred after the Russian retreat; the first German census in October 1941 showed a population of 500,000, and the second in August 1942 only 350,000.

With regard to the total number of evacuees and refugees, several estimates, differing widely from each other, have been given. Those quoted below refer to the whole evacuation of 1941. They include people evacuated not only from the former territory of the Soviet Union, but also from the territories occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940, *i.e.* the Eastern Polish Provinces (Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine), the Baltic States, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. They do not include evacuation during the German offensive in 1942.

Mr. A. Grajdanzev wrote in November 1941 that the number of refugees and evacuees "may be between ten and twenty millions".¹

¹ *Far Eastern Survey*, 17 Nov. 1941.

Even less specific is the statement made in a *Pravda* editorial that "tens of millions of Soviet people moved to new places".¹

An authoritative non-Russian source in Kuibyshev estimated the number of evacuees up to June 1942 at 20 million.

The estimate given by Dr. Rachner, Chief of the War Economy Department in the German Economic Administration in the East, starts from the assumption that the rural areas "retained their human stock", and that "assuming that the entire population of the occupied area was 75 million before the war, 50 million may belong to the countryside. . . Thus 25 million remain for the urban population of the occupied area". Dr. Rachner goes on to say that all enquiries tend to the conclusion that on the average half of the population at the most remained in the cities and towns. The number of those who left the occupied territory would accordingly amount to 12,500,000.²

A calculation made by one expert, Mr. H. R. Habicht, with the help of data which he collected in Russia in 1941, is based on an estimate of the transport facilities available. The total transport capacity of the railways is estimated as permitting the evacuation of 15 million, and the great majority, although not all, of the refugees left by rail. On the other hand the railways had to carry other transport also. Mr. Habicht assumes that the number of persons who left by other means of transport equalled those who might have been carried by trains which were actually used for other purposes, and therefore reckons the total number at a maximum of 15 million.

Another estimate, also based on railway transport capacity, has been made by Mr. Sergius A. Vassiliev, an authority on Russian transportation. Out of about 250,000 railway cars in the occupied territories, some 50,000 (20 per cent.) may be presumed to have been abandoned to the Germans. Assuming that half the remaining 200,000 were used for removing the population, and taking forty persons to be the normal capacity of a car, four million persons must have been evacuated. These trains, no doubt, were overcrowded to the extent of 50 to 100 per cent.; the total number of those who left by railway alone, therefore, must be between six and eight millions.³ Twenty-five per cent. more, or between one and a half and two millions, may have escaped by other means of transportation,

¹ *Pravda*, 17 Dec. 1941.

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, *loc. cit.*

³ Some indication of the number of evacuees might also be obtained from the average number of trains which could run daily on the railways utilised for the retreat. Assuming that the railways of the Moscow region were closed to refugees, the number of railways available for this purpose might be estimated at 10. If each railway could accommodate 10 evacuation trains daily (without interruption for military traffic), and each train carried about 1,000 passengers, the number of people transferred would be 100,000 daily, or 3,000,000 monthly.

making a grand total of 7,500,000 to 10,000,000.¹ This estimate, of course, includes the evacuees from the annexed Soviet territories, as the railway cars could not possibly have made a second trip before the winter. It does not, however, include those who might have been evacuated at the time of the second German offensive in the summer of 1942, when the available cars could be utilised again.

All these estimates refer only to the evacuation of 1941. Those given below also include the evacuation of 1942.

As to the total of evacuations in 1941 and 1942 from the former Soviet territory, excluding the northern Caucasus, only indirect data to form the basis of an estimate are available. These data are of two kinds: first, Dr. Rachner's statement that the rural areas retained their population, and that on the average half of the urban population at most remained²; and secondly, the extent of the transportation facilities available for evacuation by rail.

It has been seen that the number of persons evacuated in 1941 from the Soviet-occupied part of Poland was between 1,200,000 and 1,500,000, from the Baltic States about 200,000, and from Bessarabia and Bukovina over 100,000, making a total evacuation of between 1,500,000 and 1,800,000 from the Soviet-annexed territories. Further, on the basis of information collected during the course of the evacuation, the number of evacuees from the northern Caucasus has been given as 1,500,000.

According to the census of January 1939, the urban population of the whole of the former territory of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans in 1941 as well as in 1942, except the northern Caucasus (and excluding the territories newly occupied by the U.S.S.R.), amounted to about 18,000,000. Adding the natural increase of the population and the migratory gain of industrial cities, the result is an urban population of over 19,000,000, the evacuated half of which would amount to about 9,500,000. To this figure must be added the evacuations from the Soviet-annexed territories in

¹ The difference between this and Mr. Habicht's estimate is due to the different assumptions as to the percentage of trains utilised for carrying passengers, and to the different estimates of those who left by other means of transport, but the estimated total transport capacity in the two cases is about the same.

² There is no ground for contesting Dr. Rachner's statement, which is based on enquiries specially made for the purpose. Of course, not only the urban population was affected by the German advance; skilled labourers operating agricultural machinery were almost all evacuated, and mobilisation for the army drained the countryside of manpower even more than the industrial areas. On the other hand, however, it has to be remembered that after the occupation the rural population was swollen by the return of many unskilled factory workers who were not evacuated, and by other members of the urban population returning to their native villages. In view of the social structure of the Russian urban population the number of such people must surely have been very high. As to the urban evacuations, there is no means of determining the percentage of evacuees, so that Dr. Rachner's very rough assumption that 50 per cent. of the urban population was evacuated must be accepted in the absence of better data.

1941 and those of 1942 from¹ the northern Caucasus, for which direct information is available. This gives a total of 12,500,000 persons evacuated in 1941 and 1942.¹

This figure may be compared with a calculation obtained in quite a different way. It has been seen that a calculation based on transport facilities gave an estimate of 7,500,000 to 10,000,000 for the entire occupied area in 1941—that is, for the old and new territory of the Soviet Union. The evacuation of 1942 covered two areas—the northern Caucasus, with an estimated evacuation of 1,500,000; and the eastern Ukraine and Don Basin, with an estimated evacuation of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (based on Dr. Rachner's assumption); this gives a total evacuation of between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 for 1942, and a grand total of between 9,500,000 and 12,500,000 for 1941 and 1942 together.

Finally, the results obtained may be compared with the estimates made by a competent body giving separately the number of mobilised men and of other evacuees. The number mobilised is given as 4,000,000. This includes men who had been called to the colours before the German invasion, numbering about a million, so that only the remaining 3,000,000 who were mobilised during the retreat, or in other words who were evacuated in order to be mobilised, have to be taken into account. The number of other evacuees from the old Soviet territory in 1941 and 1942 is estimated at 6,000,000, mainly on the basis of transportation facilities. Together with 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 evacuees from the Soviet-annexed territories the grand total obtained is 10,500,000 to 11,000,000.

A comparison of all these estimates obtained in different ways shows that the results do not differ greatly from each other. If, therefore, the grand total of evacuees from both the old and annexed territories in 1941 and 1942 is estimated at 12,000,000, (*i.e.* over 10,000,000 from the old and over 1,500,000 from the annexed territories) the error on either side would probably not exceed 15 per cent.

With regard to the geographical distribution of the evacuees, no reliable information is available², apart from the previously

¹ At first glance this result seems to correspond closely to the figure of 12,500,000 resulting from Dr. Rachner's rough calculation. There is, however, some difference. Dr. Rachner's figure of 12,500,000 includes only evacuation in 1941. For 1942, 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 would have to be added, thus giving a grand total of between 14,500,000 and 15,000,000 for 1941 and 1942 together, instead of the 12,500,000 obtained by a more exact calculation.

² There are incidental data about care being taken of 200,000 evacuated children in children's homes in 24 regions of the Russian Soviet Republic alone, reported by Dr. KAZANTSEVA, Assistant People's Commissar for Health, in *Soviet War News*, 19 Sept. 1942. This information gives no geographical location, because this Republic extends from the frontiers of Bielorussia and the Ukraine to the Pacific. Other incidental reports refer to houses built for refugees (*Izvestia*, 25 Aug. 1942) and to "hundreds of families" established and employed on the collective farms of the Kuznets region (*Izvestia*, 4 Sept. 1942).

quoted report on Polish refugees in inner and Asiatic Russia. The general tendency seems to have been to remove people far from the front. Factories were transferred mainly to the Urals. Further, "the great migration caused by the war has chiefly affected Central Asia and Siberia". Refugees were, however, sent even farther into Eastern Siberia; thus, the city and probably the entire region of Irkutsk, 900 miles from the border of Manchukuo, would seem to have been chosen as a major centre of wartime resettlement. It was reported in *Pravda* on 21 May 1942 that in this city, whose total population had been a quarter of a million in 1939, there were now 204,000 workers having their own individual or collective truck gardens. This would indicate a population, including children, of 400,000 or more¹ or, in other words, an influx of 150,000 refugees.

There can be no doubt that the war also caused a great transfer of population from one part of unoccupied Soviet territory to another, but on this subject information is lacking. The only exception is in the case of the deportation of the Volga Germans about which an official declaration was made. The Volga Germans are descendants of the 27,000 colonists settled in 1761 at the invitation of Catherine the Great, their number having since risen to many hundreds of thousands. Their territory constituted the "Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic". An official statement of 28 August 1941 indicated that "according to reliable information received by the military authorities, thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany". The statement continues that, while no Germans from the Volga have reported the existence of the purportedly large numbers of dissidents who have been uncovered:

If any diversionist acts were carried out under orders from Germany by German dissidents or spies in the Volga German Republic or in neighbouring regions, and bloodshed resulted, the Soviet Government would be forced under martial law to adopt reprisals against the entire Volga German population.

In order to avoid such an undesirable occurrence and to forestall serious bloodshed, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. has found it necessary to resettle the entire German population of the Volga regions in other districts under the condition that the resettled peoples be allotted land and given State aid to settle in the new regions. The resettled Germans will be given land in the Novosibirsk and Omsk districts, the Altai region of the Kazakhstan Republic and neighbouring localities rich in land.²

¹ William MANDEL: *The Soviet Far East*, Papers for the 8th Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Dec. 1942, p. 20.

² *New York Times*, 8 Sept. 1941.

The number of Volga Germans transferred is estimated at 400,000.¹ No information is available concerning their subsequent fate.

THE EXPULSION AND DEPORTATION OF JEWS

"The aims of Germany's policy", Gauleiter Greiser of the Warthegau has declared, "extend as far as her power." This statement explains the changes in German policy towards the Jews. Until the outbreak of war, emigration was ostensibly encouraged; Chancellor Hitler said that he would willingly give a thousand mark note to every Jew who would leave. In practice, however, less humane and more effective methods of promoting Jewish emigration were adopted. Life in Germany was made impossible for Jews in order to induce them to leave, and when they left they had to abandon almost all their property. At the same time, a moral obligation to receive the Jews was imposed on other nations.

With the extension of German conquests, the aims of Germany's Jewish policy were widened to embrace the "liberation of all Europe from the Jewish yoke". Not only the deportation and segregation of the Jews, but their extermination also was an openly proclaimed objective of German policy. But the main factor which changed the character of the anti-Jewish measures lay in the changed conditions themselves. With the progress of the war, emigration possibilities became more and more restricted. On the other hand, Germany was now able to send the Jews to non-German territories under German control, so that as stimulated emigration declined, deportation increased. The Jews were either expelled to "purge" a given country or city of its Jewish element, or they were concentrated in specific regions, cities or parts of cities to "purge" the rest of the locality.

It must be emphasised that the wholesale and recurrent removal of Jews is at the same time an effective method of securing their economic extermination. No regard is had to their prospects of earning a livelihood; on the contrary, the transfer is carried out in such a way as to make it impossible for the Jew to reorganise his economic life. His relations not only with the Gentiles but also with his own people are severed; and if he succeeds in establishing new connections they are again broken by a further move. Because of the various methods used to secure the segregation and concentration of the Jews, they are uprooted over and over again and prevent-

¹ *Ibid.* Simultaneously the Volga Germans who resided in Moscow were weeded out and sent to Siberia. Cf. Wallace CARROLL: *We're in This with Russia*, p. 83.

ed from striking fresh roots anywhere. First they are sent to the General Government. Then the town in which they were settled is "purged". In their new place of residence a ghetto is established. But even the ghetto does not give the Jews the security of a permanent residence, and they are again removed further east.

In many cases the immediate motive for expulsion or deportation was to make room for Germans. The first victims of expulsion on a grand scale were the Jews of the incorporated western Polish provinces, who were expelled along with the Polish inhabitants, in both cases to make room for the "repatriated" Germans. Later, Jews were deported because, according to the official statements, they owned apartments suitable for alien refugees from cities subject to air-raids.¹

At the same time, however, another factor, perceptible since the end of 1940 and now assuming growing importance, is strongly operating in a contrary direction—namely, the needs of the German war economy. As a result, Germany's Jewish policy may be described as a compromise between the extermination of the Jews and their utilisation in the war economy.

Early in 1941 a semi-official German article described with satisfaction the exclusion of the Jewish working population from economic life. Already in 1938 the Jews had been "released" from productive work on a wide scale. "But", the article continues, "in consequence of the incipient strain on labour resources and of the necessity of harnessing all the available supply of manpower, a trend in the opposite direction soon became noticeable." At first the Jews were used for unskilled jobs, but later the "more efficient" among them were given suitable higher grade work.² Jews were not, of course, reinstated in the professional activities from which they had been expelled. They were conscripted as forced labour, at first to "release German workers for urgent construction work for the Reich", but later also for direct employment in industries manufacturing army supplies. In a number of cases the Jews were not removed because they were needed as workers; in others, they were deliberately sent to places where they could be put to work. To some extent, therefore, the character of deportation and even its direction were influenced by labour requirements.

Generally speaking, no other group of people have been subjected to compulsory removal from their homes on so great a scale. This forced transfer has taken the following forms:

¹ *New York Times*, 28 Oct. 1941. The Belgian Nazi paper *De SS Man*, 10 Oct. 1942, reported with satisfaction that more housing was available in Antwerp owing to the expulsion of Jews. "In seven streets alone", the paper reports, "there are now 552 apartments" (*News from Belgium*, 9 Jan. 1943).

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 Feb. 1941, No. 6, Part V, pp. 106-110.

(1) Mere expulsion from a territory, the Jews being taken to the frontier of the territory they are to leave. This was the procedure adopted in regard to the Jews from Alsace and south-west Germany, who were taken to the French frontier, and also at times in regard to the Jews of the Incorporated Provinces, who were taken to the General Government and there left to their fate.

(2) Mere expulsion from a city without any assignment of destination, as in the case of the Jews expelled from Cracow.

(3) Expulsion from an area which is to be "purged of Jews" and deportation to a special region (e.g. the Lublin reservation), city or town, or part of such region, city or town. Since 1940 this has been the usual practice adopted in removing Jews from various German-controlled territories and deporting them to the General Government, or, latterly also, to the occupied area of the Soviet Union.

(4) Deportation within the limits of the same territory; thus the Jews of the General Government are deported to other cities and towns in the same territory, in which ghettos are set up.

(5) Removal from one part of a city to another, by means of the setting up of ghettos or segregation in specified quarters.

(6) Removal of Jews conscripted for forced labour to special Jewish labour camps.

It is worth noting that compulsory transfer is tending more and more to become the sole form of Jewish migration. Thus a Decree of 11 December 1939 prohibited the Jews in the General Government from changing their residence without a special permit, and similar measures have been adopted throughout the whole of German-dominated Europe.

Earlier Forms of Expulsion and Deportation

There were various isolated instances of expulsion even before the outbreak of war. Thus, in November 1938, between 15,000 and 16,000 Polish Jews living in Germany were seized, packed into freight cars and taken to the Polish border, many of them to the frontier town of Zbonszyn. In this case the German authorities could claim that they were foreigners. But this was not so in another case which attracted much attention because of the exceptional attendant circumstances. After the annexation of Austria, 400 Jewish families living in the province of Burgenland were expelled. Some

escaped to Vienna and others to Czechoslovakia, but a group of about 70, who were packed on an old freighter, remained aboard for more than four months in a no-man's land between Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

After the outbreak of the war the expulsion of Jews began at first in a somewhat unorganised fashion, its object being to place the Jews outside the limits of German rule. In September 1939 Polish Jews fled in masses from the invading armies, pushing further and further east in an attempt to escape to Soviet-occupied territory. In this they succeeded, owing to the attitude of the Soviet authorities during the first two months of the Soviet occupation of Poland. The Germans often tried to encourage this flight; many cases were reported of Jews literally driven at the point of guns and bayonets to the demarcation line and into the frontier rivers. Many were openly admitted by the Soviet authorities; many others managed to cross the border secretly. The number of Jews who fled into the eastern Polish provinces (both before they were occupied by the Soviet Union and after) is estimated by the Institute of Jewish Affairs at 200,000 at least.

At the end of November, the Soviet Government closed the frontier. In the meantime the Germans had begun to carry out another plan for the elimination of the Jews, that of deportation to the so-called Lublin "reservation". This idea of a special Jewish region, to which Jews from all German-ruled countries would be sent, is attributed to the National Socialist theorist Alfred Rosenberg, who proposed it in a lecture on 7 February 1939, developing his scheme for a reservation in contrast with the Zionist idea of a Jewish State. After the occupation of Poland the Lublin district, which according to the census of 1931 had a population of 2,465,000 and numbered 314,000 Jewish inhabitants, was set apart for the execution of this plan. Before the middle of 1940, 650,000 Jews were to be settled there. Great publicity was given to the scheme and a press campaign was launched to convince the German people that "a solution of the Jewish problem in Europe" had finally been found.¹ Deportation started in the second half of October 1939 and during the first months large numbers of Jews, especially from Vienna and the Protectorate² and from the Old Reich, were sent to the reservation. The deportees were given a few hours to leave. They were permitted to take with them up to 50 kilograms (110 lbs.) of luggage and a sum of money equivalent to between \$40 and \$120. No

¹ Cf. S. SEGAL: *The New Order in Poland* (1942), pp. 61-62.

² On 12 Oct. 1939, 6,000 Jews were deported from Moravska-Ostrava and a few other cities in Moravia from a region where the Germans had begun to execute their plan of driving a German wedge between the Czechs and the Slovaks. Cf. *The Jews in Nazi Europe*, Czechoslovakia, p. 5.

preparations were made to receive them, and the reservation soon became a hotbed of epidemics which were bound to spread to the German army too. The idea of a special reservation for Jews was accordingly given up for the time being, after some 30,000 Jews had already been sent there.¹ However, the actual policy of expulsion and deportation was not affected, and the segregation and removal of Jews merely had to be carried out in somewhat different forms.

Countries and Territories of Expulsion and Deportation

Western Poland.

According to the census of 1931, the Polish provinces incorporated into the Reich then had a Jewish population of 632,000. On 1 September 1939, it was estimated at 670,000. As has been mentioned, about 60,000 Jews from this area fled before the advancing German army to the General Government, and many tens of thousands of the Jews who fled abroad or to the Soviet-occupied part of Poland also came from the Incorporated Provinces.

In October 1939 there began a mass expulsion of Jews from the Incorporated Provinces, simultaneously with that of Poles but proportionately on a larger scale. In 1939-1940, over 300,000², or about half the Jewish population, were deported to the General Government. In October 1940 Gauleiter Forster claimed that the province of Danzig-West Prussia was entirely free of Jews. In the other two provinces constituted entirely or partly of Polish territory—Wartheland, with the city of Lodz, and Upper Silesia—this result could not be attained because of the requirements of war industry. The Lodz Jews, in particular, instead of being expelled, were segregated in the first of the ghettos and their numbers were even swelled by Jews deported from the Reich, the Protectorate and the occupied countries of western Europe. The expulsion and deportation of Jews from the Incorporated Provinces continued, however. In May 1942 Gauleiter Greiser stated that there were only 150,000 Jews left in the Warthegau, which contained the great majority of the Jews of the Incorporated Provinces. (Accord-

¹ According to a report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, dated 17 July 1941. A Paris dispatch to the *New York Times* (6 Jan. 1940) estimated the number at 25,000. S. SEGAL: *op. cit.*, p. 62, writes: "By the middle of Nov. 1939, besides the 275,000 local Jews, there were about 50,000 to 60,000 Jews in the Lublin district who were dumped there. These came from all parts of German-occupied countries."

² This is the generally accepted figure. P. H. SERRAPHIM, in *Die Burg*, Oct. 1940, estimates the "influx" into the General Government from the Incorporated Provinces after the end of the campaign at 330,000 (apart from the 60,000 who went there during the hostilities).

ing to some sources of information the additional number deported in 1942 was nearly 100,000.)¹

Germany.

According to the census of May 1939, the Jewish population of Germany and Austria numbered 330,900 persons. On 1 September 1939 the number was estimated at 300,000. As already stated, the first deportations, which started in October 1939, were directed to the Lublin reservation. Deportation from Germany seems to have slackened for some time after the failure of this experiment, but in February 1941 there was a revival of deportation from Vienna.² In the autumn of 1941 there was a new drive against the Jews, which resulted in deportations from Berlin, the Rhineland, and Westphalia. Continued deportation on a huge scale was also reported in the winter of 1941-1942 from Germany (as well as from Prague, where most of the Jews of the Protectorate were concentrated).³ It was rumoured that further deportations were temporarily stopped because the military authorities intervened on behalf of the Jews employed in essential war industries and because the disturbance of military transportation had to be avoided.⁴ But at the Passover mass expulsion to ghettos in Eastern Poland was resumed, the new age limit for the deportees being set at 65.⁵ The total number of Jews deported from the Old Reich from September 1939 to December 1942 is estimated by the Institute of Jewish Affairs

¹ The Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the total of Jews deported from the Incorporated Provinces up to the end of 1942 at 600,000. This figure appears to be exaggerated. At the outbreak of the war the Jewish population of the Incorporated Provinces was estimated at 670,000. Of these, 60,000 fled to the General Government during the hostilities, and the 240,000 Jews who escaped to Rumania, Hungary, the Baltic States and Soviet-occupied territory during this same period included at least 60,000 former residents of the Incorporated Provinces. If, therefore, the number of deportees is estimated at 600,000, the total number of Jews who left the Incorporated Provinces would exceed the pre-war Jewish population of the area. This would mean that the deportees from the Incorporated Provinces also included numbers of Jews who had been transferred there from the west. But the figure of 150,000, representing the Jews who remained in the province of Poznan in May 1942, is itself higher than the number of Jews transferred from Western Europe to the Incorporated Provinces, and it can hardly be supposed that from May to Dec. 1942 there was a large-scale removal of Jews from the Incorporated Provinces at a time when the Germans were being forced by the labour shortage to bring in Jews from France and other Western European countries. In Upper Silesia in particular, there is evidence of the continuing segregation of Jews within the province itself. The establishment of a ghetto in Chrzanow containing 4,000 Jews was reported by the *Oberschlesische Zeitung* (Katowice), 19 Dec. 1942, while in Zarocercie the segregation of Poles and Jews was announced on the occasion of the establishment of a German quarter.

² *New York Times*, 20 Feb. 1941.

³ *Jewish Affairs*, Mar. 1942.

⁴ *New York Times*, 2 Nov. 1941, 14 Mar. and 7 July 1942.

⁵ Information received by the American Jewish Committee (*Contemporary Jewish Record*, June 1942).

at about 120,000¹, and those from Austria would be about 40,000.² For the summer of 1943 the total may be estimated at 170,000.

Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

The census of October 1939 showed 80,300 Jews by religion and 90,100 racial Jews. Up to December 1942, 50,000 to 60,000³ had been compulsorily removed and confined. This is the great majority of the Jewish population, bearing in mind that about 10,000 Jews emigrated between 1 October 1939 and the middle of 1941 and that the excess of deaths over births for the three years October 1939 to December 1942 was no less than 7,000. Unlike those of other countries, the Jews of Bohemia-Moravia were not sent abroad but mostly to the Terezin concentration camp.⁴

Slovakia.

Slovakia is the only country where the expulsion (*Aussiedelung*) of Jews is expressly regulated by law. According to the Constitutional Act of 15 June 1942, expulsion applies to persons of Jewish origin with the following exceptions: (1) those who before 14 March 1939 were not of the Jewish faith, or who before that date had married a non-Jew; (2) those individually exempted from the application of the law by the President; (3) physicians, veterinary surgeons, chemists and engineers, except that expulsion may be ordered for certain individuals in this group.

Dr. Anton Vasek, Chief of Section in the Slovakian Ministry of the Interior, who had been made responsible for solving the

¹ Estimate made by Jacob Lestchinsky taking into consideration the number of Jews in Sept. 1939 and Dec. 1942, the loss by emigration, and the excess of deaths over births. At the outbreak of the war the number of Jews in the Old Reich was 215,000. On the other hand, the most recent reports on Jews are as follows: In Berlin, where the German Jews were mainly concentrated, only 28,000 were left, according to a *Times* dispatch from Jerusalem, 24 Nov. 1942; Frankfurt on Main was "clean of Jews", according to the *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, quoted by the *Israelitisches Wochenblatt* (Zurich), 17 July 1942; in Leipzig only a few Jews remained, according to a report received by the *Morgen Journal* (New York), 1 Aug. 1942. Therefore, a total of 50,000 Jews in the Old Reich in Dec. 1942 would be rather an over-estimate.

² This evaluation, based on an estimated number of 25,000 Jews still remaining in Austria, is rather conservative. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, speaking for some American Jewish organisations, gave a figure of only 15,000 for the Jews remaining in Austria in Nov. 1942 (*New York Times*, 26 Nov. 1942). The Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the total of Jews deported from Germany, including Austria, up to Sept. 1942, at about 150,000.

³ A report from Geneva, dated Aug. 1942, stated that over 47,000 Jews were deported and 33,000 remained (*Jewish Frontier*, Nov. 1942, pp. 33-34). The Institute of Jewish Affairs estimates the number of deportees up to Sept. 1942 at 42,000 and those remaining at 33,000 (this figure including all racial Jews). Rabbi Wise in Nov. 1942 gave the number of those who remained as 15,000 (persons of Jewish religion only). Another source reported the number of deportees as 60,000 (*Contemporary Jewish Record*, Dec. 1942).

⁴ On 25 Feb. 1943 the *New York Times* reported the deportation of the majority of the inmates of Terezin to Poland.

Jewish problem, gave some particulars of the application of this law at a conference on 29 October 1942. Before 15 December 1940 there were altogether some 100,000 Jews¹ in the country, but by the following December this figure had been reduced to 88,951. Up to the end of October 1942, in consequence of the enactment of the racial law, 62,444 Jews had been deported from the country and more than 7,000 had fled of their own accord. Of the remaining 20,000, 3,500 were in labour camps. About 6,000 had been baptised since 1939 and many were in possession of false baptismal certificates, hoping in this way to avoid banishment. About 2,300 Jews were then employed in industry, making with their families a total of 8,500, and another 1,500 were working on the land.²

France.

The Jews in France at the outbreak of the war were estimated at about 300,000. This figure rose in May 1940 as a result of the influx of Belgian and Netherlands Jews (a substantial number of whom returned home after the armistice) and was increased in October-November 1940 by 9,000 Jews expelled from Baden and the Palatinate to unoccupied France and put in a concentration camp by the Vichy Government.³ On the other hand, there was some Jewish emigration overseas. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee gave the following estimate of the Jewish population of France in 1940-1941: in the occupied area, 148,000 (95,000 French nationals, 45,000 East European Jewish immigrants and 8,000 German, Austrian and Czechoslovak refugees); in the unoccupied area, 195,000 (145,000 French nationals, 20,000 East European Jewish immigrants and 30,000 German refugees). Since then the figures have changed in consequence of infiltration from the occupied to the unoccupied zone, on the one hand, and of overseas emigration from the unoccupied zone on the other. In May 1942, according to the same source, the Jewish population numbered 180,000 in the unoccupied zone (110,000 French citizens and 70,000 Jewish refugees), and about 100,000 in the occupied zone.

In midsummer 1942 a drive against foreign Jewish refugees in Paris marked the beginning of mass deportation from France to the ghettos and concentration camps of Eastern Europe. Many parents preferred to part with their children, probably for ever,

¹ Probably "racial" Jews. The census of 15 Dec. 1940 showed 89,000 persons of Jewish religion.

² *Grensbote* (Bratislava), 6 Nov. 1942; *Donaussitung*, 3 Nov. 1942.

³ *Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 1940 and the first five months of 1941*, p. 15. Since then 2,000 Jews living in Luxembourg have been deported, partly to the west and partly to the Polish ghettos.

rather than take them with them into exile. It has been reported that in many cases children, even very young ones, were sent alone across the line of demarcation into unoccupied France. The Jewish organisations, the Quakers, the Young Men's Christian Association, Catholic churches and others were taking care of thousands of homeless children from the occupied zone as well as those left by parents deported from the unoccupied zone as early as September. For in August the arrest and deportation of Jewish refugees began on a large scale in unoccupied France too. The first victims were the foreign Jews, belonging to different groups, who were interned in camps in the south of France: immigrants from Poland and other Eastern European countries; Jews from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, who before the outbreak of the war had found refuge in France; Jews from Baden and the Palatinate, expelled by the Germans in 1940. Cases of the deportation of French Jews, as well as of non-Jewish French nationals, have also been reported. But the great majority were foreign Jews who had entered France after 1936. All of these were to be deported, with the exception of persons over 60 years old and a few others.¹

The total number of deportees from the occupied and unoccupied zone up to the middle of August 1942 was officially stated as 40,000², and it was constantly increasing.

In November 1942, after the whole of French territory had been occupied by Germany and Italy, the deportation of Jews entered on a new phase. All foreign male Jews 18 to 55 years old, excepting those who had served with a combatant unit, were ordered to report to recruiting centres for labour camp duty. Furthermore, 4,000 Jewish children were sent to the Paris region. Some 10,000 to 12,000 persons succeeded in escaping over the Alps to Switzerland and 6,000 across the Pyrenees to Spain, according to the Hias-Ica Emigration Association (*Hicem*).³ The total of Jews deported from the entire territory of France up to the summer of 1943 has been estimated at 70,000.

Netherlands.

According to Netherlands sources, there were in the Netherlands about 120,000 Jews and another 60,000 people of partly Jewish origin.⁴

¹ *Basler National Zeitung*, 21 Oct. 1942.

² Transocean broadcast, 25 June 1943.

³ Cf. also above, p. 45.

⁴ *Netherlands News*, 11-25 July 1942, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 30. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee gave the figures as 150,000 of the native Jewish population and 30,000 Jewish refugees. The Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the number of Jews, refugees included, at the outbreak of the war at 150,000, of whom 5,000 fled to France in May 1940 and 2,000 emigrated.

In spring 1942 the German authorities in the Netherlands began to evacuate Jews from towns and villages in the provinces, concentrating them in three large ghettos within Amsterdam. In July the deportation of all Netherlands Jews between the ages of 16 and 42 was ordered. According to the protest issued by the people of the Netherlands, some 120,000 would be affected by this measure.¹ It was reported that in August, of the 80,000 settled and 20,000 refugee German Jews living in Amsterdam, about 10,000 had already been deported and that another 12,000 taken from a concentration camp in the province of Drente followed by the middle of October² and 9,000 more by the middle of December. According to the Institute of Jewish Affairs, up to June 1943 the Germans had completed the deportation of some 80,000 Jews from the Netherlands.³

Belgium.

The Jewish population of Belgium at the outbreak of the war has been estimated at 110,000 (80,000 Belgian citizens and 30,000 refugees)⁴, between 20,000 and 25,000 of them having since fled to England and France (in May 1940) or emigrated.⁵

The first deportation of Jews from Belgium took place in the winter of 1941-1942, when some Jews, mainly of Polish origin, were transferred from Antwerp to Lodz for work in textile factories providing uniforms for the German army.⁶

In the summer of 1942 deportation was resumed and from October onward it was on a larger scale. It may be estimated that up to December 1942 about 25,000 foreign Jews had been deported from Belgium, partly to eastern Europe and partly to France for fortification building.⁷ By July 1943 this total was probably doubled.

¹ *Netherlands News*, 11-25 July 1942, pp. 30-31; 26 Nov.-10 Dec. 1942, pp. 84 *et seq.*

² *Netherlands News Digest*, 1 Jan. 1943; *J.D.C. Digest*, Dec. 1942.

³ According to some reports (*New York Times*, 23 and 29 June 1943) all the 120,000 Jews of the Netherlands have been deported.

⁴ According to the *Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 1940 and the first five months of 1941*.

⁵ Cf. ARIEH TARTAKOWER, *op. cit.*, p. 312. The *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. XLII, estimated the number of Jews on 31 July 1940 at 82,000.

⁶ *Jewish Affairs*, Mar. 1942.

⁷ The pro-Nazi paper *Le Pays Réel* (25 Oct. 1942) made the somewhat surprising statement that there were in Belgium 52,000 Jews, only 4,000 having Belgian nationality and the rest being emigrants from Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that nearly 50 per cent. of these had been deported. This report was confirmed by another Brussels newspaper (quoted by *News from Belgium*, 19 Dec. 1942). According to another source, the number of deportees from July to November was 20,000 to 25,000 (*idem*, 16 Jan. 1943).

Norway.

At the time of the German invasion the number of settled Jews was over 1,500; together with refugees, the total was estimated at 2,000. Some hundreds of them escaped to Sweden; the rest were deported to Poland. It has been officially stated that there are no more Jews on Norwegian territory.

Hungary.

After the territorial acquisitions of 1938-1941, Hungary had the largest Jewish population after the U.S.S.R. and Poland, numbering 743,000.¹ About 20,000 Jews in the newly acquired territory of Subcarpathia were forced to cross the border into Galicia.² The annexation of north-eastern Yugoslavia (Banat, Backa and Baranja) was followed by a law providing for the expulsion of Yugoslav citizens who had settled in this area since 1 December 1918. This measure seems, however, to have had little effect on the local Jews, nearly all of whom had been settled in the country for a long time.

The Hungarian Jews suffered economically as a result of anti-Jewish measures, and many of them lost their jobs; their property, however, was not confiscated, nor did they have to wear special badges. Although the Hungarian border is permanently closed, therefore, a number of Belgrade Jews did succeed in reaching a temporary haven in Hungarian territory. Many more came from Slovakia (some 10,000) and Croatia, in particular those whose original home was in the territory annexed by Hungary.

Rumania.

According to the census of 30 December 1930, Rumania had a Jewish population of 757,000. The census of 6 April 1942, taken after the cession of part of Transylvania, Southern Dobruja, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, showed that there remained in Rumania 302,000 Jews. The difference is, of course, mainly due to the difference in the census area. But even taking only the territory which was Rumanian in 1941 for comparison, the Jewish population was larger in 1930, numbering 329,000.³ Thus the recorded decrease is 27,000. In fact, however, Jewish emigration from Rumania greatly exceeded this figure, because, apart from the natural increase, many Jews also immigrated between 1930 and 1940 from Bessarabia and other adjacent regions, especially

¹ Cf. *Ungarn*, published by the Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut, Berlin, 1941.

² *The Jews in Nazi Europe, Hungary; and Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 1941 and the first five months of 1942.*

³ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 20.

to Bucarest. The flight of many Jews to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, after their occupation by the Soviet Union, and the subsequent expulsion, in July 1940, of the Jews who had come from the Soviet-occupied territories, have certainly contributed to the number of Jewish emigrants. Furthermore, the pogroms which in January 1941 followed the establishment of a Rumanian Nazi Government provoked a new flight of Jews to the Soviet area, reported to have numbered 72,000 persons.¹

In June 1941, when Rumania joined Germany in invading Soviet territory, between 100,000 and 130,000² Jews fled from Bessarabia and Bukovina before the invaders. The Rumanians themselves also tried to drive the Jews under their rule eastwards. Following the German example, Jewish ghettos were at first established in the reconquered provinces; but after October 1941 the Jews were driven farther eastward into the Rumanian-occupied Soviet territory renamed Transnistria.

According to a German source, "185,000 Jews have been evacuated since October of last year (*i.e.* 1941) into Transnistria, where they were housed in large ghettos until an opportunity arose for their removal further east. Today there still remain 272,409 Jews in the country. . . Both the provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina can now be considered as free of Jews, excepting Czernowitz, where there are still about 16,000. . . It may be assumed that even during the present year a further 80,000 Jews could be removed to the Eastern Territories."³ However, according to later reports, the Rumanian Government announced in October 1942 that there would be no more "evacuations" to Transnistria.⁴

Yugoslavia.

Before the German invasion, Yugoslavia had a Jewish population of 80,000 citizens and 6,000 refugees. With the invasion, many Jews fled into neighbouring countries. Thirty thousand remained in the new State of Croatia and 8,000 to 9,000 in Serbia, some of them having escaped into the mountains. In May 1942 the *Grenzboten* (Bratislava) announced that only 6,000 Jews remained in Croatia. Some 3,000 succeeded in escaping to Italian-controlled

¹ This figure is given by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in its *Report* for 1940 and the first five months of 1941. The *Krakauer Zeitung*, 13 Aug. 1942, refers to thousands of Jews having migrated to Soviet-occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina.

² The figure of 130,000 is given by a "prominent Rumanian politician" on the basis of the "most detailed investigation" (*Aftonindningen*, Stockholm, 15 Mar. 1943). The estimate of the Institute of Jewish Affairs is 100,000.

³ *Krakauer Zeitung*, 13 Aug. 1942.

⁴ *New York Times*, 13 Feb. 1943.

Yugoslav territory and Italy.¹ All those who remained in Serbia were either exterminated or deported, mostly to Poland or to the Pilsen district in the Protectorate.²

In 1943 the Bulgarian Government started deporting Jews to Poland from Yugoslav Macedonia³, as well as from Bulgarian-controlled Greek territory (Thrace).⁴

Territories of Destination and Methods of Confinement

The number of Jews deported up to December 1942 from all European countries except Poland, *i.e.* from Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, may be estimated on the basis of the figures given above at about 650,000. Furthermore, 50,000 to 60,000 Jews from Bohemia-Moravia have been confined in a concentration camp within the country itself.

Some of the Jews from Belgium were sent to a neighbouring part of Western Europe for forced labour, but generally speaking the tendency has been to remove the Jews to the east. Many Western European Jews were reported to have been sent to the mines of Silesia. The great majority were sent to the General Government and, in ever growing numbers, to the eastern area, that is, to the territories which had been under Soviet rule since September 1939 and to the other occupied areas of the Soviet Union.

During the early period, deportation meant removal to the General Government, but since 1940 the deported Jews have tended more and more to be sent exclusively to ghettos and labour camps.

Ghettos.

The first ghettos were set up in Lodz in the winter of 1939-1940. Since spring 1940 they have been introduced in a number of cities and towns in the Warthegau and the General Government. In the summer of 1940 the Germans segregated the district of Warsaw inhabited mainly by Jews under the pretext that it was a breeding-place of contagious diseases, and in the autumn of the same year a ghetto was formally established. All Jews living outside its confines were ordered to move into the ghetto and all Poles living inside to leave the ghetto area. Many Jews were also brought there from abroad. In the first half of 1942 about 500,000 persons were crowded into the Warsaw ghetto.

¹ According to information received by the Institute of Jewish Affairs.

² Jewish Telegraphic Agency despatch, 4 Feb. 1943.

³ According to information received by the Institute of Jewish Affairs,

⁴ *Donauszetting*, 24 Mar. 1943.

The growth of the ghettos is illustrated by the following estimates. In November 1941 the Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the number of Jews confined in the ghettos "at no less than 1,000,000". In December 1941 figures released by Polish Jewish circles in London showed that about 1,300,000 Jews had been herded into eleven ghettos in various parts of the country.¹ For the early summer of 1942 the Institute of Jewish Affairs gave the number as 1,500,000. On 28 October and 10 November 1942 the Secretary of State for Security in the General Government issued regulations about Jewish ghettos in the five districts of the General Government (Warsaw, Lublin, Cracow, Radom and Galicia), providing that from 30 November 1942 all General Government Jews must live in confined areas. Jews employed in armament and other war industries and living in closed camps are exempted. The confined areas are of two kinds: ghettos inside the larger towns, and purely Jewish towns, cleared of their non-Jewish population. In the whole of the General Government there are 13 ghettos, the largest being the Warsaw ghetto, and 42 Jewish towns.²

Since the invasion of the U.S.S.R., ghettos have been established in Western Bielorussia, Western Ukraine and the Baltic States, and also in occupied Russia.

The primary purpose of the ghettos and special Jewish towns is the segregation of the local Jewish population. This consists of the former inhabitants of the area which was turned into a ghetto or a Jewish town, the inhabitants of the same town who are removed to the ghetto, and Jews removed from other localities of the same country. For the second and third categories segregation in the ghetto meant compulsory removal, and for the third category forced migration also. The number of persons affected by this internal forced migration may have numbered many hundreds of thousands in the General Government alone.³

The ghettos of the General Government or of the Eastern Territories are also the usual destination of the Jews deported from the west by the German authorities or by the authorities of other countries allied to Germany.

Forced Labour Camps.

Forced labour, a system whereby the Jews are used in the interests of the German war economy, was introduced primarily for the

¹ *Contemporary Jewish Record*, Feb. 1942. The Polish Ministry of Labour gave the number of Jews in Polish ghettos in early spring 1942 as 1,200,000.

² *Ostland* (Berlin), 15 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1942.

³ A report on the "Jewish town" of Miedzyrzec may be quoted as showing a typical case. Before the war it contained 14,000 Jews, forming 90 per cent of the population, to whom have now been added 5,000 Jews deported from Cracow. In the large ghettos the proportion of Jews from abroad is substantially higher.

purpose of employing them in the locality, or at least in the country, of their residence.

In Germany, all Jewish men from 18 to 65 years of age and Jewish women from 20 to 55 years are liable to forced labour, with the exception of those permitted to hold jobs in private undertakings. They must work in segregated groups, are not entitled to special payments, and are not protected by the general regulations governing conditions of work. In October 1941, of the 75,000 Jews who were still in Berlin, 30,000 were engaged in forced labour, which for most of them was the only remaining means of livelihood.

Forced labour for Jews has been introduced by the Germans in most of the occupied countries. In the Protectorate, in addition to the general labour service to which all inhabitants of the Protectorate are liable, an especially hard form of compulsory labour has been instituted for male Jews from 18 to 60 years of age, who are organised in battalions for labour camps whenever the need arises. At first many of them were deported to labour camps in Poland, but owing to the spread of epidemics the authorities were forced to transfer thousands of others from Prague, Pilsen and Brno to camps in the Protectorate itself. As has been seen, between 42,000 and 60,000 Jews were confined in the Terezin labour camp.¹ This camp is unusual in that it is both a labour camp and a concentration camp; it contains not only working Jews but also others incapable of work.

But the classic land of Jewish forced labour is Poland; it was here that the whole system was initiated with the Order of 28 October 1939, supplemented by that of 12 December 1939, which made all Jews between the ages of 14 and 60 liable to compulsory labour for a two-year period. During the early days of the occupation the Germans rounded up Jews indiscriminately to perform the work, which at that time consisted mainly in clearing up debris; later, the system was organised and the duty of providing men for forced labour was imposed on the Jewish community councils.

There are different forms and degrees of forced labour. A "privileged" class, even though they work in overcrowded barracks for over 12 hours a day, is that of Jewish artisans employed in workshops turning out goods for the German army. Then come the labour battalions, which work in or near large cities; they are employed mostly on heavy manual work, but can at least return to their homes at night. Others are compelled to work on special construction projects, or for private contractors; they too, are allowed to travel home. Worst of all is the situation of those who are sent to labour camps which differ little, if at all, from concen-

¹ Cf. above, p. 101, n. 3.

tration camps. Up to the summer of 1941, at least 85 Jewish labour camps were known to exist in the General Government. Of the 35 camps the position of which was known, two-thirds were located on the eastern frontier.

Forced labour for Jews expanded rapidly, having developed from a subsidiary measure into an essential feature of the treatment of Jews. In April 1941, the *Gazeta Żydowska* reported that 25,000 Jews were engaged in compulsory construction work in the Warsaw district, and on the basis of other data given by the same journal, the Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the total number of Jews in forced labour camps in Poland in the fall of 1941 at 100,000. During 1942, forced labour became the common fate of the Jews in Poland and in German-occupied Soviet territory. The period for which Jews fit to work are liable for forced labour is no longer limited. Their removal to the east was largely motivated by the wish to make use of them as forced labour, and as Germany's need of manpower grew, deportation for adults of working age was tantamount to assignment to forced labour. In contrast with the other inhabitants of German-occupied countries, Jews are not sent to work in the Reich, because Jewish immigration would run counter to the policy of making Germany "free of Jews". The needs of the war economy are, of course, compelling the German authorities to deviate from this rule to some extent, and indeed some exceptions have been reported.¹ But, generally speaking, deportation to the east is for the Jews the equivalent of the recruitment for work in the Reich to which the rest of the population of German-controlled Europe is subject, and their removal further and further eastward is doubtless connected with the need for supplying the army's requirements near the front.

For the Polish ghettos are not the last stage in the forced eastward migration of the Jewish people. On 20 November 1941, the Governor General, Hans Frank, broadcast the information that the Polish Jews would ultimately be transferred further east. Since the summer of 1942 the ghettos and labour camps in the German-occupied Eastern Territories have become the destination of deportees both from Poland and from western and central Europe; in particular, a new large-scale transfer from the Warsaw ghetto has been reported.² Many of the deportees have been sent to the labour

¹ Thus, according to information of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 200 Jewish saddlers were sent from Poltava (Ukraine) to Vienna. The deportation of Polish, French and Belgian Jews to the coal mines of Upper Silesia is also an exception to the general rule from the National Socialist point of view.

² *Unser Zeit*, quoted by *Nowy Pał*, 10 Jan. 1943. On 22 July 1942, the Jewish Council of Warsaw received an order to prepare 6,000 persons to be sent away daily. Deportation started the next day, and several thousand persons are said to have been deported every day.

camps on the Russian front; others to work in the marshes of Pinsk, or to the ghettos of the Baltic countries, Bielorrussia and the Ukraine. It is hardly possible to distinguish how far the changes in the Jewish population of the General Government are due to deportation and how far they are attributable to "ordinary" mortality¹ and extermination. Moreover, the number of Jews remaining in the General Government is in any case uncertain.²

Total Number of Uprooted Jews

On the basis of the data presented above, the numbers of Jews expelled and deported from Germany and countries under German occupation or control since the outbreak of war in September 1939 may be estimated as follows:

Germany and Austria	180,000
France (excluding Alsace-Lorraine)	70,000
Alsace-Lorraine	22,000
Belgium	50,000
Netherlands	80,000
Luxemburg	2,000
Norway	1,000
Slovakia	70,000
Subcarpathia	20,000
Incorporated Polish Provinces	400,000
Old Rumania, Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia	185,000
Total	1,080,000

¹ The high mortality by non-violent death is exemplified by the death rate for Warsaw. During the first half of the year 1941 there were 12,900 deaths, the total population of the ghetto numbering about 500,000 (*Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, No. 2, 1942). For the second half of 1941 a great increase is reported. For the whole of 1941 the figure is 47,000, according to the Institute of Jewish Affairs, and 49,000, according to Polish Government sources. The mortality rate was undoubtedly still higher in 1942 owing to the deterioration in conditions. Thus the "biological deficit" amounted to over 20 per cent. for 1941 and 1942.

² According to *Ostland* (Berlin), 1 Dec. 1942, the Jewish population of the General Government numbered 2,093,000. This statement has been contested as incredible, the places of Jewish residence listed by the same source being inadequate to house so large a population, even assuming that they were overcrowded to the extent of 50 per cent. beyond their normal capacity. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the same paper reported that on 1 Dec. 1942 the Warsaw ghetto still had a population of about half a million, whereas according to information of the Institute of Jewish Affairs at the end of 1942 it was only 36,000 at that time. However, the question of the number of Jews remaining in Warsaw is in any case dubious. Reports of the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto (obtained only indirectly) seem to be corroborated by the Nazi *Danau Zeitung*, which stated that its suppression raised the serious problem of disinfecting the whole district. On the other hand, according to a message which reached the Polish Government in London through underground channels, there were still some 200,000 Jews within the confines of the Warsaw ghetto (*Congress Weekly*, issued by the American Jewish Congress, 26 Mar. 1943). It may be noted as a curious coincidence that practically the same figure (2,092,000) was given for Jews living in the General Government in summer 1942 (*Krakauer Zeitung*, 15 July 1942, quoting *Europäische Revue*), i.e. before the new deportations to the east had started. On this point, cf. J. SCHWARTZMAN: "More Circumspection", in *Zionism*, 28 Feb. 1943, pp. 16-18.

In addition, some tens of thousands have been deported from the Bulgarian controlled parts of Yugoslavia and Greece. This brings the total number of expelled and deported Jews up to some 1,100,000.¹ Of this total, 9,000 Jews from Baden and the Palatinate, 22,000 from Alsace-Lorraine, some of the 70,000 from Slovakia, some of the 2,000 from Luxemburg, and the first 300,000 from the Incorporated Provinces of Poland, were expelled; the others have been deported.

Only a few thousand of these deportees were sent to western Europe; all the others went to the General Government, and further east to the German and Rumanian-occupied territories of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that some of the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine and Germany may possibly appear twice in the calculation, since the 70,000 Jews deported from France to the east probably include a number of those expelled at an earlier date from Alsace-Lorraine and south-western Germany. In any case, a total of 1,050,000 would make allowance for any double counting.

In order to estimate the total number of uprooted Jews, however, this figure must be increased by the addition of those who were evacuated, fled or emigrated. According to the data given above, these figures are as follows:

Refugees from Poland to and through Rumania, Hungary and Lithuania.	50,000
Refugees from the Incorporated Provinces to the General Government.	60,000
Refugees from German-occupied Poland to Soviet-occupied territory.	200,000
Refugees from Bessarabia.	100,000
Evacuees from the Baltic States.	30,000
Evacuees from Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine.	500,000
Evacuees from the pre-1939 territory of the Soviet Union.	1,100,000
Emigrants to overseas and neutral European countries. .	160,000
Total.	2,200,000

This number again includes some refugees who have been counted twice, among the following groups: (1) 50,000 refugees from Poland who went to European countries; many of these emigrated later, while others were afterwards deported; (2) 200,000 Jews who went from German-occupied Poland to Soviet-occupied territory in 1939; some of them were afterwards removed to the east, and therefore figure in the total of 500,000 Jews removed from Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine. To avoid the possibility of double counting, half of both these groups may be deducted, thus giving a total of 2,100,000.

¹ Many Jews, transferred from Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine to Asiatic Russia shortly after the occupation of these territories by the Soviet Union, should also be added to the number of those forcibly removed from their country of residence. They are included in the total of 500,000 evacuees from Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine, given in the second table.

Summing up both sets of figures, *i.e.* figures relating to Jews deported and expelled and to those otherwise displaced, a total of 3,150,000 is obtained.

This figure does not include: (a) the hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews deported eastward from the General Government, and (b) hundreds of thousands of Jews transferred by compulsion within the limits of the same country or territory to be segregated in ghettos and special Jewish towns, in particular in the General Government and in the German-occupied Eastern Territories. Assuming that only a third of the resident Jews who remained in these territories were affected by (a) and (b), nearly 1,000,000 Jews must have been compulsorily removed eastward or from one town to another. Accordingly, the number of Jews compulsorily removed from their homes would be about 2,100,000, or in any case over 2,000,000, and the total of all uprooted Jews 4,150,000, or in any case over 4,000,000.

SUMMARY

It is difficult, for several reasons, to present the population movements described in the foregoing chapter in the form of a systematic table.

One difficulty lies in the frontier changes which have taken place and in the transfer of whole territories from one national sovereignty to another. In the case of Rumania, for instance, some of the figures relate to the whole of the country before its dismemberment in 1940; others to Rumania after the loss of Northern Transylvania, Southern Dobruja, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina; others again to Rumanian territory after the re-annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In Poland the partition of the whole country and the various changes which have since been made in the frontiers of the Incorporated Provinces and the General Government often make it impossible to determine precisely which territories are concerned in the comings and goings of migrants even when the total volume of migration is more or less accurately known.

Another difficulty arises out of the fact that in some territories there have been successive incoming and outgoing movements and that it is impossible to tell how far the same people were involved. For instance, the evacuations from Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine just before or at the time of the German invasion in June 1941 doubtless affected many people who had come to these provinces earlier from the Polish territory under German occupation.

MOVEMENTS OF NON-GERMAN POPULATIONS

From	Number of persons	To
Germany (including Austria)	170,000 Jews	General Government
Germany (Baden and Palatinate)	50,000 "	Overseas
Bohemia-Moravia	9,000 "	Unoccupied France
Slovakia	10,000 "	Overseas
Slovakia	130,000 Czechs	Bohemia-Moravia
Slovakia	60,000 Jews	Eastern Galicia
Slovakia	10,000 Jews	Hungary
Hungarian-annexed Slovak territory	60,000-80,000 Slovaks	Remaining part of Slovakia
Hungarian-annexed Subcarpathia	20,000-30,000 Czechs and Slovaks	Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia
German-occupied Poland (frontiers of 1940)	20,000 Jews	Galicia
	40,000 (including Jews)	France, America, Palestine and other countries through Rumania and Hungary
	9,000 (including 3,000 Jews)	Hungary
	4,000 (including 1,600 Jews)	Rumania
	50,000 (including 15,000 Jews)	Baltic States
	300,000 (including 200,000 Jews)	Soviet-occupied Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine
Incorporated Provinces	1,660,000 (including 460,000 Jews)	General Government
General Government	30,000-40,000 Bielorussians and Ukrainians	Soviet-occupied Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine
Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine (frontiers of 1940)	1,500,000 (including 500,000 Jews)	Eastern U.S.S.R. (113,000 beyond to Iran, India and Africa)
Finland	20,000 children	Sweden
Soviet-annexed Karelia	180,000	Inner Finland
Lithuania	2,000	Reich
	66,000 (including 10,000 Jews)	
Latvia	60,000 (including 15,000 Jews)	
Estonia	61,000 (including 5,000 Jews)	
Memel	21,000 Lithuanians and Russians	
Denmark	1,000-2,000	
Norway	500-1,000	
	1,000 Jews	
	9,000	
Netherlands	2,400	
	5,000	
	10,000	
	10,000-30,000	
	80,000 Jews	
	2,000	

From	Number of persons	To
Belgium	15,000 2,000-5,000	England German-occupied Soviet area
	1,000 Jews	Northern France
	50,000 "	German-occupied Poland
	15,000 (including Jews)	France and over- seas
Alsace-Lorraine	270,000 (including 22,000 Jews)	Unoccupied France
Other parts of France	200,000 70,000 Jews	Reich Incorporated Polish Provinces and Gen- eral Government
	24,000 (including Jews)	Spain and Switzer- land
	50,000 (including Jews)	North Africa, England and overseas
Coastal areas of France, Belgium and Nether- lands	1,000,000	Inland
Hungarian Transylvania	202,000 Rumanians	Rumania
Austrian Carinthia	10,000 Slovenes	Unidentified
German-annexed Slovenia	10,000 "	Italian-annexed Slovenia
	30,000 "	Croatia
	26,000 "	Old Serbia
	45,000 "	Reich
Italian-annexed Slovenia	35,000 "	Italy
Italian-annexed Dalmatia and the Croatian coastal area	57,000 Yugoslavs	Southern Italy
Northern Macedonia (Bulgarian-occupied)	120,000 Serbs	Old Serbia
Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Rumanian Transylvania	17,600	Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav territory
Croatia	250,000 Serbs and Croats	Old Serbia and Italy
Serbia and Macedonia	70,000 Croats	Croatia
Old Bulgaria	80,000 Bulgarians	Western Thrace
South Dobruja	110,000 Rumanians	Rumania
Western Thrace (Bulga- rian-annexed)	80,000 Greeks	Remaining territory of Greece
	25,000 "	Old Bulgaria
Greece	32,000	Middle East and beyond
Old Rumania, Transyl- vania and Dobruja	80,000 Jews	Bessarabia and North Bukovina
Bessarabia and North Bukovina	185,000 "	Rumanian-annexed Soviet territory (Transnistria)
Bessarabia and North Bukovina	100,000 Jews	Eastern U.S.S.R.
North Dobruja (Ruma- nian)	62,000 Bulgarians	South Dobruja
Leningrad region (German-occupied)	10,000 Ingermanlanders	Finland
German- and Rumanian- occupied old Soviet territory	10,000,000 (including 1,100,000 Jews)	Eastern U.S.S.R.

A third difficulty is due to the variety of the population classes transferred. In many cases certain national or ethnical groups were specifically affected, as for instance the Jews in all the countries under Axis control, and certain national minorities transferred or exchanged by several of the countries of south-eastern Europe. In others, and in particular in the case of the flight of war refugees and evacuation, every class of the population was involved in the movement.

In these circumstances it has proved impossible to classify the available figures in a methodical table. It seemed useful however, in closing the present chapter, to summarise all the movements which have been described in it

The movements shown in the table are obviously very varied in character. In some cases the people concerned left their homes of their own accord at the approach of the enemy armies and found refuge either in another part of their own country or abroad. Others were transferred by the authorities, either to remove them from the range of enemy action or to facilitate military operations, or again to ensure that they remained in the service of their own Government to play their part in national defence by serving in the armed forces or working in industry. In other cases population transfers were organised methodically; the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian minorities from other countries who were repatriated were usually resettled by their own Governments and provided with a new home to replace the one they had left. The position of the populations of the whole of Europe under Axis occupation who have been deported and expelled is very different, however. Driven from their homes to make room for newcomers, concentrated at given places or scattered far and wide, deprived of every possibility of carrying on their usual occupation and making a new home, these uprooted people are living a precarious life under the constant threat of further transfers. Unlike the majority of the workers individually recruited or conscripted, as described in the following chapter, they have left behind no home or family which awaits their return. All their moorings have been cut, and they can rely on no-one to protect them. This uprooting of populations is one of the most tragic features of the present situation in Europe, and will be one of the gravest problems calling for solution in the future.

MAP II. MOVEMENTS OF NON



CHAPTER III

MOBILISATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BEFORE THE WAR

The use of foreign labour, especially in rural employment, is traditional in Germany. Before 1914 it formed one of the links in the migratory chain which crossed the country from east to west. Between 1871 and 1910, the number of Russian and Austro-Hungarian nationals in Germany (largely Poles in both cases) increased from 90,000 to 805,000, that of Italians from 4,000 to 104,000, and that of Netherlanders from 22,000 to 144,000. In addition to these large numbers of permanent migrants, there were also hundreds of thousands of seasonal workers. The rural exodus was especially marked in the east of Germany, and the vacuum created by the migration of German country boys and girls to the towns was filled by Polish seasonal workers from Russian Poland and Galicia.¹ Numerous workers from Italy, Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were also employed in agriculture, building and construction, and mining. On the eve of the war of 1914-1918 there were in all more than one million foreign workers in Germany, about evenly distributed between agriculture and industry. During the war itself the compulsory or semi-compulsory labour of enemy aliens made a very important contribution to the German war effort. The campaigns on the eastern front, in particular, provided Germany with a valuable source of manpower which was drawn upon mainly for agricultural work.

From 1914 to 1918, 2,500,000 prisoners of war, of whom nearly 1,500,000 were Russian, entered German prison camps. Towards the end of the war, on 10 October 1918, there were in Germany over two million (2,072,000) prisoners, this total including 1,200,000 Russians whom the Germans had not yet freed despite the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed in the previous March.² Nearly a million

¹ A. and E. KULSCHER: *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196 and 159-160.

² W. DÖRGEN: *Kriegsgefangene Völker* (published by the German Ministry of War, Berlin, 1919), pp. 26-29. Up to 10 Oct. 1918, 219,000 prisoners had been freed or exchanged and 107,000 had escaped. According to the *Reichszentralstelle für Kriegsgefangene*, the precise number of prisoners held in Oct. 1918 was 2,042,000.

were employed in agriculture. In addition, the German authorities organised the impressment of men and young women in the occupied countries, while other workers volunteered for work in Germany when they became unemployed in their own countries, where the Germans had carried off plant and raw materials and obstructed the organisation of relief.¹ The majority of the workers recruited, forcibly or otherwise, were employed in the occupied countries themselves, but a number of them were sent to Germany. From Belgium, 107,000 workers went to Germany voluntarily and 60,000 were forcibly deported. It was intended that they should replace German workers called up from war industry for the forces, but owing to Belgian resistance the results of the scheme were meagre. In 1917 most of the deportees were sent back to Belgium; there were, however, still 90,000 Belgian volunteers and 12,000 deportees in Germany in January 1918.² On a far greater scale was the influx of workers from the east. At least 350,000 workers were forcibly transferred to Germany from Russian Poland alone³, and workers in other parts of Russia conquered by the Germans were similarly rounded up and deported, especially for agricultural work. This process continued even after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and right on until the end of the German occupation.⁴

After 1918, although the current of migration into Germany continued to flow mainly from the east, its composition changed. Henceforward, the migrants were mainly of German extraction; special permits and registration cards were introduced to restrict the number of immigrant seasonal workers to a minimum (28,000 on the average during the years 1920-1924). "During the years 1925-1927 the shortage of German agricultural workers involved a steady increase in the annual quota of immigrants and the average number of immigrants rose to 57,000 in 1925-1927. The alien workers who thus immigrated to Germany came mostly from Poland, but in certain years there were also a number from Czechoslovakia."⁵ The number of foreign agricultural workers employed in the Reich was 374,000 in 1918; it varied from 138,000 to 151,000

¹ F. PASSELECO: *Déportation et travail forcé des ouvriers de la population civile de la Belgique occupée* (published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History, New York, 1927), p. 11, and J. van der HORVEN LEONARD: *Les déportations belges* (1931), p. 34.

² F. PASSELECO: *op. cit.*, pp. 323, 349-350, 378-390, 395-399.

³ S. T. RUZIEWICZ: *Le problème de l'émigration polonaise en Allemagne* (Paris, 1930), pp. 26, 91-92.

⁴ For an account of the deportations from the region of Pakov, cf. the memoirs of P. SAYANOV, in *Zvezda*, Aug. 1937, p. 71.

⁵ INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, *Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 4: Migration Movements 1925-1927* (Geneva, 1929), pp. 33-34. The introduction of Hungarians was an experiment of short duration. In industry, only Austrian unemployed were admitted as an exceptional measure.

in the years 1919-1922, fell to 110,000-119,000 in 1923-1924, and rose again to 133,000-146,000 in 1925-1930. After the latter date the entry of foreign workers was completely stopped. In 1931 there were only 30,000 still employed in the Reich and in 1932, 43,000. Those who remained were workers holding permanent work permits granted to a few foreign residents in Germany and to aliens covered by the special reciprocity agreements¹

In 1937, however, in view of the growing labour shortage created by the rearmament programme, the German Government decided not only to reopen the frontiers to seasonal workers from abroad, but also to recruit a certain number. As a result, immigration from Poland brought 17,000 agricultural workers into Germany in that year and 60,000 in 1938. In the following spring Poland refused to put Polish agricultural workers at Germany's disposal in view of the tense political situation, but the German authorities "did not interfere with the large-scale illegal immigration of Polish workers".² A new and important source of seasonal agricultural labour was found in Italy, whence some 30,000 workers went to Germany both in 1938 and 1939. During the harvest season, from 1937 onwards, immigration was also organised from Austria and Czechoslovakia.³

The expansion of the Reich with the annexation of Austria in March 1938 and of the Sudetenland in the following October, the submission of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, and the creation of the vassal state of Slovakia, opened up abundant sources of manpower for German agriculture and industry. These bloodless conquests were the prelude to the German drive to the east and south-east after the outbreak of war in September 1939, with the defeat of Poland and Yugoslavia and the invasion of Russia. According to one of the favourite theories of National Socialism, this *Drang nach Osten* was intended to enlarge the "living space" of the German nation. But the victories of German diplomacy and German arms did not change the traditional pattern of population movements. On the contrary, the removal of the frontier barriers opened the door still wider to immigration from the countries falling under German domination.

The immigration of workers from the east and south-east began with the annexation of Austria, which gave the Austrian unemployed access to the German labour market. From 1934 to 1939 Austria lost 140,000 of its population through migration. German

¹ *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Vol. 441, p. 81.

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 2.

³ P. WÄRLBROECK and I. BESSLING: "Some Aspects of German Social Policy under the National Socialist Régime", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, Feb. 1941, p. 135.

statisticians attribute this to two important migration movements which took place after the annexation: the flight of the Jews and the migration of Austrian workers into the Reich to find work.¹ During the same period Bavaria, which borders on Austria on the west and north-west, and where huge building schemes were being carried out at the time, gained 95,000 migrants. Thus the current of Austrian migration, which had flowed internally but always from east to west since the war of 1914-1918, gained with the annexation of Austria a broad outlet into Germany.

In Czechoslovakia, the international crisis provoked by the Sudeten question led to the same result; the Sudeten Germans obtained access to the Reich. Germany could not refuse to take in those whom German propaganda had represented as persecuted brothers; they were not only admitted, but were supported at the expense of the German Government. The number of these so-called refugees registered in Germany was stated by Chancellor Hitler to be 200,000.

While, at the time, the exodus of the Sudeten was attributed to political persecution, its real nature was explained differently later. In 1941, the official publication of the German Ministry of Labour, dealing with the movement of the Sudeten Germans to Germany just before the annexation of the country, made no mention of any political motives. The movement was attributed solely to the unemployment which had been rife in the country since the crisis of 1929, and which had reached a figure of 250,000 by October 1938. Attracted by the vast employment opportunities which the German armaments programme had opened up on the other side of the frontier, the Sudeten Germans "crossed the green frontier² in their thousands and tens of thousands and found a warm welcome in the Old Reich, where the labour shortage was already acute".³

An immediate result of the annexation was to aggravate the situation in the Sudetenland by severing its economic ties with Bohemia. In December 1938 a million people—nearly a quarter of the total population of the Sudetenland—received relief from the German "Winter Help" fund. This still further stimulated immigration into the Reich, which was no longer barred by a frontier. The recruitment of workers for Germany was organised by the employment offices.⁴ The results were seen in the census returns of 17 May 1939, which show a migratory loss of 317,000 since the

¹ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, No. 2, and 1941, No. 20.

² A German phrase used for illegal emigration.

³ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 May 1941, No. 13, Part V, p. 223.

⁴ *Ibid.*

previous census of 1 December 1930. Before 1938, emigration from the Sudetenland to Germany was insignificant; this tremendous loss of nearly 9 per cent. of the population must therefore be attributed to the exodus which took place just before and after the annexation. To some extent this movement was directed towards the interior of Bohemia—so far, that is, as concerns the flight of the Jews before and after the Germans obtained control of the Sudetenland¹, the flight of Czechoslovak officials after the annexation, and the expulsion of 40,000 Czech peasants. But the overwhelming majority of the migrants were Sudeten Germans moving into the Reich. This is confirmed by the German statisticians, who state that "the political events of 1938 led to the emigration of non-German inhabitants, but workers mainly flowed into the Old Reich in an urgent search for work and bread".²

The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 provided Germany with a new source of manpower. Even before, there had been a steady movement of migration from Czechoslovakia to Germany.³ After taking over Bohemia and Moravia, however, the German Government encouraged Czech emigration. Some Czech factories were dismantled and part of their equipment was transferred to Germany. Direct encouragement was also given; in the first four months following the annexation (March to June 1939), 52,000 Czechs were engaged in the Reich, including Austria.⁴

Germany's political expansion facilitated the migratory movement not only of the Czechs but of the Slovaks. One of the results of the creation of the vassal state of Slovakia was the movement of 40,000 Slovak workers into the Reich.⁵ The census of 17 May 1939 showed 56,600 seasonal workers from Slovakia.⁶

Up to 1938, the foreign workers entering Germany had been mostly agricultural labourers. In 1938 there were in all 120,000 foreign agricultural workers in the Reich. In the spring of 1939, however, the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia brought to Germany, for the first time, a large body of industrial immigrants. On the eve of the present war the total number of foreign workers

¹ Comparing the figures of the last Czechoslovak census in 1930 and the German census in 1939, the Jewish population of the Sudetenland fell from 27,400 to 2,600 between these two dates.

² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, No. 2.

³ This is shown by a comparison between the figures for aliens in the censuses of 1933 and 1939. The returns for 1933 show 28,000 Czechoslovaks and those for 1939, 86,000 Czechs and 40,000 Slovaks, apart from a further 59,000 seasonal workers (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, No. 11). Concerning Czechoslovak movements before 1933, cf. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: *Migration Movements 1925-1927*, pp. 34 and 66.

⁴ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 Oct. 1940, No. 29, Part V, p. 511. By Nov. 1939 this figure had risen to 85,000.

⁵ *Idem*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 6.

⁶ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 12.

in Germany exceeded half a million¹, this figure excluding the Sudeten and Austrians who had gone to work in the Old Reich.

It was not until the outbreak of war in the autumn of 1939, however, followed by Germany's military conquests, that a flood of foreign labour began to pour into the country and the number of foreign workers employed in Germany rose from some hundreds of thousands to several millions.

GENERAL SURVEY OF FOREIGN LABOUR MOBILISATION DURING THE WAR

Several phases may be distinguished in Germany's progressive mobilisation of foreign labour since the beginning of the war. These phases correspond to the development of military operations, which at first gave Germany access to vast reserves of labour, but also caused ever-growing losses of manpower which had to be made good while maintaining the labour force at the highest possible level.

On the eve of the war, 24,461,000 wage-earning and salaried workers were employed in Germany, including 16,331,000 men and 8,130,000 women.² Even at that time the country's labour reserves were already at a low ebb, and the effects of mobilisation were felt immediately in a shortage of labour, especially in agriculture. When, therefore, the rapid termination of the Polish campaign opened up a new and abundant source of manpower, it was immediately utilised to the full. Prisoners of war were the first source tapped, but all kinds of methods were adopted to recruit civilian Polish workers as well. Propaganda, indirect pressure and compulsion were all employed to maintain a steady stream of Polish manpower.

One of the first acts of the German civil administration in the General Government was the introduction of compulsory labour service for Poles and forced labour for Jews. All unemployed Poles from 18 to 60 years of age were subject to labour service. Compulsory registration for work in Germany was introduced by a proclamation of the Governor General issued on 24 April 1940, requiring the inhabitants of the General Government, at the invitation of their local authorities, to register for agricultural work in Germany. This requirement applied especially to men and women born in the years 1915 to 1924. Failure to register entailed severe penalties and those who did not comply with the requirement were liable to prosecution by the police.³

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 609.

² *Idem*, 25 Aug. 1940, No. 24, Part V, p. 405.

³ Cf. S. SIEGAL: *The New Order in Poland* (published by the Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of the American Jewish Committee, New York, 1942), pp. 162 *et seq.* Forced labour for Jews is dealt with in Chapter II, above.

In addition to this orderly, if compulsory, form of recruiting, Polish labour for Germany was also secured by means of round-ups, both in the Polish Provinces annexed by Germany and in the General Government. These round-ups, followed by mass arrests and deportations, began as early as October 1939. Their object was, of course, not merely to provide labour for Germany; those arrested included politicians, members of the clergy and of the bourgeoisie, and intellectuals, who were sent to concentration camps. In Western Poland the main purpose of the wholesale arrests and deportations was to clean up the provinces incorporated in the Reich and destined to be completely germanised. The great majority of the Poles rounded up there in their homes or in the streets were deported to the General Government, but those capable of physical labour were separated from the women and children, the aged and the unfit, and were deported directly from Western Poland to Germany. Apart from these political transfers, however, the main objective of the coercive methods employed by the German authorities was to supply Germany with labour.

In this way the agricultural labour Germany so urgently needed was procured without delay. Train after train brought thousands of Poles to replace the mobilised German peasants.

Having thus strengthened its economic basis, Germany occupied Denmark and Norway and then undertook the great offensive in the west. The months which followed the collapse of France marked the climax of Germany's economic as well as military successes. An enormous booty of arms, munitions and other materials had fallen into German hands. The food situation was greatly relieved by drawing on stocks which had been piled up in the occupied countries before the invasion. A million and a half German soldiers were living on the rich resources of France. The satisfactory development of the military situation and the temporary lull in land operations enabled leave to be granted to a great many peasants and industrial workers.

At the same time as the pressure on Germany's domestic labour supply was relieved, further apparently inexhaustible reserves of foreign manpower were opened up. Nearly 2,000,000 prisoners of war had been taken. Another 2,000,000 workers had been thrown out of employment in the countries of Western Europe as a result of the destruction and economic dislocation due to their defeat. Demobilised soldiers and returning refugees swelled the masses of the unemployed, while the shortage of food and rising prices made living conditions difficult. Moderate pressure was sufficient to provide German industry and agriculture with the workers they required. Where necessary, the withholding of relief from the

unemployed who refused to go to Germany acted as an effective stimulus.¹

The political control of the countries of South-Eastern Europe secured by the Reich during the summer and autumn of 1940 further increased the labour supply available. Indeed, during this second stage of the war, extending from the time of the Compiègne Armistice to the opening of the Russian campaign, Germany could afford to pick and choose. "We are in a position to-day", said Chancellor Hitler, "to mobilise the manpower of almost the whole of Europe, and that I shall do so industrially you may well believe." Germany could obtain from prisoners-of-war camps, from the occupied countries, and from its allies, all the workers that were needed; the only problem was to regulate and distribute the stream of labour. During the closing months of 1940, German labour requirements were so amply satisfied that recruitment was temporarily suspended in certain territories and surplus workers were sent home. No serious effort was made at that time to mobilise the manpower reserves of France, where there was considerable unemployment; French prisoners of war provided all the labour that was necessary.

During this period it was still agriculture that benefited most from the foreign labour supply. According to a survey issued by the German Ministry of Labour, the employment of prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers proved to be of decisive importance in harvesting the grain and root crops of the Reich in the summer and fall of 1940 and in maintaining plantings and agricultural production generally at or close to peacetime levels.² After the occupation of the industrial countries of the west however, foreign workers were employed in increasing numbers in non-agricultural work. At the same time, the prisoners of war who had first been sent into agriculture were carefully sifted and redistributed with due regard to their special skills.³ Although the total number of foreign workers employed in agriculture was constantly rising, the proportion of

¹ The following press controversy between the Polish and German Governments is characteristic. On 4 Apr. 1940, the Polish Government in exile (then in France) produced a copy of a confidential circular letter issued by Dr. Frank to show that the devastation of Poland and deportation of Polish workers was carried out according to a plan worked out by Field-Marshal Goering. In reply, the German Embassy in Washington stated that: "If such a letter, referring to measures taken concerning the Polish working population, exists, it must concern the following facts: the Governor General has given orders to the sub-delegate authorities to suspend relief payments to those workmen who refuse to accept the kind of work offered them in the General Government or in the Reich." (*New York Times*, 4 and 13 Apr. 1940.)

² *Foreign Commerce Weekly* (published by the United States Department of Commerce), 26 Apr. 1941, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 175.

³ Cf. "The Employment of Prisoners of War in Germany", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, Sept. 1943, p. 316.

agricultural to industrial workers was falling throughout 1940, and this trend became more pronounced from the spring of 1941 onward, when the call-up of fresh men for the forces in preparation for the war against the U.S.S.R. made gaps in the ranks of German labour which had to be filled up. In spite of the seasonal requirements of agriculture, which the Reich usually meets by shifting prisoners of war between agriculture and industry, the proportion of prisoners employed in agriculture was lower in the summer of 1941 than during the preceding winter.

The following figures illustrate the change in the employment distribution of prisoners of war in Germany during this period¹:

	Beginning of 1940	Middle of 1940	Beginning of 1941	Sept. 1941
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Agriculture and forestry . .	95	65	52	50
Mining, transport, industry, public administration	5	35	48	50

For civilian workers, the following figures are available²:

	Autumn 1940	1 April 1941
	Per cent.	Per cent.
Agricultural workers	58	50
Industrial workers, employees, domestic service.	42	50

These figures do not show a very pronounced rise in the percentage of non-agricultural employment. There was, however, an important change in the nature of this employment. At the end of 1940, half the workers classified as industrial were employed in building and construction, whereas the newcomers were chiefly factory workers. Unskilled and agricultural workers were recruited in eastern and later in south-eastern Europe, while western Europe had to supply skilled workers for German industry, and in particular for the armament factories.

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V. p. 257. The figures for Sept. 1941 are taken from *Il Sole* (Milan), 9 Jan. 1942.

² The percentages for autumn 1940 are calculated on the basis of absolute numbers given by the Official German News Agency (D.N.B.) and cited in *Europe under Hitler* (edited by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1941), p. 22. The figures for 1 Apr. 1941 are taken from *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339.

With the opening of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. and the gradual realisation that this time a long war, costly in manpower, was involved, German labour mobilisation entered on a new phase.

At the beginning of 1941 the position of the labour force in Germany was approximately as follows. The number of workers and salaried employees in employment, which had been 24,500,000 at the beginning of the hostilities, was still about 24,000,000.¹ To fill up the gaps in the ranks of male workers left by men drafted into the forces, 1,500,000 older workers and boys had been recruited, so that the number of male workers, which had been 16,400,000² on the eve of the war, was still 13,200,000.³ Furthermore, the number of women employed, which had at first fallen from 8,100,000 to 7,600,000 as a result of the economic dislocation which followed mobilisation for the armed forces, had steadily risen until it exceeded the pre-war figure by 300,000.⁴ To these 21,600,000 German workers, 1,100,000 foreign civilians and over 1,000,000 prisoners of war had been added.⁵

To make good the growing shortage of male German labour caused by the demands of the war in Russia, Germany had recourse to the further recruitment of women and of foreign labour. In a speech delivered on 4 May 1941, Chancellor Hitler announced an expansion of the industrial mobilisation of women. The number of wage-earning women rose by 1,000,000 between 1 January and the end of September 1941; at the end of 1941 it had reached 9,400,000⁶ and in September 1942 it was 9,700,000.⁷ But this increased contribution of woman-power could not in itself replace all the male workers called to the forces. To satisfy its economic needs, Germany turned both to allied countries and to the occupied territories for fresh supplies of labour.

An increasingly prolific source of foreign labour was provided by Germany's allies. It has already been noted that Germany had begun to recruit workers from Italy and south-eastern Europe before the war under special arrangements concluded for the purpose. This system was developed after the outbreak of the war

¹ The German Ministry of Labour indicates that at the turn of the year 1940-1941 the number of occupied workers and employees was 22,670,000 (14,250,000 men and 8,420,000 women). This number includes foreign civilian workers, but not prisoners of war (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5). The corresponding figures in May 1941 were 23,083,000 and in Feb. 1942, 24,084,000 (*Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1942, No. 15, Part V, p. 284), and about the same in July (*Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 20, July 1942).

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 Aug. 1940, No. 23, Part V, p. 395.

³ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5. The total figure given is 14,250,000 including "over one million foreigners".

⁴ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 Feb. 1941, No. 5, Part V, pp. 85-93.

⁵ Statement by Dr. Sauer (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 Oct. 1940).

⁶ *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1942, No. 1.

⁷ Statement made by State-Secretary KORNIG at a German labour conference, reported by the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 Sept. 1942.

for the recruitment both of seasonal workers and of permanent agricultural and industrial workers, the recruitment being so organised as to make the Government of the workers' country of origin responsible for recruiting the contingents specified in the agreements and for applying any compulsion that might be necessary. Some 250,000 additional workers were acquired in this way during the first nine months of 1941. But the bulk of the foreign workers needed were sought in the occupied areas. The total of foreign civilians employed in the Reich increased from 1 million at the end of 1940 to 2,140,000 in September 1941. Not only men, but women too were now flocking in from abroad. In 1940, the number of women was insignificant; on 1 April 1941 there were 250,000¹, representing one-sixth of all foreign civilian workers, and on 25 September 1941, 470,000, or about one-fourth of the total.²

Between the end of 1940 and September 1941, the number of all foreign workers (prisoners of war and civilians together) increased by nearly 1,500,000 to a total of over 3,700,000. This number did not vary in the course of the autumn or throughout the winter of 1941-1942. The figure for foreign civilian workers for 30 January 1942 was given as 2,138,000.³ But with the preparation of the new spring offensive against Russia the manpower problem became particularly acute. The Russian campaign had become a bloody war demanding the constant call-up of fresh men to the forces and an endless supply of armaments. The age groups newly available for military service, youths of 17 and 18 years old, could not satisfy the ever-growing demands of the army. Older classes were also called to the colours, and the comb-out in the civil service affected even the central Government departments. Meanwhile, the results of the American war effort were also beginning to be seriously felt.

To increase industrial production, Germany took three kinds of measures. First, a further contraction of non-essential industries, such as house building and textile factories, was ordered so as to release labour for the production of war supplies. Secondly, an effort was made to increase the efficiency of labour, partly by developing the piecework system. Thirdly, intensive mobilisation of all the manpower reserves of Europe was decided upon, and to organise this, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel was appointed General Controller of Labour on 21 March 1942. In the Reich itself, all reserves of manpower had to be utilised. In the spring of 1942, school-children down to 10 years of age and women not already engaged in war work were called in to help farmers with their sowing. Even tubercular workers, formerly on sickness allowances, were drawn

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339.

² *Idem*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

³ *Idem*, 25 May 1942, No. 15, Part V, p. 284.

into employment, and the blind were specially trained for certain unskilled jobs. But the mainstay of Germany's war effort had to be found in the conquered or allied countries.

To justify this general mobilisation of European labour it was represented as the duty of all European countries to help Germany in the struggle against Bolshevism. One form of this help was military. The Italians, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats and Slovaks sent fresh auxiliary forces to the eastern front, while token legions of volunteers were formed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the Baltic States and Spain. But by far the major part of the assistance required by Germany from her allies and from the conquered countries was in the form of their agricultural and industrial production and their working population.

Recruitment facilities, however, no longer corresponded to German needs. Unemployment had to a large extent been eliminated.¹ This was due in part to the German war orders placed in the occupied countries and to the increasing number of workers employed by the Todt Organisation in building defence works along the coast. But an important part had also been played during the first two years of occupation by the action taken by national and local authorities in these countries to reduce the number of unemployed to a minimum by spreading available employment among the greatest possible number of workers and by organising reconstruction or relief works. These measures were encouraged at first by the occupation authorities, who relied on the propaganda effect of a rapid abolition of unemployment. By the beginning of 1942, however, they were no longer compatible with the satisfaction of the greatly increased demands of Germany's war economy for labour. As there were no more high-grade workers to be found among those who were still unemployed, Germany began to squeeze out the required workers from the undertakings of the occupied countries.

To this end, uniform measures were adopted, although at different dates, throughout Europe. Complete control over the distribution of war materials and fuel enabled all industries which were not working for Germany to be restricted or closed down. Public works and reconstruction work regarded as unnecessary for war purposes were suspended. Hours of work were compulsorily extended, industries were concentrated to save labour, employers were forced to dismiss their surplus workers, to make regular returns of their staffs to the German authorities, and to provide the latter with any workers they demanded. All unemployed persons

¹ *Idem*, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, pp. 413-417. Cf. also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: *Year-Book of Labour Statistics*, 1942, pp. 53-59.

were obliged to register, and compulsory labour service, which had been established in Poland immediately after the occupation, was now introduced in all the countries of western Europe. Restricted at first to employment in the occupied countries, it was soon extended to include employment in Germany or in any other territory. In the Netherlands, this extension took place as early as March 1942; in Belgium, in October. On 22 August 1942, Dr. Sauckel issued an Order establishing a general order of priority for the employment of labour in all the occupied territories, in which first priority was given to the requirements of the civilian and military occupation authorities and of all undertakings working for the German armament industries.¹ At the same time strong pressure was brought to bear on the French Government, which after trying in vain to recruit the workers demanded by Germany by methods of persuasion, in turn introduced compulsory labour in September 1942.²

The countries allied to Germany were also required to comb out their labour in order to be able to provide Germany with a larger supply. In Italy, new decrees concerning the mobilisation of civilian labour were published on 26 February and 7 December. In Slovakia, compulsory labour was introduced in March 1942 on the German model. But it was mainly to the occupied territory of the U.S.S.R. that recourse was had from the spring of 1942 onward to make good the growing labour shortage in the German war economy. After the opening of the Russian campaign, some objections and difficulties had been raised to the importation of Russian workers, but these were overcome, and an endless stream of Russian labour also began to flow into Germany.

During the spring of 1942, the number of foreign civilians employed in Germany was 2,500,000, the total of all foreign labour being about 4,000,000.³ This total increased to approximately 5,000,000 in August 1942⁴ and to 6,000,000 by the end of October.⁵ The estimate for the beginning of 1943 was 6,500,000 and the increase during the later months has been considerable.⁶

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Sept. 1942, No. 25, Part I, p. 382, quoted in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, Dec. 1942, pp. 732-733.

² Cf. "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, pp. 312-343.

³ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 4 Aug. 1942.

⁴ *Ibid.*, In July 1942 it was estimated that since Dr. Sauckel's appointment in March, the number of foreign workers had increased by 900,000 (*Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, 17 July 1942).

⁵ The *Brüsseler Zeitung*, 9 Oct. 1942, gave the figure of 6,000,000. The same number was quoted in *Izvestia*, 29 Oct. 1942, on the basis of "official German data".

⁶ A Moscow radio broadcast by Ilya Ehrenburg on 3 Jan. 1943 spoke of "7,000,000 foreign slaves in Germany". The Vichy radio, on 6 Jan. 1943, reported authorised circles in Berlin as stating that between 6,000,000 and 8,000,000 foreign workers were employed in industry and agriculture in the Reich. According to one German source (*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 June 1943), the total of all foreign labour employed in Germany on 31 May 1943 would have reached 12 million.

This huge mass of workers was employed in the most varied occupations. A large proportion of them naturally continued to be absorbed by agriculture. According to a statement made by Dr. Sauckel, more labour was employed in agriculture in Greater Germany in June 1942 than in 1938, and Germany's labour problems were practically solved in the field of food production.¹ During the first two years of the war, the employment of foreign labour in the engineering and metal industries was held up to some extent by German reluctance to give foreigners access to the secrets of armament production. By the end of 1942, however, 17 per cent. of all industrial workers in Germany were foreign, either civilians or prisoners of war, and according to the statement by Dr. Sauckel quoted above, in September a large number of foreign workers were employed in armament production.² The difficulty of providing these industries with skilled workers has become particularly acute since the Russians, in 1942 still more than in 1941, systematically transferred such workers to the east before retreating. As a result, skilled workers have been particularly sought in the Western European countries and definite quotas have been demanded from France since the summer of 1942. Training for skilled industrial work has now become the watchword, not only for Germans, but also for foreign workers. All objections to training foreign workers, according to Dr. Sauckel, must give way before the need to obtain maximum production in the highly skilled armament industries.³ As a leading German paper puts it⁴, "a continued supply of foreign labour remains the only means whereby Germany's war effort can be still further expanded".

Agriculture and industry, moreover, are not the only fields to which foreign workers have been admitted. They are to be found in every occupation. "The Reich capital", wrote a foreign correspondent in January 1942, "is rapidly becoming cosmopolitan, in that foreign workers whom circumstances have made a vital factor in Germany's war effort, together with war prisoners of many nations, especially Polish and French, with pick-and-shovel tasks, have forced themselves on the streets to the extent that in some sections of the city they seem to be crowding off the natives".⁵ In restaurants, the Italian or French waiter is a customary figure. Even a sleeping-car conductor may be a Frenchman.⁶

Lastly, Germany is not the sole destination of the foreign workers, who are transferred from one occupied territory to another as

¹ *Svenska Dagbladet*, 26 Sept. 1942.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, 17 July 1942.

⁴ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 Sept. 1942.

⁵ *New York Times*, 19 Jan. 1942.

⁶ Howard SARRIS: *Last Train from Berlin* (New York, 1942), p. 355.

need arises. Danes, Belgians and Netherlands have been sent to reinforce the army of 100,000 Norwegian workers engaged in building fortifications along the coast. Skilled workers and farmers from the west have been transferred to Poland and Russia, to direct the work of the local inhabitants or to manage farms, while increasing numbers of Russians, Czechs and Poles are reported to be working in the countries of Western Europe.

Great care is taken to prevent any of the undesirable consequences which might be expected to arise from this mixture of nationalities. The different national groups of workers are housed in separate barracks and employed as far as possible in different workshops. An Italian press correspondent has described a huge factory built near Linz for the production of aircraft, motor vehicles and other armaments which employs workers from all over Europe. Italians in particular are very numerous, especially building and metal workers. Finland is the only country which is not represented in the working population of this region, which includes many Russian prisoners, and even some British prisoners who, in the writer's words, "also have to lay their stone in building the new Europe in order to earn the right to eat their daily bread".¹ Another description of these concentrations of humanity was given recently by a German press correspondent:

Thousands of foreigners live in the barrack towns in the valley of the Erzberg and in the surroundings of the great foundries. The long winter cuts them off for by far the greater part of the year from the rest of the world while they perform the very hard labour of surface mining, and for good or ill they are pressed into the traditional ways of the mining community. Europeans of all tongues, men and women from the Stakhanov factories of the Rostov district inflate the old manageable mining communities and represent, apart from the dominating economic questions, a new social problem, the solution of which strongly influences the functioning of production.²

But Germany's opportunities for obtaining foreign labour are no longer so unlimited as they appeared to be during the first three years of the war. The manpower reserves of Western Europe are nearing exhaustion. In south-eastern Europe, some of Germany's allies have even recalled their workers, whom they needed urgently for their own purposes³, and the recruitment of labour from the Eastern Territories is increasingly impeded by the latter's own pressing economic needs, bound up with Germany's war effort, and by the demands of the army. "The predominance of eastern workers", writes a German economic review, "will increase still further in the near future, but it must not lead to the erroneous

¹ *Popolo d'Italia*, 28 Feb. 1943, despatch from the Berlin correspondent.

² *Völkischer Beobachter* (Vienna edition), 21 Jan. 1943.

³ Cf. also below, under Italy, p. 157.

belief that this source of labour is inexhaustible. There is a limit to the number of workers who can be withdrawn from eastern Europe."¹

In spite of all these difficulties, Germany is persevering with the total mobilisation of all the labour resources of Europe, and is resorting more and more to coercion to overcome the growing resistance in the occupied countries. Recruitment is now taking the form of mass deportation. In preparation for future military operations, a supreme effort to make use of all available resources has been undertaken since February 1943. Two Decrees of 27 and 29 January 1943 prescribed further drastic measures to comb out the last reserves of labour in Germany itself, and similar measures have been imposed on the occupied territories. It may be expected that during the coming months maximum pressure will be exerted, without consideration for the requirements of the countries concerned, to squeeze out the extra supply of labour necessary to maintain Germany's war production at the highest possible level. In a speech delivered at Amsterdam in January 1943, Dr. Sauckel proclaimed "the conqueror's right to use all the power he needs for his own preservation"², and the Führer himself declared, in a proclamation of 24 February 1943, that: "We shall not hesitate a single second to call upon the countries which are responsible for the outbreak of this war to do their bit in the fatal struggle. We shall not scruple about foreign lives at a time when such hard sacrifices are expected from our own lives."

In the following pages a brief description is given of the progressive development of the recruitment of labour in each of the countries under German domination.

ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

Czechoslovakia

Sudetenland.

The migration into the Reich of some 200,000 Sudeten Germans, including tens of thousands of workers, has already been mentioned; this took place just before the annexation of the Sudetenland as well as afterwards. After the annexation, this great movement of voluntary migration was swelled by the forced transfer of Czech workers. The incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany gave the German authorities the power to employ workers from that region in any part of the Reich. The German Government wanted

¹ *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, 20 Nov. 1942.

² *Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden*, 21 Jan. 1943.

to rid the Sudetenland of the Czechoslovak minority, which had already been severely reduced by the flight of Czechoslovak officials and the expulsion of the peasants, and after the outbreak of war almost all Czech workers (in particular those from Teschen and Troppau) were forced to leave their homes and go into Germany.

In the meantime, the scarcity of skilled labour, due mainly to the departure of the Sudeten Germans, became more and more acute and began to alarm the German authorities. On 5 December 1940 a Decree was issued to promote the return of Sudeten Germans to the Sudetenland. Nevertheless, the shortage of labour continued, especially in the metal industries and in mining, while there was also a great lack of building workers. To fill the gap, migration of frontier workers from the Protectorate was permitted on a wider scale, but the reserve of manpower mobilised in this way was soon exhausted.¹

Information supplied by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Reconstruction in London suggests that the labour supply position in the Sudetenland is now worse than ever. Communications from economic experts in this region, all of which have passed the censorship, complain of a terrible scarcity of skilled labour in industry and state quite frankly that this is due solely to emigration to Germany.

Figures for the total number of workers who moved into Germany from the Sudetenland are not available, as this region has been entirely incorporated into the German Reich and no separate statistics of Sudeten Germans working in Germany are published. So far as can be ascertained, workers from the Sudetenland are employed in all parts of the Old Reich.

Bohemia and Moravia.

As already stated, the recruiting of Czech workers for Germany had begun before the war. From March to June 1939, 52,000 Czechs were engaged for work in Germany; 55,000 more were recruited between July 1939 and March 1940, and another 23,000 from March 1940 up to the end of 1940. In the spring of 1941, 150,000 Czechs were employed in the Reich. On 25 September 1941 the number was given as 140,000, of whom 28,200 were women.² This figure does not include 24,000 Czechs living on the frontiers within the Protectorate but working in the industries of the Sudetenland, Silesia

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 May 1941, No. 13, Part V, pp. 223-224.

² *Idem*, 15 Oct. 1940, No. 29, Part V, p. 512; 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339; and 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5. It should be remembered that in some cases the statistics give the gross total number of workers recruited, some of whom naturally returned home, and in others the number of workers who were present at a given date.

and Austria, nor the 35,000 Czech seasonal workers employed in the beet and hop fields in the adjacent German districts.¹ It seems that throughout this entire period the Protectorate was not drained of its labour as ruthlessly as other countries because the Czech workers were needed for the highly developed metallurgical industry on the spot. But according to newspaper and other reports, a new and more powerful drive for labour for Germany was launched in the Protectorate in the spring of 1942. Only the armament-producing metallurgical plants still continued to operate at full capacity. Others were closed or cut down their production to release workers for employment in the Reich. It is true that the increasingly heavy British air raids led to the removal to the Protectorate of many war factories from Germany, in particular from the Ruhr, but these were transferred along with their own workers. Many Czech workers were also sent to Austria and to the old Reich at the same time², so that an estimate of 200,000 Czechs employed in Greater Germany by August-September 1942 is probably not exaggerated.³

Most of the Czech workers are employed in the metallurgical industry and in building. The largest colony is apparently at Linz in Upper Austria, where there was a labour shortage due to the emigration of Austrians who had gone to look for work in Germany after the annexation.⁴ Many others were employed in Brunswick and Berlin.⁵ Czech building workers are also reported to have been sent to north-western France and Norway, where they were employed in building fortifications.

Slovakia.

In Slovakia, with its relatively dense population and undeveloped industry, the rural population used to migrate for seasonal work to the Sudetenland and other neighbouring parts of Bohemia and Moravia as well as to Austria. After the secession of Slovakia this movement was organised in Germany's interests, and an agreement was concluded between Germany and Slovakia under which Slovakia undertook to provide from 50,000 to 60,000 workers yearly for the Reich. According to German sources, the total number of

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 6.

² *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 June 1942.

³ *New York Times*, 5 Aug. 1942.

⁴ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 May 1941, No. 14, Part V, p. 241.

⁵ Eug. V. ERNSTLAV: *op. cit.*, p. 191. Some conclusions concerning the location of the Czech workers may be drawn from the distribution of Bohemian-Moravian local liaison offices. They have been established: (1) in Linz for Oberdonau, Salzburg and Tyrol; (2) in Vienna for Vienna, Niederdonau and Styria; (3) in Berlin for Mark Brandenburg; (4) in Hanover for South Hanover and Brunswick; (5) in Breslau for Lower and Upper Silesia.

Slovak workers in Germany had reached 80,000, of whom 25,000 were women, by 25 September 1941.¹ This figure does not, however, reflect the real volume of Slovak labour employed in Germany. Statistics published in Slovakia give the number of 120,000.² As a result of the intensive recruitment of labour for Germany, a shortage of labour began to be felt in Slovakia itself, especially in agriculture, but in industry as well, and many public and private building schemes had to be postponed or abandoned for this reason.³

Poland

On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. On 27 September Warsaw surrendered, and on 28 September the German and Soviet Governments fixed the frontiers in Poland, proclaiming the end of the Polish State.

After the conquest of Poland the German authorities "hastened to draw on the labour reserves made available by the Polish campaign".⁴ These possibilities were twofold: first, prisoners of war, and secondly, workers recruited in Poland. At first, the rapidly growing number of Poles who were brought to Germany after the fall of Poland were chiefly prisoners of war, but during the course of 1940 the proportion of prisoners to civilian workers changed. While the number of Polish prisoners of war employed in Germany diminished, that of other Polish workers rose steadily.

Prisoners of War.

According to German statements, the total number of prisoners of war captured during the hostilities in Poland was 694,000 including the Polish divisions which were surrounded by the Germans in the last stages of the campaign. Of this number, at least 10,000 died after their capture, and about 140,000 were later released and sent home. The remainder, some 540,000, were finally transferred to Germany, where many of them were employed in agriculture as well as on road building and other public works. During the course of 1940, large numbers of Polish prisoners, in particular those who were unfit for work owing to their state of health, were sent back to Poland. Others were technically released, but detained as civilian workers. According to an official German source, 180,000 former Polish prisoners of war were employed as free labourers in German agriculture at the end of 1940.⁵ In May 1941 the German

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

² *Südost Echo*, 15 Jan. 1942.

³ *Idem*, 17 July 1942; *Hospodarsky Denník*, 22 Oct. 1942.

⁴ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 7.

⁵ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5.

authorities stated that only a comparatively small number of Poles still remained in captivity.¹ According to a well-informed source, the number was 77,400 in August 1942 and 56,000 in March 1943.

By this time the compulsory labour of Polish prisoners of war had been adequately replaced by civilian labour. Some of these workers were freed prisoners, but the majority were civilians transferred from Poland, described by the German authorities as "free workers".

Civilian Workers.

The occupation of Poland "opened up the possibility of recruiting free civilian workers in the regions which traditionally supplied Polish agricultural labour".² Indeed, as has already been noted, emigration to Germany was a route which had long been followed by migrant labour.

Some six months before the outbreak of war, on 17 January 1939, Mr. Koscialkowski, Polish Minister of Social Welfare, made a statement to the Committee on Estimates of the Diet on national social policy, in which he declared that the question of seasonal emigration was of special importance to the Polish Government. This problem, he added, was linked up with that of the impossibility of absorbing all available national labour in the national labour market.³ As already noted, the policy of promoting seasonal emigration at that time did not materialise, and legal immigration to Germany came to a halt in the following spring on account of the political tension between Germany and Poland. The resumption of the movement after the invasion of Poland may therefore be considered to some extent as a reopening of traditional channels. To some observers, the recruiting of Polish labour has appeared in this light from the very beginning. The correspondent of the *New York Times* cabled as follows in his first despatch concerning the recruiting of Polish workers: "Among their number are seasonal workers who came each year from Poland for harvesting work, but were forbidden to come this year. These have been sent to the Reich now by provisional employment bureaux set up in Poland by the German authorities."⁴

However, the scale on which the movement now developed, and the methods used to develop it, soon entirely transformed its character. Whereas in the past it had been a normal overflow from certain overcrowded regions, what now took place was a systematic

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258.

² *Idem*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 7.

³ *Industrial and Labour Information*, Vol. LXIX, No. 8, 20 Feb. 1939, p. 228.

⁴ *New York Times*, 13 Oct. 1939.

draining away of all the resources which could be useful to a foreign economy, the needs of which were becoming increasingly insatiable.

Polish civilians were recruited for work in Germany throughout the length and breadth of the occupied territory. Even when the campaign was still in full swing, Germany began to establish employment offices in the occupied districts. These offices were subsequently set up in other parts of the country in order to obtain the labour required for reconstruction and current agricultural work in Poland, as well as for work in German agriculture. By the end of 1941, there were in the General Government alone (not including the former Soviet-occupied districts of Lvov and Bialystok) 20 main employment offices with 63 branches.¹

By the middle of October 1939, several trainloads of Polish workers had proceeded to Germany. Before the end of the year, agricultural undertakings in the Reich had been supplied with 80,000 civilian workers from the Incorporated Provinces and the General Government. From January 1940 recruitment became more intense. From the end of the Polish campaign to 31 December 1940, some 469,000 civilians were recruited in the Incorporated Provinces and the General Government and sent to Germany for farm work.² According to a German official statistical report, the number of Poles (besides war prisoners) occupied in Germany, including both industrial and agricultural workers, amounted to 873,000 on 1 April 1941, and on 25 September 1941 it was 1,007,000.³ In July 1942, a reliable source reported the number as 1,095,000.⁴ The estimated number for the beginning of 1943 would be about 1,300,000.⁵

Besides being employed in the Reich, Polish workers are reported to have been conscripted in great numbers as labour troops for the German army on the Russian front.⁶

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 6.

² *Idem*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 8, and *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5.

³ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339, and 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

⁴ This figure is corroborated by the following calculation. The *Krakauer Zeitung* reported that 330,000 Polish workers were sent to Germany by the General Government only; 400,000 were sent by the Incorporated Provinces (cf. below, p. 138) and 180,000 were transferred Polish prisoners of war (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5). This gives a total of 1,400,000 Poles sent to the Reich. Assuming that 15 per cent. returned home, this gives a figure of 1,200,000 employed in the Reich in Aug. 1942. The number of workers sent in Aug. was reported as 90,700.

⁵ The total number of workers sent to Germany from the General Government up to the end of 1942 was about 940,000 (about 380,000 having been sent in the course of 1942). It has been announced that the train carrying workers to Germany which left Cracow on 13 Mar. 1943 conveyed the millionth Polish worker (*Krakauer Zeitung*, 14 Mar. 1943).

⁶ *New York Times*, 16 June 1942, mentioned among other reports the conscription of 100,000 from Silesia and about 70,000 from Poznan "during the past fourteen days".

The number of Polish women working in Germany is given as 262,700, or 25 per cent. of the total of Polish workers, by German official statistics of 25 September 1941. One-fourth of these women are reported to have worked on farms.

According to a reliable source, 700,000 civilian Polish workers were employed in agriculture on 1 June 1942. The Polish Government in London gave the following information about the employment of Poles in Germany at the beginning of 1942: "About 70 per cent. of them are used for agriculture; the rest are employed in building, manufacturing, etc. The Germans avoid employing Polish deportees in important war industry, where sabotage is feared." The proportion of industrial workers, however, has been steadily on the increase. While the first contingents transferred in 1940 were recruited almost entirely for agricultural work, information from a German source indicates that from January to August 1942, 288,400 industrial Polish workers were sent to work in Germany.¹ Later figures, though fragmentary, suggest that newly recruited workers have nearly all been placed in industry. In December 1942, the number of workers enlisted in the General Government for work in the Reich was 31,595. Of these only 600 were for agriculture; the rest were for industry.²

According to information supplied by the Polish Ministry of Labour in London concerning the geographical origin of the Polish workers in Germany, of 1,000,000 Polish civilian workers employed at the beginning of 1942, 400,000 had been brought from the territory annexed by the Reich. The detailed figures are 250,000 from Poznan and Lodz (the area known as the Warthegau), and 150,000 from Pomerania and Silesia. The deportees from Silesia were mostly agricultural workers, as all others were needed for local factories and coal mines.

Norway and Denmark

Prisoners of War.

On 9 April 1940 Germany occupied Denmark and invaded Norway. According to an unofficial estimate, 50,000 prisoners of war were taken in the Norwegian campaign³, but an official German source states that none were transferred from Norway to Germany.⁴

Civilian Workers.

With Denmark, "negotiations for the engagement of workers

¹ A D.N.B. report of 9 Oct. 1942, quoted in *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Nov.-Dec. 1942.

² *Krakauer Zeitung*, 28 Jan. 1943.

³ *New York Times*, 8 July 1940.

⁴ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258.

were opened immediately after the occupation of the country, in connection with the supply of coal and raw materials to Denmark. It was pointed out on the German side that the employment of Danish labour in Germany would enable that country to give the labour needed for extracting the coal wanted by Denmark."¹ On 1 April 1941 there were 31,000 Danes and 1,400 Norwegians employed in Germany, and on 25 September 1941 the number of Danes was 28,900.² According to press reports they were employed as factory hands and in construction work, mainly in ports in the north-west of Germany. A report from Sweden states that in August 1942 there were 40,000 Danish workers in Germany³, while 5,000 were sent to German fortification works in Norway. In spring 1943 this number had risen to 10,000.⁴

The situation in the latter country is described by the official German *Reichsarbeitsblatt* as follows: "The unemployment which prevailed at first in the Norwegian war sector was soon transformed by military construction works into a labour shortage. General compulsory labour was therefore introduced by an Order of 11 July 1941. This measure was necessary to supply agriculture, for example, with the necessary manpower."⁵ But other information suggests that labour conscription in Norway was applied primarily for the purposes of military construction.⁶ The number of Norwegians employed in Germany was unofficially reported to be still only 2,000 in the autumn of 1942.

The Netherlands

Prisoners of War.

On 10 May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands, and on 14 May the Netherlands Army laid down its arms.

During this brief campaign, according to an unofficial estimate

¹ P. WAELBROECK and I. BESSLING: *loc. cit.*, p. 136. In Aug. 1942 it was reported from a Swedish source that the Germans had not delivered more than 30 to 40 per cent. of the promised quantity of fuel.

² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 5; *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339, and 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

³ The figure of 48,000 was given by *Fædrelandet* on 22 Nov. 1942.

⁴ *Vestkysten* (Esbjerg, Denmark), 12 Apr. 1943.

⁵ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 Mar. 1942, No. 9, Part V, p. 179.

⁶ On 9 July 1942 *Folketoiljan* reported that most of the 75,000 Norwegians conscripted for employment would be employed in Norway on various defence schemes. According to *Aften-Tidningen*, 20 July 1942, between 14,000 and 20,000 men were conscripted from Oslo and other parts of Østlandet and sent to fortification works and aerodromes in Søerlandet, Vestlandet and Trøndelag. It is estimated that, as a whole, the number of Norwegian workers directly engaged in German building activities and fortification works in the autumn of 1942 was slightly above 100,000, i.e. one-third of the number of workers engaged in Norwegian manufacturing industries before the war. This figure, it is pointed out, accounts for the fact that no large-scale transfer of Norwegian workers to Germany has taken place. On the contrary, a considerable number of foreign workers have been transferred to Norway.

by a source already quoted, 331,000 men were captured, but on 1 June 1940 Chancellor Hitler announced that the Netherlands prisoners would be released. Half of them were set free immediately and the rest demobilised by degrees. Only a small number, mostly officers, were kept in captivity.¹

Civilian Workers.

While the Germans thus deprived themselves of the services of some 330,000 prisoners whom they might have used as workers, they began immediately after the occupation to recruit the workers they needed directly from the Netherlands labour market. As a result of economic dislocation, the release of prisoners of war and the demobilisation of the army, the number of registered unemployed had risen at that time to 400,000, and invisible unemployment probably accounted for a further 100,000.² Before the war a number of workers from the Netherlands were more or less regularly employed in Germany, mostly as frontier and seasonal workers. After the occupation this movement was revived and systematically encouraged. Workers who declined employment offered in Germany were refused all unemployment relief.

Between 20 June and 30 December 1940, nearly 100,000 workers were placed in employment in Germany, including over 31,000 as frontier workers. Recruitment was suspended during the winter, but in January 1941 big groups of workers were being prepared for departure in the spring. The employment offered was mainly agricultural work and skilled work in the building industry.³

During 1941 the number of workers recruited for Germany rose steadily. From 20 June 1940 it rose to 130,634 (45,478 frontier workers and 85,156 others) at 26 April 1941 and 157,033 (55,239 frontier workers and 101,794 others) at 2 August 1941.⁴ By 28 December 1941

¹ According to a Stockholm report, more than 2,000 former army officers and cadets released on parole were rounded up on 15 May 1942 and sent to prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich. A later report indicates that they were subsequently transferred to a prisoners' camp at Stanislawow in Polish Galicia (*Netherlands News*, 15 Dec. 1942). It has recently been announced that all Dutch prisoners of war who had been released in 1940 were called to report in order to be interned and transferred to Germany, as a reprisal measure for sabotage action in the Netherlands. However, the official D.N.B. agency stated, on 29 Apr. 1943, that at that time officers and non-commissioned officers of the former army were merely required to report, and that nothing was yet known about the actual time of their return to German prisoner-of-war camps.

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Mar. 1941, No. 7, Part V, p. 128.

³ The information given, unless otherwise stated, is taken from *De Arbeidsmarkt*, organ of the Netherlands National Unemployment Council, Dec. 1940 - Dec. 1941, and *Arbeidsbestel*, organ of the Netherlands National Labour Council, Jan. 1942 - May 1943.

⁴ According to the *Reichsarbeitsblatt* (see table, p. 160), the number of civilian Netherlands workers employed in the Reich on 1 Apr. and 25 Sept. 1941 respectively was 90,000 and 93,000, the difference doubtless being due to the inclusion of frontier workers in the Netherlands figures.

the figure was 199,655 (67,040 frontier workers and 132,615 others) and by March 1942, it was 235,793 (74,215 frontier workers and 161,578 others). During the same period, however, there was a steady return movement of workers whose contracts had expired. The total number of returns recorded was 61,000 at 28 February 1942, but it was admitted that an unknown number of workers had also broken their contracts and returned secretly. The total number of workers employed in Germany at the end of March 1942 may therefore be estimated at between 160,000 and 170,000. In addition, 29,472 workers had also been recruited in the Netherlands since June 1940 for work in France and Belgium. Most of those recruited for Germany were industrial workers. According to information published by the Netherlands Central Statistical Bureau in March 1942¹, out of 227,000 workers recruited up to the end of February, 17,000 were employed in farming, 5,000 in domestic service, 24,000 in transportation and commerce, while 130,000 belonged to various groups of skilled industrial labour, 48,000 were registered as unskilled and 3,000 were unclassified.

The proportion of industrial labour, and more particularly of skilled labour, rose still higher during the following months. In the Netherlands, as in France and in Germany itself, the mobilisation of labour for Germany was intensified under the direction of Dr. Fritz Sauckel, who was appointed General Controller of Labour in Berlin on 21 March 1942. A three-months campaign was set on foot, directed mainly to the recruitment of metal workers, which resulted in providing about 30,000 metal workers for German industry. Special commissions were set up by the German authorities to comb out the labour force of the metal-working undertakings in the Netherlands and to send those regarded as surplus to requirements to Germany—if necessary, by having recourse to the compulsory labour service which had been introduced for work within the country in March 1941 and extended to cover work in Germany a year later.

At the beginning of July the commissions had finished their work and were disbanded and the second stage of the programme was put in hand, namely the expansion of output with a view to economising labour and releasing further workers for employment in the German armament industries. Measures were taken to promote the retraining of workers in other occupations for the German metal-working industries at the rate of 2,330 a month. And lastly, the transfer of whole undertakings together with their staffs, which had been begun some time earlier, was methodically organised.

¹ Quoted in *Netherlands News* (New York), 11-25 Sept. 1942.

The following figures show the expansion of recruitment, especially during the months of May, June and October.

Date	Frontier workers	Workers in other parts of the Reich				
		Total	Metals	Transport	Building	Unskilled
30 March-25 April 1942	2,061	6,811	940	1,449	1,589	999
27 April-31 May 1942	2,008	20,324	*	*	*	*
June 1942	1,714	20,586	10,423	1,803	1,597	3,133
July 1942	1,789	8,896	2,939	1,072	1,294	1,215
August 1942	1,119	5,940	1,204	781	986	971
September 1942	2,160	10,171	1,862	1,656	1,595	1,758
October 1942	2,446	23,101	4,135	3,254	3,668	4,381
November 1942	1,397	13,761	*	*	*	*
December 1942	776	10,085	1,881	1,360	1,153	1,932

* No published data

At the end of December 1942, the total number of workers recruited for Germany since 20 June 1940 had risen from 226,921 at 28 March to 362,956, including 87,514 frontier workers. The number of workers recorded as having returned was 100,084 so that, making allowance for secret returns, the number of workers then employed in Germany was probably between 255,000 and 260,000.¹ The number of workers from the Netherlands working in France and Belgium, which had remained stable for several months, was then 36,500.

At the beginning of 1943 a fresh effort was made to mobilise the remaining labour reserves in the Netherlands. General civilian mobilisation was ordered on 22 February on the same system as had been introduced in Germany in the same month. There was a drastic combing out of labour from banks, insurance companies, export and wholesale firms, while all places of amusement, restaurants and luxury shops had to be closed. In commenting on this measure, the *Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden* noted on 6 March 1943 that the country still had larger untapped labour resources than Germany. It was added that the mobilisation Order would affect a great many of the better-off people in the Netherlands who had never worked or had worked only occasionally before. More labour would be released by closing non-essential establishments, but women would be left in the country to work in agriculture.² A special German commission was set up in January to carry out the programme. As a result 41,969 more Dutch workers

¹ These workers were not necessarily all employed in the Reich. The employment of workers from the Netherlands on fortification work in Norway has been reported, and some workers were also sent to the Eastern Provinces. See Chapter II, pp. 65-67.

² *Netherlands News* (New York), Vol. VI, No. 2, 11-25 Mar. 1943, pp. 34-35.

were recruited during the first three months of 1943, bringing the total of workers recruited since 20 June 1940 to 404,725. Taking into account the return of 109,178 workers, the number of workers employed in Germany at the end of March 1943 was nearly 300,000.

Belgium

Prisoners of War.

Belgium was invaded on 10 May 1940 at the same time as the Netherlands and Luxemburg. On 28 May the Belgian army capitulated. During those eighteen days, 545,000 Belgians were captured, but only some of them were retained as prisoners and transferred to Germany. According to a German source¹, all the Flemish soldiers were included among those who were released. In February 1942, according to a Belgian report, the total number of Belgian officers and soldiers in German prison camps was 80,000.² For August 1942, a well-informed source gives the number as 77,000. There is no indication that this number has since been reduced. Most of the prisoners have been put to work.³

Civilian Workers.

The recruiting of civilians for work in Germany developed gradually in Belgium after the occupation. At that time about 600,000 workers were unemployed⁴ as a result of the mass return of refugees who had fled to France before the invasion and of the complete disruption of industry and the transportation system due to destruction and military operations. The enrolment of workers for Germany was officially announced in June. In August and September, the number of workers who left for Germany averaged 1,500 to 2,000 a week. The weekly average then fell to 500 or 600, and on 15 December the movement was interrupted owing to a seasonal decline in the demand for labour in Germany. By the end of 1940 the number of Belgian civilians employed in the Reich totalled 70,000. It was 87,000 on 1 April 1941.⁵ Then came a rapid rise in connection with preparations for the Russian campaign. On 25 September 1941 the number of Belgian workers in Germany had reached 121,500.⁶ In March 1942 it was announced from Ger-

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 257.

² *News from Belgium* (New York), 7 Mar. 1942.

³ Recently the *Brüsseler Zeitung* forecast that the Belgian prisoners of war would soon be put on the same footing as the Belgian civilian workers in Germany (*Nya Dagligt Alla handa*, Stockholm, 15 Apr. 1943).

⁴ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, p. 416.

⁵ *Idem*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339.

⁶ *Idem*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

man sources that the 250,000th Belgian worker had left for Germany¹ and at the end of May the total number of recruited workers was given as 300,000², but these figures do not indicate how many Belgian workers were actually employed at those dates in Germany. The fact that the total number of recruited workers up to the middle of July 1941 was given as 175,000³ while the number of those actually working in Germany on 25 September of the same year was only 121,500 indicates that there had been an important return movement. In the Netherlands, as stated above, the number of registered returns amounted to over 83,000 at the end of August 1942 against a total number of 298,000 recruitments at the same date. Assuming that the proportion of returning workers was the same in Belgium as in the Netherlands, the number of Belgian civilian workers employed in Germany at the end of May 1942 may be estimated at 215,000.

The workers recruited were almost all industrial workers, and in particular skilled workers. Large numbers of Belgians were reported to have been sent to the industrial centres of Brunswick and to various other factories in different parts of Germany. Some of the Belgian women sent to the Reich were employed on domestic work, but the majority worked in factories.

The movement slackened during the summer months. As early as April the organ of the Belgian National Employment Office announced that the country's manpower reserves were nearly drained dry, and that recruitment for work abroad was meeting with growing difficulties, due largely to the fact that the Todt Organisation was employing a large number of workers in the coastal area of Belgium itself, while of the remaining 47,000 unemployed 65 per cent. were over 50, and 20 per cent. between 40 and 50 years of age.⁴

There was a fresh increase in the number of departures in the autumn as a result of the Order of 6 October 1942⁵ extending liability to compulsory labour service to cover employment anywhere outside Belgium. According to Belgian sources, in the last three months of 1942 over 50,000 Belgians were sent to the Reich. At the end of the year the rate of departure exceeded 20,000 a month.⁶ On 4 March 1943, a German broadcast, describing the recent mass call-up of Belgian labour under the compulsory legislation, stated that 110,000 Belgian workers had been recruited since the Order

¹ *Wirtschaftsdienst*, 27 Mar. 1942. According to the same source, some Belgians were also employed in occupied France.

² *Volkscher Beobachter*, 6 Sept. 1942.

³ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, p. 417.

⁴ Article analysed in *Arbeitsdienst*, organ of the Netherlands National Employment Office, June 1942, p. 125.

⁵ Cf. *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 372.

⁶ *News from Belgium* (New York), 9 Jan. 1943.

of 6 October 1942, bringing the total of workers sent to Germany to about 436,000. Taking into account the probable number of returning workers, it may be estimated that the number of civilian workers employed in Germany at the beginning of March was about 300,000. Including the prisoners of war, the Belgian labour force employed in Germany at that time amounted to some 370,000 persons.

The mobilisation of labour, however, had not yet come to an end. Belgian handicrafts, according to the same source, were to release many workers for the Reich and the remainder for the Belgian armament industry. Only the most vital artisans were to continue their trade. The textile industry, too, was to be combed out again. There would be a considerable reduction in the number of luxury shops and places of entertainment.

While more Belgian labour was still being sought for Germany, the scarcity of workers in some industries, particularly in coal mines, had become so acute that foreign labour was being imported. According to a Belgian source, more than 7,000 Russian prisoners had been deported to Belgium by the end of 1942 to work in the mines.¹

France

Prisoners of War.

On 17 May 1940 German troops began their invasion of France. On 13 June they marched into Paris, and on 22 June the armistice was signed in the Forest of Compiègne. The number of French prisoners captured during this whirlwind march through France was estimated at about 1,800,000. A number of them have been liberated since the armistice. Ill-health rendering them unfit for work, or advancing age, were the most frequent grounds for release. Some others were temporarily released *en congé de captivité* because they were indispensable for the restoration of normal life in occupied France; for instance, a baker might be released if he were the only baker in the town. It has been assumed, on the basis of the high figures for releases published at intervals by the press and radio, that the total of prisoners released by the autumn of 1941 amounted to 800,000.² But, according to the official statistics of the Vichy Government, 1,426,000 French prisoners were still in German camps in January 1942. These camps were first situated not only in Germany but in occupied France as well, and the prisoners were put to work, mainly at clearing debris. At the beginning of 1941

¹ *La Belgique Indépendante* (London), 11 Feb. 1943.

² "Foreign Labour in Germany", *loc. cit.*, pp. 1263-1269.

French prisoners who had formerly been working in France were removed to Germany, but some remained in occupied France, in particular the Senegalese and all other coloured French troops. In the spring of 1941, "far more than one and a half million prisoners from the west", most of them French, were said to be employed by the Germans, and probably the majority were already working in the Reich.¹

In June 1942, the Head of the French Government, Mr. Laval, obtained a promise from the German Government that in exchange for the sending of trained workers to Germany some of the French prisoners of war would be released. This release was conditional, however, since the prisoners were to be given temporary leave subject to renewal. It was first provided that 50,000 prisoners of war would be repatriated if 150,000 trained workers went to work in Germany. Further negotiations led to the adoption of the ratio which was ultimately applied—that is, the repatriation of 1,000 prisoners for every 5,000 trained workers.²

In August 1942 the total of French prisoners, as given by a trustworthy source, was 1,353,000. This number has only slowly been reduced since. As will be seen below, only 115,000 trained workers signed contracts for Germany between 1 June and 16 December 1942, so that the proportion of prisoners of war who were released up to the end of the year under the agreement concluded by Mr. Laval was small. Radio Lyons announced on 29 November 1942 that the first contingent of 25,000 prisoners freed under the scheme had returned to their homes.

A certain number of prisoners, however, appear to have been released on condition that they went on working in Germany as civilian workers. At a press conference held in Vichy on 9 February 1943, Mr. Laval declared that there were about 1,150,000 prisoners actually working for Germany.³ The German Government had promised to free 50,000 prisoners if 250,000 new workers were sent to Germany.⁴ It had also consented to use in a civilian capacity in German factories nearly 250,000 other prisoners.⁵ This informa-

¹ The total of prisoners of war, both from the west and the east, working in Germany at the end of April 1941 was given as 1,300,000 (*Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258), of whom 100,000 were working for military authorities and 1,200,000 in industry and agriculture. In addition, 135,000 were at work in the soldiers' camps. After deducting the Polish, Belgian and British prisoners, it may be estimated that out of the total number of French prisoners of war in Germany some 1,150,000 had been put to work.

² "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 325.

³ *Free France* (Free French Press Information Service, New York), Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 176.

⁴ The releases appear to have started only after 1 Apr., when the full contingent of 250,000 workers had been recruited.

⁵ Official communiqué of 22 Feb. 1943.

tion suggests that there may in the future be a decrease in the number of prisoners of war in Germany as a result not of their return to France, but of their conversion into civilian workers forcibly employed in Germany.

Civilian Workers.

The first batch of French civilians employed in the Reich came from Alsace-Lorraine. Their number was officially given as 24,500 for the months July to November 1940.¹ As these provinces were then incorporated into the Reich, however, Alsations do not figure in the later statistics of foreign workers employed in Germany.

In the rest of occupied France recruitment did not begin until about a year after the armistice, and made little progress. During the winter of 1940, the number of workers who accepted the offer of employment in Germany was insignificant. The few who did so were mainly foreigners², who were told by the French authorities that they would be deprived of relief if they did not accept the German offer. The official statistics show that in April 1941 there were only 25,000 workers from France in the Reich.³ In September 1941 the number was 48,600.⁴

Later, the lack of raw materials and fuel and other factors compelled many French factories to close down, and this, together with food restrictions, acted as an incentive to workers to agree to go to Germany or to accept work in the ports and arsenals of the Channel area. But notwithstanding the constantly worsening conditions of life in France the further progress of recruitment for Germany was far from rapid. The departure of the hundred-thousandth French worker for Germany was celebrated in December 1941, but the number of workers actually working in Germany at that date was far below this figure, as many of those who had left earlier had since returned to France.

It was in the spring of 1942 that Germany began to press the French Government and succeeded in obtaining its full co-operation in supplying an increasing number of workers, in particular of trained workers, for German factories. At the end of March 1942 the German Government lodged a demand with the French Government for a further 350,000 workers, including 150,000 trained workers, for work in Germany, and in the course of the following months Mr. Laval negotiated an agreement under which he undertook to supply the required quota before 15 September, obtaining in

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 20 Dec. 1940, Nos. 35-36, Part V, p. 616.

² *Idem*, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, p. 414.

³ *Idem*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339.

⁴ *Idem*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

return the promise of the temporary release of some of the French prisoners.¹ A series of measures was then taken to stimulate the recruitment of volunteers for factory work in Germany by putting indirect pressure both on employers and workers; these included a reorganisation of French industry involving the concentration of production and the extension of hours of work, with the object of releasing labour which it was expected would then volunteer for Germany, and the opening of German employment offices in the unoccupied as well as in the occupied zone.

As a result of these measures, the rate of departure of French workers to Germany appears to have risen to a few thousand each week during the summer months. But the results remained far below the German demands. Before these demands were presented at the end of March 1942, between 140,000 and 150,000 workers, skilled and unskilled, had been recruited in France, women forming 20 per cent. of the total. This figure included not only French workers but 22 to 23 per cent. of colonial or foreign workers living in France.² Moreover, thousands of these workers had returned to France under various pretexts, so that the number of civilian workers actually employed in Germany about that time was probably not much higher than 100,000.³

From the end of March up to 30 June 1942 some 20,000 to 30,000 new workers signed contracts. On 20 June 1942 Mr. Laval broadcast an urgent appeal to the French people to provide the quotas of workers he had promised the German Government at the end of March. In spite of this appeal the movement was still inadequate. From the end of June up to 7 September, according to a statement of the Secretary of State for Industry, some 40,000 more French workers, including 10,800 trained workers, were transferred to Germany.⁴ But there had been a steady flow of workers returning at the end of their contract and the total number of French workers actually employed in Germany had only risen to 140,000⁵, which represented an increase of not more than 40,000 since the end of the previous year.

As a consequence of the measures taken by the French Government under the Act of 4 September 1942 concerning the employ-

¹ See above, p. 146.

² "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 342.

³ The *New York Times*, 8 Feb. 1942, referring to an announcement by the German authorities in Paris, gives the figure of 100,000. Cf. also *Le Temps*, 9 Feb. 1942, and *Il Sole* (Milan), 18 Dec. 1941.

⁴ The number of trained workers having offered their services between 1 June and 1 Sept. has been given as 17,000 (cf. *International Labour Review*, loc. cit., p. 329).

⁵ *Il Sole* (Milan), 9-10 Sept. 1942.

ment and direction of labour, recruitment was accelerated during the autumn of 1942. A press release of the French Information Office announced on 16 December 1942 that according to official statistics, 205,000 workers had left for Germany since the appeal made by Mr. Laval (probably the speech broadcast on 20 June 1942). This number included 115,000 trained workers.

On the basis of these figures the total number of workers recruited for work in Germany from the armistice up to the end of 1942 may be estimated at about 370,000. Taking into account the number of returning workers¹, the number of workers from France employed in Germany at the end of the year 1942 was probably about 300,000.

In January 1943, press reports mentioned that the French Government had consented to place 60 per cent. of French specialised workers at the disposal of Germany, involving the despatch of a further 250,000 French workers to Germany beyond those already there.² The total number of workers having left for Germany up to 23 February 1943 has been given as 348,000³, but it is not clear from what date this figure is counted. If it refers, as is probably the case, to those who left after the appeal made by Mr. Laval at the end of June, it would mean that 143,000 workers were recruited between 16 December 1942 and 23 February 1943, bringing the total number of civilian workers from France employed in Germany at that date to well over 400,000.

This number has increased still further in recent months. On 22 February 1943 it was officially announced that 250,000 more workers were to be recruited for Germany, and on 11 April Mr. Laval stated that this recruitment had been completed on 31 March. It was later reported that a third contingent of 220,000 had been promised and was to be sent to Germany before 30 June.⁴

From German sources it was stated that on 21 April 600,000 French workers were employed in Germany.⁵ With the addition of the 220,000 workers who were to be recruited before 30 June⁶ the number of French workers in Germany would therefore exceed 800,000, and the total labour force from France employed in Germany, including the prisoners of war, can be estimated at about 1,900,000.

¹ According to a statement made by the French Secretary of State and already quoted, between 50,000 and 60,000 workers who had been employed in Germany had returned to France by 7 Sept. 1942.

² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 24 Jan. 1943.

³ *Le Soir* (Brussels), 2 Mar. 1943.

⁴ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7 May 1943; *La Suisse* (Geneva), 13 May 1943.

⁵ *Pariser Zeitung*, 21 Apr. 1943.

⁶ The recruitment of this last quota seems to have met with some difficulty. According to the official D.N.B. (25 June 1943), only 100,085 workers had been sent up to 23 June.

Yugoslavia and Greece

The Balkan campaign began on 28 October 1940 when Italy invaded Greece, but this invasion was unsuccessful until the German army entered Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1941, and occupied Yugoslavia within a few days. On 27 April the German army entered Athens, and on 1 June, with the occupation of Crete, the Balkan campaign came to an end.

The main objective of German policy towards Yugoslavia was its dismemberment. Some parts of Yugoslav territory were given to the neighbouring countries allied to Germany, while Croatia was separated from Serbia. In Greece, the situation was complicated by the fact that not only Germany but Italy and Bulgaria had hand in the administration of the country.

This political background also affected the employment of a prisoners of war and labour recruitment.

Prisoners of War.

The total number of prisoners of war captured by the Germans in the Balkans was 589,000, including both officers and men. Of the Yugoslav prisoners, however, all those of German, Macedonian, Hungarian and Albanian origin and all Croats were released, so that only the Serbs, numbering not more than 200,000, remained for transfer to Germany.¹ According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, at the end of 1941 180,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war were held in Germany and about 40,000 in Italy. These numbers have decreased since then, as some categories of prisoners, in particular those who are natives of the Yugoslav territories annexed by the Axis Powers, have been released. Releases more particularly affected the prisoners in Italy, whose numbers had decreased by half towards the end of 1941, while the number of prisoners in Germany was still at that time not much below 180,000. In August 1942, according to a well-informed source, the figure for Germany was 149,000. At the beginning of 1943 it was about 133,200, while in Italy the figure had dropped to 6,500.

According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, all Yugoslav prisoner-of-war camps are located in Germany and Italy. One or two of them seem, however, to be situated on Yugoslav territory which Germany claims to have incorporated into the Reich, *i.e.* near Maribor in Slovenia. No exact data are available about the number of Yugoslav prisoners employed as workers, but it may be assumed that the great majority are so

¹ *Reichszeitung*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 259.

employed, the number varying with the seasons, since Yugoslav prisoners, the great majority of whom are peasants, are employed mainly for agricultural work. The only information available about the employment of prisoners on work in mines and quarries (where the work is very hard) relates to the punishment of refractory prisoners.

With regard to the Greeks, only the 5,000 prisoners taken by the Italians were held for some considerable time in Italy or in Italian camps on the Adriatic. The Germans, on the other hand, who took more than 200,000 Greek prisoners, liberated all the men, and probably the officers as well, immediately the war was over.

Civilian Workers.

The recruiting of workers in Yugoslavia began before the country was invaded. At the end of 1940, Germany employed 4,400 Yugoslavs, and by April 1941, on the eve of the German invasion, this figure had risen to 48,000. A small number of Greeks, about 500, were also employed. Immediately after the campaign, the recruiting of workers in the new Kingdom of Croatia was begun. Official German statistics show 108,800 workers from all Yugoslavia in September 1941, 26,000 of them being women.¹ According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, 100,000 more workers were sent to Germany between then and the summer of 1942, and the total (including Croats) exceeded 200,000, employed mainly in agriculture.² In spring 1943 it was over 250,000.³ A further 50,000 Yugoslav workers are employed in German-occupied countries.⁴

The Greeks were at first mostly employed as sailors on German ships.⁵ It was only in March 1942 that the first group of Greeks was sent to Germany for agricultural and industrial work.⁶ Recruitment was stimulated by the situation in the Greek labour market. According to the Greek Office of Information, many factories had been obliged to cease work since the beginning of the occupation for lack of the necessary raw materials or power, which

¹ *Idem*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

² According to information published by the *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe* (Apr. 1943), 70,000 Serb workers and 120,000 Croat workers were employed in Germany by the end of 1942. A number of Slovenes who had been deported to Germany to make room for the Ljubljana Germans were also recruited for work. Cf. above, Chapter II, p. 80.

³ Sixty-six thousand from Serbia according to the *Deutsche Stimme* (Munich), Feb. 1943, and 200,000 Croats, according to the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 Apr. 1943, the latter figure including some Croats from France and Belgium.

⁴ *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, Oct. 1942.

⁵ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610.

⁶ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 Mar. 1942.

depended mainly on imported coal. Only certain kinds of activities were kept going, such as munition factories and industries producing materials needed for fortifications. The closing of factories intensified the unemployment problem, while inflation made any wages earned almost valueless. On 7 September 1942 it was announced in a broadcast from Rome that 26,000 persons had been recruited from Northern Greece for work in German factories.¹ With regard to workers from Central and Southern Greece, jointly occupied by the Germans and Italians, a German source quoted by the Greek Office of Information gives a figure of 8,000 employed in Germany on 11 September 1942. Many thousands of Greek labourers were also working in the beet fields of Czechoslovakia, while others were employed in the steel industry of occupied France, according to information received by the same Office in September 1942.

U.S.S.R.

Prisoners of War.

German information concerning the number of Russian prisoners of war is contradictory. On 3 October 1941, only three and a half months after the invasion of Russia, Chancellor Hitler stated that the number of Russian prisoners had risen to 2,500,000, and on 11 December 1941, in declaring war on the United States, that Russian prisoners up to 1 December totalled exactly 3,806,865. But on the anniversary of the invasion of Russia, the official German news agency (D.N.B.) stated that in one year Russia had lost more than two million men captured, and on 12 August 1942 the German High Command announced that 1,044,741 Russian soldiers had been captured since the resumption of fighting in the spring. The latter figure caused some surprise, for whereas in the campaign of 1941 whole regiments and even divisions were reported to have been surrounded by the German armoured troops which pierced the Russian lines, nothing similar had been announced in the campaign of 1942, and there seems to be no explanation for such great losses in prisoners by an army showing stubborn resistance and retiring in good order.

The explanation given for this contradiction is that the German figures include not only Russian soldiers captured on the battlefield, but also civilians who are regarded as prisoners of war and treated accordingly. A communiqué of the Soviet Government Information Bureau accused Germany of treating every male able

¹ It is not clear whether this figure relates to workers who actually left for Germany or to all those who registered for work in Germany.

to bear arms as a prisoner of war and supported this assertion by the publication of some Orders of the Day found in the possession of German detachments.¹

With regard to the territorial distribution of Russian prisoners of war, the following figures, which give a rough picture of the situation in February 1942, are derived from a well-informed source. The total number of persons regarded as prisoners of war was between two and three million. Of this number, 300,000 were in camps and labour detachments in Germany and 180,000 in the General Government. The transfer of Russian prisoners of war to the west was then in full swing, but there is no doubt that the bulk of the prisoners were still in the area between the fighting front and the line from which the German offensive started in June 1941. Many of this vast number of prisoners remaining in occupied Soviet territory were confined in temporary or more permanent prison camps in different districts, but a constantly increasing number were brought to work in the Ukraine and in other parts of the Soviet Union. Thousands of Russian prisoners were reported to have been sent to German-occupied or German-controlled countries; for instance, 32,000 to build railways and fortifications in Norway² and 7,000, as already mentioned, to Belgian mines.³ Thirty-five thousand Russian prisoners in Rumanian hands have been put to work on farms in Rumania.⁴

Civilian Workers.

The system of treating all civilians capable of bearing arms as prisoners of war may have been primarily intended to put down guerilla warfare, but it was also a special method of recruiting labour. In addition, by September 1942, the German authorities had also set up 238 employment offices in occupied Russia⁵, excluding the Bialystok region, which was incorporated into the

¹ The following Order issued on 21 Jan. 1941 by the 9th German Tank Division was published in *Pravda* on 9 Feb. 1942: "According to the Secret Order of the High Command, No. 2974/41 of 6 Dec. 1941, all men liable for military service from occupied localities must be sent to prisoner-of-war camps".

² *Norsk Tidend*, 6 May 1942.

³ According to *Ny Dag* (Stockholm), 20 Mar. 1943, Swedish sailors who had been to Danzig stated that only Russian prisoners were working in the docks. Another report refers to Russian prisoners sent to work on fortifications along the Aegean coast (*Folkviljan*, Stockholm, 30 Mar. 1943). According to an Order issued in the autumn of 1942, Soviet prisoners of war of Ukrainian stock who came from the Galician district of Lvov were to be released for war work in Germany.

⁴ Reported on 5 Jan. 1942 from a reliable source.

⁵ *Berliner Borsen-Zeitung*, 11 Sept. 1942. Another paper gives this figure as "about 288" for the whole of the *Ostraum*, besides a number of labour offices set up by the military authorities in the south (*Deutsche Betriebs-Zeitung*, 4 Sept. 1942).

Reich, and Galicia, which became part of the General Government.¹ Nevertheless, in the first months of the German occupation, the labour supply from Russia was very meagre. The German authorities explained this partly by the opposition to the employment of Russian workers in the Reich on grounds of principle, and partly by the great shortage of manpower in occupied Russia itself, a shortage which was caused by the flight of the population before the advancing German armies and which made it necessary for all available agricultural labour to be used on the spot.² Even in 1942, for the spring ploughing, 400,000 agricultural workers were requisitioned "from the northern regions of the Eastern Territories for the Ukraine to remedy the lack of manpower there".³ For the same reasons the great majority of the Russian prisoners of war had to be left in the occupied regions to work in local agriculture and thus to ensure at least the supply of food necessary for the German army.

During the course of 1942, however, the situation changed considerably. Measures were taken to isolate the Russians from other workers. Recruiting was extended to regions more remote from the main lines of communication. In the summer of 1942 it was announced that between 14,000 and 20,000 Russian workers had been brought daily to Germany.⁴ These were not only agricultural workers, but also industrial workers in steadily increasing numbers. The German authorities admitted that in occupied Russia "the labour supply possibilities in the cities have fallen to a negligible level owing to the destruction wrought almost everywhere".⁵ The great majority of skilled workers had of course been evacuated by the Russians before their retreat. So far as those who remained were concerned, the German authorities realised that "it would be unreasonable to employ them for rural labour". The proper sphere of activity for these skilled industrial workers would be the armament industry in the Greater German Reich.⁶ Great successes were announced in the recruitment of miners, metal and other workers. Ukrainian women are reported to have been sent

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 Mar. 1942, No. 9, Part V, p. 168.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 17, June 1942, p. 554.

⁴ *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, 17 July 1942.

⁵ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Mar. 1942, No. 7, Part V, p. 131. The scale of the destruction is suggested by the German claim to have achieved the clearing of some dozens of pits in the Donetz region and to have resumed production in a few of them, so that "many hundreds of men could be put to work in each pit and were again getting wages and bread" (*Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 18, June 1942, p. 594).

⁶ *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, No. 17, June 1942, p. 555. Already in 1941 the German employment offices had been advised to employ the skilled workers among the Russian prisoners of war in their own trades. Cf. *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 629.

as far away as the Westmark, a new province including Lorraine and the adjacent districts of western Germany; they were found to be suitable for certain work usually performed by men, such as transport work, the operation of large machines, and mining.¹ In some regions wholesale recruitment was carried out and all available labour taken. In August 1942 it was reported that an acute shortage of agricultural labour in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been caused in this way, so that the German labour authorities permitted about 400 Estonian "volunteers" working in Germany at the time to return to their homes for three weeks for harvesting.²

The result of all these recruitment measures was a huge influx of Russian workers into Germany.³ The Russian press speaks of millions of deported Russian workers, these including, of course, recruited workers as well as those whom the Germans classified as prisoners of war. "Eastern" workers from the Ukraine, the former Baltic States and the other territories occupied by the German army constituted the main supply of foreign labour at that time. In September 1942 it was stated that 1,200,000 Eastern workers had already been employed in the Reich for some time, and that this number was still growing.⁴

In all, about 2,000,000 eastern workers were reported to have been sent to Germany in 1942⁵—a figure which was confirmed by a press release of 13 January 1943 issued by the official German news agency.⁶ Of this number, according to information given by the German General Commissioner for the Ukraine, 710,000 came from the Ukraine.⁷ There is no reliable information to show where the remainder came from. It should be remembered that the expression "Eastern workers" is used in two different ways in Germany. In connection with regulating working conditions, an Order of 30 June 1942 limited the definition of "Eastern workers" to "all non-German workers recruited within the German Commissariat of the Ukraine, the General Commissariat of White Russia and the territories to the east of these regions and bordering the former free States of Latvia and Estonia". But in every-day language, the expression often includes all workers recruited east of the frontier of the Greater Reich (including territories incorporated into the Reich)

¹ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 July 1942.

² *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland*, 18 Aug. 1942.

³ For a more detailed study of the methods of recruitment and conditions of employment of Eastern workers in Germany, see "Soviet Workers in Germany", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 5, May 1943, pp. 576-590.

⁴ *Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, 4 Sept. 1942.

⁵ *Monatshefte für N.S.-Sozialpolitik*, Nos. 23-24, Dec. 1942.

⁶ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 14 Jan. 1943.

⁷ *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, quoted by *National Zeitung* (Basle), 8 Jan. 1943.

and thus applies, in addition, to the workers recruited in the territory of the General Government (including Galicia) and in the German Commissariat of the East—that is, in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Probably the figure of 2,000,000 published by the German news agency should be taken to include all workers from the east in the wider sense of the term. The communiqué of the German Labour Front, already noted above¹, speaks of "two million Poles and Russians who came to the Reich in 1942 for work". If this is correct, it may be estimated, by subtracting the number of Polish and Baltic workers and returning seasonal workers, that 1,500,000 workers from the Soviet Union were employed in Germany at the beginning of 1943 and that nearly half of them had come from the Ukraine.

Italy

Among the allied and neutral countries which have provided Germany with manpower Italy takes first place. Workers came to Germany from Italy not only far earlier than from the other countries, but also in far greater numbers. Before the war Germany employed 30,000 Italian seasonal workers and since the outbreak of war the number of Italians has risen constantly. Before Italy entered the war, the supply of agricultural workers even exceeded the demand. When the surplus labour in Italy had been absorbed by mobilisation, recruiting naturally became more difficult, although the field was extended over central and southern Italian provinces with a large agrarian population. According to official German statistics, 47,000 agricultural and 70,000 industrial workers were brought to Germany by the end of 1940. At the beginning of February 1941 agreements were concluded at Rome between the German and Italian authorities providing for the expansion of the employment of Italians in German industrial undertakings, under which the quota of Italian workers was to be increased by about 200,000. Furthermore, earlier agreements concerning the seasonal employment of agricultural workers were renewed and widened in scope, so that the quota for 1941 was somewhat larger than that for the previous year.² In pursuance of these agreements, especially in so far as they concerned Italian metal workers, special committees were set up in Italy to make adjustments in the organisation of work, and in particular in hours of work, so that workers might be made available for employment in Germany.³

On 1 April 1941 there were altogether 130,000 Italian workers

¹ Cf. above, p. 132, footnote 1.

² *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 5, May 1941, p. 584.

³ *Idem*, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, Oct. 1941, p. 439.

in Germany, and on 25 September 1941, 271,000, of whom 21,700 were women.¹ In the spring of 1942 it was stated that Italy had provided Germany with 300,000 workers (8 per cent. being women), and that this number would soon reach 350,000.² According to a German broadcast, Italian workers were also sent to occupied Russia. As to the occupations of the Italian workers in Germany, according to a reliable source, 100,000 of them were engaged in the metal industry and 25,000 in mining in May-June 1942.

It should be noted that the Italian contribution to Germany's labour reserves was limited by Italy's own needs, especially in respect of skilled metal workers. Already in May 1941 reports received from the corporative inspection authorities indicated that the number of workers released for work in Germany was less than the number demanded.³ Another indication of the scarcity of skilled labour in the Italian metal industry came from Italy in August 1942, when it was reported that out of 100,000 metal workers in the province of Turin 27,000 were women, an unusual feature in Italy.⁴

Hungary

The employment of Hungarians in German agriculture began in 1937. An agreement concerning the recruitment of industrial workers was made in July 1941. On 25 September 1941 there were in Germany 35,000 Hungarian workers, of whom 9,600 were women, the latter being employed mainly in agriculture. At the end of September 1942 the number was 29,000.⁵ This figure is lower than in the summer, and represents the number of permanent workers who remained after the return of the seasonal workers recruited for harvesting. The majority of these permanent Hungarian immigrants were skilled and semi-skilled workers, but some industrial apprentices are also included.

At the end of November 1942 all Hungarian agricultural and

¹ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339; 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 611; and 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 9. Italian official sources give a figure of 140,000 for 1939-1940. For 1941 the figure is identical with the German statistics. Cf. *Problemi e informazioni sociali*, Jan.-Feb. 1942.

² Stefani Agency, 5 June 1942; *New York Times*, 6 Apr. and 9 June 1942.

³ Cf. *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, Oct. 1941, p. 439.

⁴ *Gazzetta del Popolo* (Turin), Aug. 1942. Recently rumours have filtered out of Italy that a large number of the Italians employed in Germany had been ordered home and that many had already left. It was explained that the workers were urgently needed in Italy, in particular for fortification building. On the other hand, in April a German broadcast announced the impending transfer of new contingents of skilled Italian workers to the Reich. Cf. the article by Edgar R. Rosen in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 May 1943. According to a Stockholm despatch to the *New York Times*, 26 May 1943, the *Kieler Zeitung* announced that the first contingent of Italians had left the city under a general scheme to send back all Italian workers from German war industries "so that they can make their contribution on their own home front".

⁵ *Magyar Nemzet*, 19 Oct. 1942.

forestry workers in Germany were informed that they would have to return to Hungary by the end of December.¹ The Hungarian News Agency reported at the end of the year that all Hungarian workers were being recalled from abroad to relieve the labour shortage at home.²

Bulgaria

On 25 September 1941 there were 14,500 Bulgarian workers, including 2,000 women, in Germany, and approximately the same number in the spring of 1942.

In addition to industrial workers Germany also recruits gardeners from Bulgaria. Bulgarian gardening specialists used to farm garden lands in Greater Germany for many years, in particular in the vicinity of large cities, which they cultivated at their own expense and under their own management with the aid of Bulgarian assistants. In 1941, under an agreement between Germany and Bulgaria, 1,000 of these independent gardeners were permitted to enter Germany, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the General Government of Poland, after the Bulgarian Government had authorised the recruitment of an equal number of gardeners for employment in German undertakings.³ In this particular case, therefore, the promotion of foreign colonisation is combined with arrangements for recruiting workers.

On 9 February 1943, a new agreement was signed between Germany and Bulgaria concerning the recruiting of Bulgarian workers for Germany⁴, but no information is yet available about its results.

Rumania

Under an agreement concluded between the Rumanian Ministry of Labour and the competent German authorities at the end of 1941, 16,000 Rumanians of 18 and 19 years of age were to be sent as apprentices into German industries for a period of 3 years.⁵ According to a reliable source, however, only 4,500 actually went. From the same source it is reported that there are no Rumanian agricultural workers in Germany as they are all needed at home, especially since the army call-up. The number of 17,000 agricultural workers published by the foreign press is probably an exaggeration.

¹ *Magyar Nemzet*, 30 Nov. 1942.

² *New York Times*, 3 Jan. 1943.

³ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 13.

⁴ *Zora*, 10 Feb. 1943.

⁵ *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 47. Cf. also *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Sept. 1942, p. 349.

Spain

As a result of arrangements made by the Spanish National Trade Union Office in the spring of 1941, the German Labour Front invited 100,000 Spanish workers to go to work in Germany.¹ Following an agreement concluded between the two Governments on 22 August 1941, a recruiting campaign, in which German agents participated, was launched in September 1941.² The campaign is reported to have had some success among the miners of the Rio Tinto and the building workers of Madrid, but in the industrial region of Catalonia the number of registrants was negligible in spite of the very heavy unemployment prevailing there. The first contingent of recruits left Spain late in November 1941. In August 1942 the official German news agency reported that 9,000 Spanish workers were employed in the Reich.

SUMMARY

The table printed below gives the numbers of foreign workers, both war prisoners and civilians, employed in Germany at various dates. It shows how the influx of foreign labour into the Reich has steadily increased, in spite of seasonal fluctuations in agriculture.

There have been constant changes in the occupational distribution of the foreign labour employed in Germany. At the beginning it was used mainly for agriculture. It was next claimed for building and construction work, and later a constantly growing proportion was employed in factories. Now the utilisation of foreign labour for skilled work is the main problem of Germany's war economy.

The geographical origin of foreign workers has also varied continuously during the course of the war. The first contingent consisted of Poles. In October 1940, when there were already a great many prisoners of war from the west, workers from the east still constituted the majority. In September 1941 workers from the west approximately equalled those from the east and south-east. After the influx of the Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers, however, the proportion from the east again rose sharply. According to data for the autumn of 1942, the foreign workers and employed prisoners in Germany then included over 3,500,000 from the Slav countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe and about two million from western European countries. Since then continuous recruitment from west and east has kept the proportion nearly the same.

¹ *La Vanguardia Española* (Barcelona), 18 June 1941; *International Labour Review*, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, Nov. 1941, p. 580.

² *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 Jan. 1942, No. 2, Part V, p. 31.

FOREIGN LABOUR EMPLOYED IN GERMANY AT VARIOUS DATES
FROM THE END OF 1939 TO THE BEGINNING OF 1943
(in thousands)

Country	End 1939	October 1940	1 April 1941	25 Sept. 1941	Spring 1942	August 1942	Beginning 1943
POLAND: Civilian workers	80	340	873	1,007.6	1,000	1,100	1,300
War prisoners	200 ^a	540	80 ^b	80 ^b	80 ^b	77	56
DENMARK: Civilian workers		25	31	28.9	30 ^c	40	48
NORWAY: Civilian workers			1.4	<i>d</i>	2	2	2
NETHERLANDS: Civilian workers	?	80-90	90	93	170	210	300
BELGIUM: Civilian workers		70	87	121.5	215	220	300
War prisoners		—	80 ^c	80	77	77	77
FRANCE: Civilian workers			25 ^f	48.6 ^f	150 ^f	190 ^f	400 ^f
Employed war prisoners		500 ^g	1,250 ^h	1,250 ^h	1,200 ^h	1,200 ^h	1,150
YUGOSLAVIA: Civilian workers			48	108.8	200	200	250
War prisoners				180	165 ⁱ	149	133
GREECE: Civilian workers			0.5	<i>d</i>	8 ^c	34	34
U.S.S.R.: Civilian workers			10	<i>d</i>	?	1,200 ^k	1,500
Employed war prisoners					300	300	500
CZECHOSLOVAKIA BOHEMIA-MORAVIA (PROTECTORATE): Civilian workers	85	107	150	140.1	200	200	200 ^j
SLOVAKIA: Civilian workers	57	80	69	80	120	120 ^m	120 ^j
ITALY: Civilian workers	30	90	132	271.7	300	350	350 ^j
HUNGARY: Civilian workers			21	35	35 ^m	29	
BULGARIA: Civilian workers			8	14.6	15	15 ^m	15 ^j
RUMANIA: Civilian workers			4			4	4 ^j
SPAIN: Civilian workers			1.1		10 ^c	9	9 ^j
SWITZERLAND: Civilian workers			17		20 ^c	18	18 ^j
SWEDEN: Civilian workers			1.2	189.9		1	1 ^j
FINLAND: Civilian workers			0.2		2 ^c	1	1 ^j
PORTUGAL: Civilian workers			0.1				
TOTAL: Civilian workers	500	1,100 ⁿ	1,500	2,140	2,500 ^o	3,500	4,800
Employed war prisoners	200	1,100 ^p	1,300	1,500 ^q	1,600	1,600	1,750
APPROXIMATE TOTAL FOREIGN LABOUR EMPLOYED IN GERMANY	700	2,200	2,800	3,700	4,000	5,000 ^r	6,500

The figures for civilian workers in Oct. 1940 are taken from *Europe under Hitler* (ed. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1941), p. 22, they are based mostly on German press reports. The numbers of civilian workers on 1 Apr. and 25 Sept. 1941 are taken from *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 15 July, No. 20, Part V, p. 339, and 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. The following notes give sources and some explanations for other figures, insofar as the sources are not already given in the text.

^a *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 7.
^b Estimate based on information about the release of Polish prisoners of war in the course of 1940, and on the figure given for 1942.

^c According to a press report from London, *New York Times*, 3 May 1942.

^d Included in the total of 189,000 given under the denomination of "others".

^e Estimate based on the figure for Sept. 1941.

^f Alsace-Lorrainers not included. At the end of June 1943 the figure had risen to 800,000.

^g Estimate based on the difference between the total of prisoners of war employed and the number of Polish prisoners employed.

^h Estimate based on reports of the total of French war prisoners, of the total of all employed war prisoners in Germany, and of the number of French war prisoners released in 1941 and 1942.

ⁱ Estimate based on the figures for Sept. 1941 and Aug. 1942.

^j *Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung*, 4 Sept. 1942.

^k Figure for August 1942.

^l Figure for spring 1942.

^m Statement made by Dr. Syrup (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 Oct. 1940).

ⁿ The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 4 Aug. 1942, states that in the spring of 1942 the number of foreign civilians reached 2,500,000, the total of foreign labour being about four million. *Der Angriff*, 28 Apr. 1942, mentions nearly 2,500,000 foreign workers.

^o This figure is given for the end of 1940 by Reichminister Seidte in *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 1.

^p Estimate. The Bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce of Berlin, quoted by *Il Sole*, 9 Jan. 1942, gives the figure of 1,600,000 "war prisoners occupied as workers" in Germany. This number probably includes some Russian war prisoners.

^q *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 4 Aug. 1942; total of foreign labour.

The information available concerning the geographical distribution of foreign labour in Germany is meagre. All that is known about the workers employed outside agriculture is that they are concentrated mainly in the ports on the North Sea and the Baltic, in the industrial and mining areas of the Ruhr, Upper Silesia and Westphalia, and in central Germany and Austria.

The problem of prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers is mainly a manpower problem, but by putting them to work Germany has set in motion a great migratory movement towards the Reich. Nevertheless, the demographic changes produced by the employment of prisoners of war and other foreign workers do not exactly coincide in extent with the use of foreign labour. There are some prisoners of war who are not used as workers partly because, as officers, they are exempted from compulsory labour duty, and partly because they are not fit for work or because appropriate work has not yet been organised for them. Thus the total number of prisoners of war held in Germany is somewhat higher than the number employed in the German economy.¹ On the other hand, not all the prisoners captured by the Germans were sent to Germany, and there is likewise a great difference between the number of foreign civilians employed by the Germans and the number employed in Germany. The working population of the occupied countries is in the first place employed, voluntarily or under compulsion, in those countries themselves. Millions are engaged in repairing and constructing roads, railways and waterways to connect Germany with its armies throughout the entire continent from the Atlantic Coast to the Russian steppes; in producing grain and meat on the confiscated Polish estates to feed the German troops; in operating German-managed mines and factories to provide the German army with armaments; and in building German fortifications and naval bases. Those of them who are civilians are mostly employed within their own districts, but many hundreds of thousands of others have been sent away from their homes. Thus, throughout German-occupied Europe, a tremendous internal migration, partly voluntary and partly enforced, has been set in motion by German rule.

As has been seen, foreign workers have also been transferred from one part of Europe to another. Information about the German-occupied territories is very scanty but it has been estimated that 100,000 Czechs, 50,000 Belgians, and 50,000 Yugoslavs are employed there. Labour appears to have been transferred mainly for

¹ The official figures for the spring of 1941 are 1,300,000 prisoners at work and 135,000 not at work in Stalags (soldiers' camps). The number of prisoners in Oflag (officers' camps) is not given. Cf. *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258.

two purposes. The first is to work on naval bases and fortifications along the Atlantic and Channel coasts. In March 1942, Czech building labourers and Netherlanders are reported to have been employed in the coastal districts of France and Belgium and Belgian workers on the Channel Islands.¹ Danes (10,000), Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Netherlanders (36,500), Belgians, and in particular Russian prisoners of war (32,000), are working in Norway. Secondly, labour has been requisitioned to supply the needs of Germany's armies in Russia and to reconstruct the Eastern Territories under German occupation. The number of Polish workers thus employed was particularly large.² The Netherlands, Danish and Belgian farmers who have left for eastern Europe are generally classified as colonists. Sometimes however they are referred to as "agricultural overseers" or managers, and there are also reports of the removal of artisans and industrial workers to Poland³ and the occupied parts of Russia.⁴

But the main and ever-growing stream of foreign workers flows into the Reich, providing the economic and technical basis of the German armies. Today a host of foreigners unprecedented in number and unparalleled in character is living and working in Germany; like a gigantic pump, the new German Reich is sucking in all the resources of Europe and masses of Europe's working population. The total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and the foreign civilian workers officially recognised as foreigners, but excluding those workers from Alsace-Lorraine and the Sudetenland who do not appear in the statistics of foreign workers, exceeds six and a half million. More than one worker out of every four employed in Germany is a foreigner. All these workers have been recruited to operate the vast war machine which has been built up from the resources of the whole of Europe to support the German armies.

¹ O.N.A. despatch, 13 Oct. 1942.

² E.g., 170,000 Polish workers from Silesia and Poznan employed as labour troops for the German army (*New York Times*, 16 June 1942); 12,000 Polish workers engaged in road building in the Ukraine, being the first group of 50,000 requested by Governor Koch (*Nowy Swiat*, 15 Aug. 1942, reporting a despatch from Ankara).

³ E.g., Netherlands artisans and workers transferred to Poznan. Cf. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 10 Nov. 1941; *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, 11 July 1942.

⁴ E.g., more than 2,000 Belgian workers employed in the Ukraine (*Vooruit*, Ghent, 27 Jan. 1942); 800 Netherlands artisans in Kharkov (*New York Times*, 25 Apr. 1942). A German broadcast has also referred to Italian workers employed in occupied Russia.

CONCLUSION

Taking into account all the information assembled in the foregoing chapters, it may be estimated that more than thirty million of the inhabitants of the continent of Europe have been transplanted or torn from their homes since the beginning of the war.

This total may possibly include some persons who have been counted twice over, in spite of every effort made to avoid double counting. On the other hand, however, the figure of 30,000,000 is far from including all the people in Europe who are living away from their pre-war homes to-day. In particular, it takes no account of the millions of men in the armed forces of the Axis countries who are stationed abroad or who have been taken prisoner and scattered over the five continents. The transfers of workers within the frontiers of individual countries, sometimes to great distances from their homes, have also been very imperfectly covered. Both in Germany itself and in the other Axis countries, labour conscription has snatched hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of workers away from their families. In each of the occupied territories, enormous transfers have likewise taken place about which no figures are available. In Norway, in Poland, in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R., in the countries of south-eastern Europe, as in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the Todt Organisation and the army services are employing vast levies of the country's own workers on the construction of defence or military works, herded together in labour camps which are often far from their homes.

Furthermore, the above total does not include the additional millions of German and Italian refugees who since 1943 have fled or been evacuated from heavily bombed cities in increasing numbers. Even the transfers from one country to another have doubtless been on a larger scale than is assumed in this estimate. Germany has not only transferred workers from all over Europe to the Reich, but has redistributed labour on a growing scale between the various occupied territories, and the extent of this redistribution probably largely exceeds the figure of some 500,000 quoted in this study on the basis of fragmentary data.

If all these movements could be properly taken into account, the result would certainly be a grand total of over forty million.

This total has piled up progressively. Each phase of the war has contributed its separate quota. From September 1939 to May 1940, the population movements began with the flight of Polish war refugees to the Baltic countries, Rumania and Hungary, and thence to the countries of western Europe, followed immediately by the movements in opposite directions to which the division of Poland into a German and a Soviet sphere of influence gave rise; deportation and expulsion from the Incorporated Provinces to the General Government; the transfer of hundreds of thousands of war prisoners and workers to Germany; the transfer to eastern Russia of further hundreds of thousands of the population of the provinces occupied by the U.S.S.R.; and finally, the entry into the Incorporated Provinces of the Germans "repatriated" from the Baltic countries and the Eastern Provinces. At the same time, the policy of germanisation initiated before the war was being continued in Czechoslovakia, while in the north of Europe the war between the U.S.S.R. and Finland led to the transfer of 420,000 Finns from the regions annexed by the U.S.S.R. to other parts of the country and the flight of many war refugees to the Scandinavian countries. In all, nearly 3,800,000 persons were uprooted from their homes within eight months.

In May 1940, there arose the next great wave of refugees, sweeping a few people as far abroad as America and Africa and leaving in unoccupied France, as it receded, several tens of thousands of Belgians, Netherlands, and former German and Austrian refugees, and over half a million French people from the occupied zone, including 70,000 Alsatians who were soon joined by other inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine driven from their homes by the annexation of their homeland to Germany, and by the Jews expelled from Baden and the Palatinate. At this time there began also the progressive transfer to Germany of French and Belgian prisoners of war and of the first groups of civilian workers recruited in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. At the other end of Europe, new population movements were set in motion by the incorporation of the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina into the U.S.S.R., by the frontier changes between Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, by the further repatriation treaties made between these countries and Germany, and by the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia and the subsequent dismemberment of their territory. When this second stage of the war was terminated on 22 June 1941 by the opening of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., nearly four million persons had been added to those

who had already lost or been transplanted from their homes during the first stage.

From that time onwards, the population movements in Europe exceeded all previous bounds. From the Eastern Provinces of Poland, from the Baltic countries, Bessarabia, and the territories of the U.S.S.R. invaded by the German armies, a surging tide of refugees flowed eastward, and the movement became still vaster when it was organised into a systematic evacuation. Ten million people were removed from the territories occupied by Germany in 1941 and another two million were evacuated when the German armies made their fresh advance in the summer of 1942. Behind the German lines, the extension of the area under German domination enabled the Reich to extend and reshape its population policy. Deportation and expulsion were intensified; in all the territories annexed from the conquered countries, the Reich and its satellites pursued their policy of racialism and demographic nationalisation. From all the countries within its sphere of influence, Germany recruited an ever-growing army of workers who were used, together with the prisoners of war, to replace the new quotas of men who had to be drafted into the army. Lastly, the threat of continental invasion and air raids led to the evacuation of whole cities and regions, sometimes to far distant places. In Europe as a whole, nearly twenty-three million people were transplanted, deported or dispersed from the middle of 1941 up to the beginning of 1943.

It is impossible to anticipate how much further these population movements will go during the coming months. Until 1942, their development was governed by two factors—the advance of the Axis armies and the labour requirements of the German economy. The first factor led to the flight or evacuation of millions of people from the areas menaced by invasion; it also opened up to the Reich fresh lands for the application of its demographic policy and the recruitment of its labour. To-day the German march forward is checked and even reversed. Not only is Germany unable to extend the scope of its activities any further, but outside the ring formed by the German armies evacuation has come to a stop and the former inhabitants will gradually return to their homes. Within this ring, on the other hand, population movements may be expected to become more violent than ever. Recent information shows that the Reich is determined to pursue its demographic policy towards peoples whom Nazi theory condemns as inferior. Moreover, the necessity of maintaining military strength at the maximum will create new labour requirements, and since fresh labour reserves will no longer be available, every effort will be made, in spite of resistance and difficulties, to exploit the remaining

resources in the countries still under German occupation or alliance more ruthlessly than ever. The fear of invasion, or actual invasion itself, will still further intensify the forced migration of populations from the outer fringes of the continent to the interior, while continuous bombing will hasten their removal and flight from the cities and industrial areas to less endangered regions.

While the value of any general tabular assessment of the displacements of population which have taken place so far must of necessity be provisional at this stage, a useful purpose may yet be served, at the close of this study, by the table given below. The data analysed in the various chapters of this study concerning the number of inhabitants who have left the territory since the beginning of hostilities and the number of those brought into it have been assembled for each country in its pre-war form, and for each part of the country in cases where there have been territorial changes during the war.

Analysis of the post-war problems raised by the present dispersal of the peoples of Europe is beyond the scope of this study, but the table below clearly indicates the magnitude of the task involved in straightening out the population tangle caused by war and occupation.

As the invaded lands are progressively set free, many evacuees and refugees will no doubt be able to return and begin to rebuild their homes even before the war is over. The retreat of the Axis armies will automatically be accompanied by the withdrawal to Germany of the officials, salaried employees and workers sent to direct the administration and economic activities of the occupied countries, of the settlers of German origin or nationality who have taken over property in those countries during the war, and of the Germans evacuated from bombed areas. At the same time, the Axis armies will leave in their wake uprooted masses of people of all nationalities. In the Reich itself, millions of prisoners of war and workers imported from all the countries of Europe will be deprived of their employment from one day to the next with the stoppage of the German war machine and the return of German civilians and servicemen.

The permanent resettlement of all these uprooted people will be one of the most urgent tasks of post-war reconstruction. It is an undertaking which will require the greatest possible amount of international organisation and collaboration.

In most cases, repatriation will be the obvious solution. The vast majority of the people concerned will ask nothing better. Their help will be needed to rebuild their countries; and the services of the skilled workers will be indispensable in setting industry to

work again. Repatriation on so vast a scale will meet with tremendous difficulties, however. Transport systems, severely strained by the war, may be completely disorganised during the retreat of the Axis armies. The closest co-ordination, on an over-all basis, of means of communication will be essential to ensure that the best use is made of them, and that necessary priorities are observed in meeting the needs of the armies of occupation, feeding civilians, re-establishing economic life, and repatriating the scattered populations.

Assistance to those being repatriated should not be restricted to organising transport for them. Before they can be sent on their way, they must be fed, clothed, and given medical aid. If transport facilities are not available for some time, work must be found for them locally, wherever possible. A special effort should be made to reunite, at the earliest possible moment, families separated by flight, expulsion or deportation. Unless there is an organisation to provide these people with means of subsistence, and to give them confidence that they have not been forgotten, the highways of Europe will be blocked by long processions of destitute exiles, enduring every kind of privation in an effort to return unaided to their homes.

Even when these people have returned to their countries, help will still be needed. Many will find nothing but charred walls, bomb craters and shell holes on the site of their former homes. Others will find their fields laid waste and their cattle scattered. Still others will find the factories where they formerly worked destroyed, stripped of their equipment, or converted to serve the needs of German war industry. Here their problem merges into the general problem of the rehabilitation of the liberated countries, which comprises not only the reconstruction of the devastated areas, the re-equipment of industry, and restocking with cattle, seed, fertilisers and raw materials, but the reorientation of economic life as a whole. Freed from the bonds which tied it to the German war economy, each national economy will once again have to find its place in the world economic order. This problem does not affect the repatriated exiles alone. It affects the provision of work for the whole population of the liberated countries. In the last analysis, its solution will depend on the extent of the international co-operation offered to the countries set free. All the same, the returned exiles will meet with special difficulties. Their ties with their country will have been broken for years in many cases; many will have become strangers to their usual occupations; and many others will have had their property confiscated. Special measures will therefore be needed to help them back into economic life.

In spite of all endeavours, it can hardly be expected that economic life will be resumed at the same pace in every country. Some countries will probably be unable for some time to provide employment for all those of their inhabitants who were away during the war. On the other hand, other countries will lack sufficient labour for their reconstruction. Return to their own countries will therefore not be the only choice open to those removed from their homes by the war. After the last world war, France gave employment to a large number of foreign workers. After the present war, the countries which have taken in refugees on a temporary basis may find need for their services and may offer them an opportunity of settlement. Other countries may be glad to use the services of workers awaiting repatriation in order to acquire additional labour for their reconstruction programmes. In other words, labour requirements in post-war Europe will not necessarily correspond to the pre-war distribution of the European population. Redistribution of labour may be necessary if full employment is to exist. Thus, instead of seeking to solve the whole problem of the scattered populations by repatriation, it may be wiser to encourage and assist the persons concerned to remain where they now are or to transfer to other regions where the prospects of employment and settlement are better than in their country of origin. This kind of geographical redistribution of labour, like repatriation, would call for action on an international scale. It would call for nothing less than the organisation of an international employment service.

The resettlement of individuals in their country of origin, permanent settlement in their present location, or transfer to other liberated countries of Europe will go a long way towards solving the problem of wartime dispersions of population; but they can not wholly solve it. The problem is not merely continental. It must be considered in a world-wide context.

The dispersal of the European populations as a result of the war has already affected other continents. Many of the refugees admitted as permanent immigrants to the United States and to other American countries have settled there and have no intention of returning. Many others, however, have merely been granted a temporary refuge; and all of these will not want to return to their own countries. Clearly the problem of resettling the dispersed populations of Europe will be simplified if this group of refugees is allowed to settle overseas. It may be hoped that overseas countries who have taken them in temporarily will give equally generous consideration to their requests for permanent settlement, and that at least they will not expel but rather help to resettle elsewhere those whom they are not prepared to admit as permanent immigrants.

The problem of extra-European settlement will arise for others as well as for those already outside Europe. Among the people who have been scattered over the continent of Europe during the war, many will look towards emigration away from Europe as a means of building up a new life.

First of all, there will be the refugees. It may be hoped that after this war the problem of refugees as such may disappear. In the coming international order there should be no place for the enforced migration, political and racial discrimination, expropriation, expulsion and mass denationalisation which have been among the most tragic features of the international anarchy caused by the racial and nationalistic theories of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, it would be Utopian to hope that after the upheavals of war the whole of Europe will return to a peaceful way of life from one day to the next and that obstacles to the repatriation of refugees will disappear as by the wave of a magic wand. In most cases, it is true, the collapse of the totalitarian régimes will reopen to the refugees the frontiers of their former country; they will therefore cease to be refugees in the proper sense of the term. In some countries, however, the political situation may be stormy for some time, and many refugees may hesitate to risk returning even if the legal obstacles to their re-entry are removed. There will also undoubtedly be many refugees who will be unwilling to return to an environment in which they had suffered racial and religious persecution. Only the resumption of inter-continental migration will enable most of these refugees or ex-refugees to find permanent homes after the war.

Refugees will not be the only candidates for overseas settlement, although they are the group most often mentioned in connection with a resumption of migration. Many other people who have been uprooted from their old homes will, if they have the opportunity, prefer to try their luck in an overseas country rather than face the difficulties of readjustment in their country of origin. Instead of rebuilding their old homes, they will want to make new ones. After the vicissitudes of war and deportation, they will look upon emigration as a means of embarking on a new life and protecting their children from the insecurity and suffering which they themselves have endured and which they still fear may return once again. This will also be the feeling of many who have been forced to suffer the horrors of war and persecution in their native homes.

Moreover, while the effect of the war on population pressure in Europe cannot now be forecast, it is possible that, in some regions at least, the destruction of economic equipment and of the means of production will have been so extensive that, despite the probable shrinkage of the population, the need for emigration

during the early years may be even greater than before the war. The possible influence of political factors must also be taken into account—changes in systems of government carried out with violence, for example, or the redrawing of frontiers, which, even if no force is used, may lead to a movement of population.

The political, economic and moral reconstruction of Europe depends partly on whether these centrifugal forces can find an outlet. The suspension of migration movements was a serious handicap to pre-war Europe. Unless these movements are resumed in an ordered manner, it will not be possible to solve the problem of war and pre-war refugees, and this problem may be further aggravated by a fresh wave of enforced migration.

The refugee problem is thus an integral part of the general problem of migration. In the last analysis, it can be solved only within this context. The migration problem will therefore have to be tackled as a whole after the war, with a view to re-establishing continuous and normal migration movements embracing all classes of migrants without distinction, whether their motives for seeking new homes are economic, social, religious or political.

The general question of the resumption of migration after the war is outside the scope of this study. Like the problem of resettling dispersed populations, however, its solution will depend on international co-operation. It has already been pointed out that the international co-operation which the liberated countries of Europe can count upon for assistance in reconstruction will largely condition their ability to reabsorb and re-employ their scattered populations. Failing this co-operation, the need for emigration after the war is likely to reach proportions which will make the problem insoluble. Moreover, international co-operation will also condition economic expansion and prosperity in the world as a whole and therefore determine the development of natural resources and of industrialisation which will create new employment opportunities in countries of immigration.

Whatever the coming need for emigration and immigration, however, the resumption of migration movements will certainly not be achieved by a mere return to the unregulated migration which prevailed before the war of 1914-1918. The attempts made before the present war to revive migration have shown that its revival will depend in future on the existence of an international organisation capable of co-ordinating the interests of the countries of emigration and immigration and of making available the capital necessary to enable the labour of the former countries to be used to develop the natural resources of the latter. The age of immense, free and accessible spaces, of the ultra-rapid growth of resources

of food and raw materials, and of open doors for international migration—this age, unique in the history of the world, is no more. No Government which is concerned with ensuring full employment and raising standards of living can neglect immigration and emigration. In the contracting world economy before the war, Government policy necessarily tended to be restrictive. If an expansionist economy is created after the war through international co-operation, the organisation canalising this collaboration will have to deal with movements of men as well as with movements of capital and goods.

In short, the resettlement of millions of people uprooted from their homes and countries during the war will call for immense effort in a variety of co-ordinated directions. However the problem is tackled—whether by repatriation, resettlement or emigration—its solution is beyond the powers of any single country. Millions of people have been victimised by a narrow nationalism which has had a total disregard for human beings. They can be helped only by international co-operation and organisation.

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